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Foreword
The MONIT project was endorsed by the TIP working party in December 2002.
Building on the results of the TIP NIS project, its main objective is to generate
knowledge on how to improve innovation policy governance and create a more
coherent and comprehensive innovation policy. The focus is on how to achieve
a more horizontal innovation policy through co-ordination with non-core po-
licy areas, vertical integration and coherence, and new forms of governance and
policy making processes. More specifically it studies the foundations for inno-
vation policy governance by highlighting issues such as political leadership,
building effective co-ordination mechanisms, socio-political foundations for
information exchange and policy learning, cultural factors in policy systems
and related sources for coherent policy making.
The MONIT network consists of 13 countries, all devoted to generate know-
ledge to be shared by the others. The MONIT project is organized in 3 work pac-
kages (WP):
• WP1 consists of a broad analysis and assessment of the national policy pro-
files and challenges, as well as of key governance issues;
• WP2 includes policy case studies in the areas of information society, sus-
tainable development and transport, and regional policy;
• WP3 will synthesize the results from WP1 and WP2 and draw the policy
implications.
STEP is in MONIT studying the Norwegian innovation policy system through
several inter-linked studies. A main focus is to better understand the underlying
logic of the Norwegian system, its roots in terms of cultural traditions and the
main priorities coming out of it. Both mapping studies and more detailed stu-
dies of parts of the innovation policy system are therefore covered in the project.
Norway is the lead country in this network, while Austria, Finland and
Netherlands are co-leads. The Norwegian part of the project is commissioned by
the Research Council of Norway (RCN), and funded by this council and the mi-
nistries of Science and Education, Trade and Industry and Regional Affairs. The
project also consists of a learning arena organized by the users through which re-
sults and perspectives generated by MONIT is disseminated and discussed.
Oslo, juni 2004
Per Kock Svend Otto Remøe
Assistent Director Project Leader
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Executive summary
This report contains an analysis of the foundations for a horizontal, coherent
innovation policy in Norway spanning the range of governmental boundaries.
It is part of a wider OECD study to investigate lessons and models for the rene-
wal of institutions and practices of policy making in OECD countries as the in-
novation driven economy makes a more effective policy co-ordination neces-
sary.
The main results in this study of Norwegian governance are highlighted as
following:
a) The Norwegian governance system has in general changed since the years af-
ter the WWII from a more interventionist and strategic role played by the
government to a model based on New Public Management. This develop-
ment has led to increasing state fragmentation and segmentation, less stra-
tegic policy making and more attention to a balanced but restricted use of
state budget surpluses.
b) Although innovation policy has been on the agenda for some time, it has
still a weak position in the overall policy system. In particular, there is a
weak link between economic policy and innovation policy, leading to a
weak strategic framework for innovation policy. This is most evident in the
current attempt by the government to launch a coherent innovation policy
plan (HIP).
c) The Norwegian governance structure is ill fitted for the challenges posed by
the need to generate more coherence. The ministries are by tradition
strongly autonomous, and the co-ordination mechanisms in place, like
RFU, GFU and more recently RUI, are typically static, focussing on short
term co-ordination and steering needs. Long term mechanisms have weak
foundations in the Norwegian system.
d) This is evident in the state budgetary system, where short-termism prevails,
and where even the half-yearly state budget revision gains a policy making
role on its own.
e) The long term needs of the Norwegian economy has recently been well add-
ressed, pointing to future value creation needs exceeding what the current
economic structure is likely to achieve. However, related to c), the gover-
nance system has so far been less able to create a momentum and imple-
mentation strategies for the changes in priorities that need to take place. An
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exception is the increasing budgetary allocations for R&D, albeit through
new institutional mechanisms outside the state budget.
f) The inherent principle of sector responsibility in the Norwegian system has
many advantages, one of which is an obligation for each ministry to develop
R&D strategies for their own sectors of responsibility. However, this system
needs to be amended in order to be better able to take up more strategic
policy making on the one hand, and give more leeway to RCN on the other
hand.
g) Among the proposals presented, two are highlighted: First, a better integra-
tion between policy areas through goal alignment and monitoiring of imple-
mentation is warranted. Second, a strengthening of the prime minister’s
office (PMO) is suggested to generate more horizontal, strategic policy
making on areas that require full governmental attention, like innovation
policy.
Rapport 6-2004m.fm  Page 10  Wednesday, November 10, 2004  9:29 AM
1 Introduction    11
1 Introduction
1.1 Background: The MONIT project
OECDs project on National Innovation Systems (NIS) started originally in
1995. Being managed by the working party of Technology and Innovation Po-
licy (TIP) it set out to explore the requirements for redirecting innovation poli-
cy in OECD countries, taking into account the new insights in the innovation
process that came out of the innovation research at that time. While many ac-
cepted that the linear model of innovation did not capture the realities of the in-
novation process, it was acknowledged that public policy was still founded upon
the linear model and its implications for policy. Hence, the OECD NIS project
became an important collaborative mechanism for generating new data based
on the interactive model of innovation and for developing a set of recommen-
dations for public policy.
Formally, the OECD NIS project was concluded in 2001, and had over the
years produced many outputs that were fed into other OECD work and genera-
ted by itself several publications on industrial clusters, networks, human mobi-
lity as well as synthesis reports for renewals of innovation policy. However, in
the concluding work (OECD 2002), a critical question was raised that became
the starting point for the current MONIT project: If the developed economies
are changing into a more innovation oriented and dynamic mode, is it feasible
that national governments and their policy making modes can remain largely
the same? More precisely, given the needed changes in the policy content, how
could or should governments change their structures and processes to better ac-
commodate the dynamism in their environments?
To explore these issues, OECD and its working party for Technology and In-
novation Policy (TIP) endorsed in 2002 a new collaborative study called MO-
NIT (Monitoring and assessing national innovation policies). It was to be carri-
ed out as the activities of the preceding NIS project with voluntary research ac-
tivities conducted by the countries willing to participate in a modus operandi
referred to as focus groups. In all 13 countries decided to participate (see annex
1). The Nordic countries had been driving forces behind the MONIT project,
and Norway volunteered to take the role as the lead country with the overall re-
sponsibility to co-ordinate and steer the progress and direction of the project. It
was also decided to broaden the lead role to ensure a collaborative management
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of the project, and Finland, Austria and Netherlands became co-leading coun-
tries.
Innovation policy is not a new area, but the focus on the capabilities of the
policy systems delivering innovation policy implies a shift in focus. If coherent,
comprehensive innovation policy is needed, it needs to span horizontal bo-
undaries of government to ensure that all policy areas that have consequences
on a firm’s or industry’s innovative performance are co-ordinated and integra-
ted. To achieve a best possible empirical basis for drawing conclusions and im-
plications for innovation policy, it was decided to include studies of policy areas
that had similar characteristics as innovation policy in being broad, crossing
sectors and in need to exploiting co-ordination mechanisms. Hence, in addition
to the study of core innovation policy, a set of non-innovation policy areas was
selected: Regional policy, environmental policy (or policy for sustainable deve-
lopment), policy for the information society (in many countries as national ac-
tions plans), and transport policy. While information society became mandato-
ry for all participating countries, the others were voluntary. Norway conducted
the first three (all published by STEP, the contracted research institute, as inde-
pendent publications).
To ensure a best possible outcome, STEP engaged in collaboration with Pro-
gramme for Sustainable Development (Prosus) at the University of Oslo. Prosus
did most of the study on sustainable development, and given their well-founded
knowledge of this area, were able to provide broad and thorough perspective on
the interface between policies for sustainable development and innovation po-
licy.
This report is a national overview of the set of determinants and conse-
quences of the Norwegian innovation governance system. It has been produced
within a joint format of the participating MONIT countries to allow some level
of comparison. However, the main purpose of it is to reveal the strengths and
weaknesses of the system to help induce changes and adaptations that may lead
to better policy.
1.2 Interactions in policy systems
A critical point of departure is that seen from the vantage point of view from a
firm, policies and their incentives, disincentives and regulatory effects interact
to create a policy environment for that firm. This includes both core science,
technology and innovation policy areas like R&D, as well as other, often more
peripheral policy areas that have innovation consequences for firms. Govern-
Rapport 6-2004m.fm  Page 12  Wednesday, November 10, 2004  9:29 AM
1 Introduction    13
ments typically know too little about these interactions and, needless to say,
how to correct or accommodate policies to produce a coherent whole, if pos-
sible.
Seen from this perspective, it becomes a concern for governments to engage
in processes that produce such outcomes. But governments may not be able to
do so, or do it late and with little effectiveness. With the typical trait of govern-
ments, sector based division of labor between ministries, they will vary in terms
of how and to which extent they are able to overcome these divisions and create
what the MONIT project has termed horizontalization.
Horizontal interactions are combined with vertical ones: Vertical interac-
tions depict relationships between different layers of government bodies, like
between ministries and agencies, and between ministries and the regional level.
Typically, this is most important concerning implementation of policies, but
lead in total to very different governance structures across countries. Recent de-
velopments in governance underline this: New Public Management (NPM) has
been to various degrees adopted across the industrialized world, leading to
more decentralization. Still, horizontal innovation policies is a key concept as it
frames the focus on the need to co-ordinate and govern many policy domains
to achieve better innovation policy.
1.3 Coherence: A key feature of horizontal 
innovation policy
Horizontalization is not a goal in itself, but rather a characteristic of a policy sy-
stem. It could be defined as the degree to which (in this case) innovation policy
is guided by a comprehensive national strategy in which contributions from the
various sectors are linked to achieve policy coherence. The link between hori-
zontalization and the arrangements for co-ordination and governance is a cru-
cial one.
Hence, it is the national capabilities of national policy systems to generate co-
herent innovation policy that are at stake. Coherence is important for many rea-
sons: 1
1 From a discussion paper for the Centre of Government Network: Government Coherence: The Role of
the Centre, OECD, PUMA. 
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• Coherent policies are more likely to be effective and more readily applied in
a consistent and equitable way;
• Governments are increasingly faced with complex and difficult issues,
which may impact differently on different areas of society;
• They frequently have a range of objectives which cannot easily be reconciled
and may be in conflict;
• Faced with greater accountability and challenge, through parliaments, civil
society and the media, lack of coherence becomes readily apparent and
results in uncertainty loss of confidence.
The concept has basically three dimensions:
• Horizontal coherence ensuring that individual, or sectoral, policies, build on
each other and minimises inconsistencies in the case of (seemingly) conflic-
ting goals;
• Vertical coherence ensuring that public outputs are consistent with the ori-
ginal intentions of policy makers;
• Temporal coherence ensuring that today’s policies continue to be effective in
the future by limiting potential incoherence and providing guidance for change.
The MONIT study aims at generating lessons for national governments on how
to achieve coherence in innovation policy by highlighting issues like political
leadership, building effective co-ordination mechanisms, socio-political foun-
dations for information exchange and policy learning, cultural factors in policy
systems and related sources for coherent policy making. 2
1.4 An institutional approach
The MONIT project builds on an important assumption: The national and glo-
bal economies are changing to become more dynamic, innovation and know-
ledge driven, and complex. A next proposition is that governments need to re-
spond, but need to do so in manners different from before. There is a wide-
spread, but differentiated, need to assume the same characteristics as their
environments. Governments need to be able to develop new capabilities if they
shall be able to deliver coherent policies for this changing world. Which are
2 See appendix for a list of tools that may enhance policy coherence. This list, derived from the above
OECD paper, serves only as a point of departure. It is the aim of MONIT to expand and develop this into
instructive lessons for member countries.
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they? What are their determinants? And which are the inertia and counterforces
that will undermine a socio-institutional change?
The institutional approach taken here is that «social choices are shaped,
mediated and channelled by institutional arrangements» (Powell and DiMaggio
1991: 2). Behaviours and structures change slowly because they are institutiona-
lized. People in different institutions have different preferences, and individual
choice can therefore not be understood without reference to the cultural and
historical framework in which they are embedded (March and Olsen 1995). In-
stitutionalization is understood as «phenomenological process by which certain
social relationships and actions come to be taken for granted» and a state of af-
fairs in which shared cognitions define «what has meaning and what actions are
possible» (Zucker 1983: 2; 1987). Cognitive and cultural explanations are nee-
ded to gain a full understanding of institutions and how they behave. Institu-
tions are products of interpretations of their environments, and even assume
traits and characteristics that are blended in by these interpretations (Meyer and
Rowan 1977).3
Hence, the research reported here focuses deliberately on the dynamics and
inertia of formal and informal institutions, and on social and cultural processes
that make up the creation and reinterpretation of these institutions.
For analytical purposes, the study of these phenomena reflects the key stages
of a policy cycle, as depicted below:
a) Agenda setting
b) Prioritization
c) Policy implementation
d) Learning and evaluation
This is certainly a formalistic version, and may invite a similar understanding of
the policy making process as in the case of the linear model of innovation.
However, this not the case, as these processes are interlinked and should be un-
derstood as elements of an interactive model of policy making. The processes of
co-ordination, integration and communication in policy systems cut across the-
se stages or elements. In the present study, the stages above illustrate four key
capabilities in governance of innovation policy (or any other policy area), and
the aim of MONIT as of this report is to identify the systems strengths and fail-
ures influencing the policy making systems to provide effective governance.
3 See also Rannveig Røste: Studies of innovation in the public sector: a literature review. STEP – Center for
Innovation Research. Oslo, 2004.
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1.5 The focus of the report
The focus of the MONIT project is to thus to identify and help develop national
capabilities of appropriate innovation governance. Each country has its own
history or trajectory which implies that strict comparisons or benchmarking
across countries is not seen as useful. This report will focus on the capabilities
of the Norwegian system to govern, adapt and co-ordinate policies for innova-
tion.
It addresses the following issues.
• How is the trajectory or history of the innovation policy area and what has
been the outcome in terms of particular biases or priorities?
• How does the current innovation system look like and who are the key
actors?
• What are the challenges facing Norway and what is the likely position of STI
policies vis a vis these challenges?
• How processes like agenda setting, prioritisation and stakeholder involve-
ment conducted?
• How are policies co-ordinated?
• To which extent are there in place mechanisms for policy learning and capa-
bilities for strategic shifts in policy and innovation system trajectories?
Hence, we will aim at understanding how the system came into being, its key de-
terminants, how it works and to what extent it constitute the capabilities needed
to respond to the challenges it meets. We end with an assessment of strengths
and weaknesses that seem to emerge from the analysis, and highlight both some
particular recommendations for policy in the Norwegian context as well as
some lessons to be learned for other countries.
1.6 Methodological considerations
This work is part of a wider international collaboration, and a general metho-
dological framework has been developed with this in mind. The approach was
endorsed by the TIP group in December 2003, but has been amended since.
This report represents the work accomplished on the work package 1 in the
MONIT terminology, focussing on the core STI policy making system.4
In short, the methodological approach taken derives from the focus on pro-
cesses and dynamics of policy making and the idea to identify crucial national
capabilities for developing governance practices, policy coherence and horizon-
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tal policy. As the national practices are indeed national, the task at hand is to
identify them as inherent components of national traditions, structures and cul-
tures. Hence benchmarking is not the issue, rather, learning across countries on
governance practices.
There one common quantitative activity in the project, the comparative il-
lustration of performance on science, technology and innovation indicators as
presented in chapter 2. This was achieved by the Dutch team in MONIT, using
the data from a recent EU study5. Countries outside the EU were then asked to
supply their corresponding data to generate a complete set of all countries
(please see chapter 2 for further information).
In addition, we launched a small survey among policy makers and people be-
ing placed such that they would have opinions on the challenges ahead for Nor-
way in this context and what blank spots there may be in the policies addressing
these challenges. Results from this survey are included in chapter 4.
Most of the work has been done through using available documents, studies
and public information like state budget data. In addition, and due to the pro-
cessual focus in this study several interviews have been conducted with key
players in the policy system. Further, three mini case studies have been con-
ducted to generate more substantial insight into the processes concerning selec-
ted, but highly important policy developments: The development of the new go-
vernment plan for a coherent innovation policy (the so called HIP), the proces-
ses related to the recent implementation of a tax refund scheme (skatteFUNN),
and the reforms of the Norwegian Research Council).
4 The work package 2 consists of various policy studies of more peripheral but highly relevant areas like
the information society, environmental policy, regional policy,  and transport policy. The approach taken
in these studies are basically similar to the one taken in work package 1, and key findings are integrated
in this report.
5 “Benchmarking national research policies: The impact of RTD on competitiveness and employment
(IRCE)”, EU Commission 2002.
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2 Historical development of the 
science and innovation system 
and governance structure6
2.1 Introduction
In October 2003, the Norwegian government presented a plan for the intro-
duction of a «holistic» innovation policy, entitled From Idea to Value.7 At the
heart of this plan is the idea that innovation policy should be embedded in a ran-
ge of policy fields, and not only in the traditional fields of industrial and re-
search policy. In this respect, the new policy is in accordance with what the Eu-
ropean Commission has termed a «third generation» innovation policy. This
third generation policy differs from the first and second generations – building
on a linear and a systemic understanding of innovation respectively – in that it
emphasizes the importance of integrating and coordinating innovation policies
across several policy areas.8
This paper surveys the historical developments in Norwegian innovation
policies leading up to today’s plan for a «third generation» policy. Whereas the
term innovation policy was introduced in Norway as late as in the early 1980s,
innovation policy as a functional policy concern is far from new. It has been an
integral part of wider industrial policies, covering areas such as research policy,
educational policy, regional policy, etc.
For pragmatic purposes, the scope of the paper is limited to the postwar pe-
riod. The paper is organized as a chronological overview of central policy deve-
lopments. Based on what have been the overriding trends, the period in questi-
on is divided into to four phases: 1946 to the late 1970s; the 1980s; the 1990s; and
recent developments.9 In conclusion, the historical developments in Norwegian
6 This chapter is based on Hauknes, J. and Wicken, O., Innovation policy in the post-war period, STEP Re-
port 01-2003. Hauknes and Wicken's report has however been reworked, edited, and expanded with sub-
stantial new contributions.
7 From Idea to Value - the Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy (Fra idé til verdi- Regje-
ringens plan for en helhetlig innovasjonspolitikk), Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2003. See analysis in
chapter 5.
8 Lengrand, Louis et al, Innovation Tomorrow, Innovation Policy and the Regulatory Framwork: Making Inn-
ovation an Integral Part of the Broader Structural Agenda, DG Enterprise, October 2002
9 Needless to say, this periodization must not be interpreted too rigidly.
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innovation policies over the past fifty years will be viewed in light of the idea of
different generations of innovation policy.
2.2 1946 to the late 1970s: State supported 
development of large-scale industry
In the decades following the Second World War and up to the late 1970s, Nor-
wegian industrial policies were strongly influenced by the idea that there existed
a «productivity gap» or «technology gap» between the USA and Europe. Subse-
quently, «America» stood out as a model for industrial development, and the
dominant strategy was to promote the construction of big industry: Large orga-
nizational units directed towards large scale production.
The State played a central role in this strategy. In general, the first postwar
decades were characterized by a strong belief in the need for direct state inter-
vention to promote industry. This is clearly evident in the strong role the La-
bour governments in the 1950s and 1960s had in industrial development, also
with a substantial and actively used public ownership.
The Second World War was followed by great optimism regarding the roles
of science and technology as driving forces in economic development and
growth. Immediately after the war, a commission was established to assess the
organization of Norwegian technological research. In its report (published in
1946), this so-called Vogt Commission stressed that future industrial develop-
ment rested upon two forms of research activity: First and foremost, basic sci-
entific research; and secondly, technological research which could develop new
forms of technology based on the results of the former.
Since there were few Norwegian companies that were large and financially
strong enough to engage in technological research on a large scale, the State
took upon itself to establish a public technological research institute sector. The
immediate postwar years saw the rise of the Norwegian Defence Research Es-
tablishment (FFI, Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt), the Institute for Nuclear Ener-
gy (IFA, Institutt for Atomenergi) and the Central Insitute for Industrial Re-
search (SI, Sentralinstituttet for industriell forskning). The public institute sector
was closely linked to the research council for technological and scientific re-
search, NTNF (Norges Teknisk Naturvitenskapelige Forskningsråd) which had
been established in 1946.10
Whereas the Vogt Commission upheld scientific research as the main vehicle
in industrial development, a report published by NTNF in 1964 emphasized the
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crucial role of applied technological research. Also, the report seemed to express
a somewhat broader understanding of the role of research in processes of econ-
omic development and growth, in that it stated that research could only be a
driving force in industrial development through interaction with other growth
factors.11 Nevertheless, the belief in science as the prime mover in economic de-
velopment remained strong well into the 1970s.
As to regional policy in the first decades following the Second World War,
the main focus was upon facilitating regional distribution and preventing de-
population of rural areas. Policy efforts were directed towards the redistribution
of capital and employment opportunities from central areas experiencing
growth to regions that were characterized by dwindling primary industries.12
A perspective that should not be forgotten during these post-war decades, is
linked to the relationships between partners in the labour market and the state.
The political project in these years were first and foremost the development of
the welfare state. This demanded a financial base, i.e. a greater GDP. The Labour
Party provided a ligitimating context for labour and capital to enter into what
has been termed the «class compromise» in which workers agreed to high rates
of technology deployment, rationalization and productivity for the state to be
able to finance the welfare state. Key mechanisms were agreements on the firm
level, and the Norwegian industry had hence a relatively progressive and tech-
nology-friendly labour during these years.
2.3 The 1980s: Growth through new technology 
and market mechanisms
The industrial policies of the immediate postwar period were gradually dis-
mantled in the second half of the 1970s, and the 1980s saw several new policy
developments. Central trends in this decade were the introduction of the so-cal-
led strategic technology areas (hovedinnsatsområdene); reduced state interven-
tion; a technology-push orientation; a new focus on small and medium sized en-
terprises (SMEs), and a shift in regional policies from the previous orientation
10 Wicken, Olav, ”Forskning og industriutvikling”, in Sejersted, Francis (red.), Synspunkter på norsk fors-
kningspolitikk – tre innlegg i debatten, TMV Skriftserie No 16, 1996, pp. 54-56; Skoie, Hans,
Instituttsektoren – viktig sektor med problemer, NIFU skriftserie nr. 15/2003, pp. 44-45
11 Wicken, Olav, ”Forskning og industriutvikling”, in Sejersted, Francis (red.), Synspunkter på norsk fors-
kningspolitikk – tre innlegg i debatten, TMV Skriftserie No 16, 1996, p. 58
12 Isaksen, Arne, “Mot en regional innovasjonspolitikk”, in Isaksen, Arne (ed.), Innovasjoner, næringsutvik-
ling og regionalpolitikk, Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget, 1997, p. 211
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towards regional redistribution to an innovation policy focus upon the deter-
minants and drivers for regional and local economic development.
Also, as has been mentioned earlier, it was in this decade «innovation policy»
appeared as a term for policy concern in Norway. It was first used in the report
of the Thulin Commission which was published in 1981.13 The terms of refe-
rence this commission had been given was to consider the volume, organization
and efficiency of public support to industrial R&D in Norway. In its report, the
Thulin Commission emphasized and reinforced the view expressed in the 1964
NTNF report, that research could only contribute to industrial development
through interaction with other factors. Underlying this view, was the conviction
that it was innovation – and not science in itself – that was the central driving
force in processes of economic development and growth.14
Industrial policies in the 1980s were, as they had been in the previous deca-
des, characterised by attempts to reconstruct industrial structures. However,
while the emphasis until the late 1970s had been on establishing a corporate
structure based on large and financially strong companies, the 1980s saw a shift
towards attempts to develop new industrial sectors based on new, generic and
enabling technologies. The development of this specific structure was regarded
as necessary to achieve long term economic growth and to be able to compete
in an international market. Technology policy priorities as these were widely
shared among industrialised countries and were generally focussed on ICTs,
material technology and biotechnology.
The new strategy of the 1980s was based on the idea that future industrial ex-
pansion was dependent on success within a few core high-tech technologies.15
Growth could not be achieved by improving old products and industries, but
only by developing new products or completely new industries, i.e. by an in-
dustry wide process of structural replacement of old industries with new ones.
In Norway, the main instrument to develop new, viable high-tech industries
was the policy of strategic technology areas. There was broad national consen-
sus behind the idea to increase funding for a few selected technologies – IT, oil
and gas, new materials, biotechnology, and fish farming – and to improve the
co-ordination between public and private actors – such as companies, univer-
sities, R&D institutes, public agencies, etc.- within each technology area.
13 NOU 1981:30A Research, technological development and industrial innovation (Forskning, teknisk utvik-
ling og industriell innovasjon)
14 Wicken, Olav, ”Forskning og industriutvikling”, in Sejersted, Francis (red.), Synspunkter på norsk fors-
kningspolitikk – tre innlegg i debatten, TMV Skriftserie No 16, 1996, p. 62
15 In Norway, this policy was developed over the period 1982-85 and was introduced fully in 1986 in the
State Budget for the financial year 1987.
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It was generally accepted that the development of new industries was the out-
come of scientific and technological processes. The new industries were defined
as «science based industries», and R&D became the core element in this indus-
trial strategy. It became a central policy concern to expand the R&D sector
(public and private), and to improve the industry-research relationship so that
more science-based industries could be established.
One policy measure that strongly contributed to increasing the size of the
Norwegian research sector, especially the institute sector, was the so-called
«Goodwill agreements». They were among a series of measures introduced in
1978 that were to ensure long term supply of inputs to oil and gas exploration
and exploitation. Through the «Goodwill agreements», international oil com-
panies improved their position in the competition for getting concessions to ex-
plore and produce oil and gas from petroleum fields in the North Sea by procu-
ring R&D and technological services from Norwegian suppliers.16
The strategic technology areas policy was successful in the sense that public
funding for the selected areas increased, but there is less evidence that the sy-
stem succeeded in improving co-ordination. Each technology area had different
histories and institutional settings, and there were different policy measures
used for each area.
In spite of a rapid increase in R&D activities in the course of the 1980s – part-
ly as a consequence of the introduction of the targeted technology areas, partly
as a reflection of the rapid increase up to 1986–87 of research activities related
to the expansion of offshore petroleum exploitation – the general policy appre-
hension at the end of the decade was that there was a serious underinvestment
in Norwegian R&D. Several policy priorities were introduced to counter the
perceived gap in R&D performance and bring Norwegian R&D performance up
to OECD levels in terms of the GERD/GDP-indicator.17 In a research policy
White paper published in 1989, the second Brundtland government (in govern-
ment during 1986–1989) set the goal of increasing public funding of R&D ac-
tivities by 5 per cent per year in real terms.18
16 For an elaboration on the “Goodwill agreements” see e.g. Nås, S.O. and Wiig, H., Goodwill – good busi-
ness? Analyse av goodwillavtalenes betydning for næringslivets FoU, STEP Report 02-1993; and Wiig, H.
and Nås, S.O., Teknologiavtalene som insentiv i norsk forskningspolitikk, Notat 14/92, the Future-Oriented
Technology Policy programme, the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 1992
17 No one at the time seemed to notice that in terms of the alternative intensity indicator - GERD/capita or
GERD/employment - Norwegian R&D performance was at least comparable with the level of all major
trade partners.
18 White Paper No 28 (1988-1989) On research (Om forskning)
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Another trend in the 1980s, discernable already in the late 1970s, was the ide-
ological shift away from using direct state intervention to promote industry to-
wards using market mechanisms. The generally strong belief of the 1950s and
60s in active state involvement in industrial development, broke down along
with the breakdown of the counter-cyclical policies of 1976–78. The Lied Com-
mission of 1979 was a signal of the need for a new market oriented approach,19
a transition that was brought to fruition with the second Brundtland Govern-
ment.
In line with this development, the 1980s saw the emergence of the policy
stance of «pushing the institute sector towards the market» – to increase its re-
ceptivity to the needs and expectations of the industrial sectors. The back-
ground was the increasing critisism directed towards the research institutes,
which were accused of neglecting their industrial role. Up to the early 1980s the
R&D organisations in the national institute sector – whether they were formally
autonomous or public organisations – had generally been seen in functional
terms as performing a public task: Producing and supplying the public good of
technological knowledge. In 1982 a «deregulative» priority was set for the insti-
tute sector, and the formerly public institutes were devolved from the public
sector. The relation to NTNF and other R&D funding agencies were implicitly
seen in terms of these agencies buying a service – the performance of specific re-
search activities – on behalf of society, while the commercial viability and com-
petitivity of the institutes were their own responsibility.
A striking aspect of the innovation policies of the 1980s is that the former fo-
cus on the science base shifted to a view of the criticality of the technology base.
We have seen that applied technological research was given a more independent
position vis-à-vis basic research already in the NTNF report published in 1964.
In the 1980s science and technology were conceptualized as essentially different
phenomena (although there were still believed to be links between the two),
something which implied an autonomous technology. This made the technol-
ogy push characteristic of the policies quite dominant. The considerable focus
of generic technologies did not necessarily imply a dominant technology push
view, but in the specification of this focus that came with the strategic technol-
ogy areas and the related plans, this became evident.
While the first postwar decades had seen a strong orientation towards large
enterprises, in the late 1970s and the 1980s increased emphasis was put on
SMEs. This shift is reflected in the SME White Paper which was published in
19 NOU 1979:35, Structural problems and possibilities for growth in Norwegian industry (Strukturproblemer
og vekstmuligheter i norsk industri)
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1978.20 The emergence of the innovation policy concept in Norwegian politics
at the beginning of the 1980s can be seen against this background. The conco-
mitance of the SME White Paper and the Thulin Commission is probably not
coincidental – innovation policy emerged as a policy concern in this period as a
consequence of the increased SME focus.
The 1980s also saw a new orientation in regional policies. From the middle
of the decade, there was an increased focus upon local innovation and value cre-
ation as the central means for obtaining settlement and growth in the regions.
Thus, the traditional regional distribution policy gave way for a regional inno-
vation policy. This shift is evident in the White Paper on regional policies pub-
lished in 1989.21
2.4 The 1990s: Searching for a new model
Towards the end of the 1980s, an increasing dissatisfaction with the outcomes
of both the strategic technology area strategy and the technology push orienta-
tion became evident, and the policies of that decade were consequently reas-
sessed. Although not representing a radical break with previous policies, the
White Paper on industrial policy published in 1989 was felt to signal a new ap-
proach.22 However, the 1990s saw no coherent new strategy for industrial pol-
icies, and the decade was in general characterized by a lack of an overriding vi-
sion in this policy area.
Central features of the policies of the 1990s were a departure from the «best
industrial structure» strategy (at least in theory), and an orientation towards a
broad innovation policy in which a «diffusion of technology» strategy played a
central role. The technology push orientation of the previous decade gave way
for arguments stressing the importance of client capabilities and network inter-
actions. The decade was furthermore characterized by institutional restructu-
ring; and a continuing emphasis on both SMEs and regional innovation pol-
icies.
The broader socio-economic background for a new industrial policy of the
1990s was a series of problems occurring in the period 1986 to 1993 which by
politicians was perceived to constitute a «crisis». This led to a departure from
the «best industrial structure» strategies of the previous decades – that is, the at-
20 White Paper No 7 (1977-78), Small and medium sized industrial firms (Små og mellomstore industribedrif-
ter)
21 White Paper No 29 (1988-89), Policies for regional development (Politikk for regional utvikling)
22 White Paper No 53 (1988-1989), On industrial policy (Om næringspolitikk)
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tempts to construct specific industrial structures that were seen as prerequisites
for industrial growth and competitiveness. The emphasis on a «best industrial
structure» lost ground to new arguments in favour of broad innovation activ-
ities in various parts of the economy. These arguments were based on the view
that policies should not be directed towards specific (and radical) structural
changes, but to promoting improved productivity and diffusion of new tech-
nologies throughout all parts of the economy. Norwegian industrial policy stu-
dies submitted by the Aakvaag, Henriksen and (the first) Hervik Commissions
– all in the latter half of the 1990s – attached importance to maintaining a broad
perspective on innovation.23
Several policy instruments were established to pursue the «diffusion of tech-
nology» strategy. The state institution, the State Institute of Technology (STI,
Statens teknologiske institutt, in existence since 1916) was transformed into a
private foundation. Under the name of the National Institute of Technology
(TI, Teknologisk institutt), it was to promote knowledge on technology and
management for SMEs. A new Service Office for Industry for Northern Norway
(VINN, Veiledningstjenesten for Nord-Norge) had parallell functions to TI but
only focused on the special needs of the northern parts of the country. Similar
services were offered by the Company Advisory Service (BRT, Bedriftenes Råd-
givingstjeneste) consisting of eighteen advisory companies offering consultancy
services to SMEs. Information on new technologies were also provided by the
Norwegian Industrial Attachés (Norges Industriattacher) which were part of the
TI system, and the Norwegian Design Council (Norsk Designråd) offered infor-
mation in the area of design.
In spite of the new broad «industry neutral» orientation, the initiatives taken
by the governments and Parliament (Stortinget) during the 1990s show that IT
de facto remained a core technology of industrial policies. There are strong in-
dications that many politicians – and other groups and individuals – still fol-
lowed the «new industries» strategy from the 1980s and argued that future wel-
fare was dependent on the development of a strong IT sector in the economy.
Another feature of the 1990s, is that the technology push approach of the
previous decade was countered by arguments of the criticality of client capabi-
lities. These arguments did not, however, generate a «market pull» alternative
23 Aakvaag Commission, The Challenge – Research and innovation for new growth (Utfordringen – Forskning
og innovasjon for ny vekst), Report prepared by a commission appointed by the Ministry of Industry and
Energy, 1996; NOU 1996:23 Competition, competence and environment (Konkurranse, kompetanse og mil-
jø); NOU 1997:27 Cost-benefit-anayses  (Nytte-kostnadsanalyser)
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strategy. Rather the subsequent development quickly proceeded to approaches
were network interactions were argued to be important.
A White Paper on research policy in 1993 introduced innovation and sy-
stems theory to a larger audience and stressed the need for larger R&D invest-
ments.24 However, it did not give birth to a larger debate. Neither did it lead to
any substantial increase in national investments in R&D.
Also, central institutions in the R&D system came under scrutiny. In 1990,
the Grøholt Commission was established to assess the organization of Norwe-
gian research. The commission’s conclusions led to the disbanding of the for-
mer five research councils and the establishment of an intended single body re-
search council, The Research Council of Norway (NFR, Norges forskningsråd),
in 1993.25 Besides being a research council in the established sense, the new
body was given the explicit task of being a central policy formulating and advi-
sing body for national R&D and innovation policies.
The 1990s also saw the establishment of the Norwegian Industrial and Regio-
nal Development Fund (SND, Statens Nærings- og Distriktsutviklingsfond). Like
the Research Council of Norway, SND was established as a re-organisation and
re-orientation of several pre-existing institutions, including the Regional Deve-
lopment Fund (Distriktenes Utbyggingsfond), The SME Fund (Småbedriftsfon-
det) and the Industrial Fund (Industrifondet). The initiative came from several
commissions involved in evaluating the Norwegian credit market policies and
groupings advocating a reorganization and simplification of the instrument
portfolio.26 SND’s main task was to stimulate industrial development, by con-
tributing to the development, modernization and readjustment of Norwegian
industry in general, and by promoting initiatives which would secure lasting
and profitable regional employment.
The new emphasis on regional innovation policy – rather than the traditional
regional distribution policy – from the mid 1980s, was upheld in the 1990s. This
is evident i.a. from the explicit consideration of «regional policies for metropo-
litan areas», with a White Paper launched in 1991.27 With 1993 and 1997 White
Papers on regional policy these aspects were integrated into a perspective that
highlighted the policy need of considering the «broad» and the «narrow» regio-
nal policy. By «broad» policy was meant all policies that indirectly affect deve-
lopment in the regions, whereas «narrow» policy referred to policies targeted
24 White Paper No 36 (1992-93) Research for the community (Forskning for fellesskapet)
25 NOU 1991:24 Organization for totality and diversity in Norwegian research (Organisering for helhet og
mangfold i norsk forskning)
26  e.g. the Steigum Commission and the Kleppe Commission
27 White Paper No 17 (1991-92), Norway needs its big cities (Norge trenger storbyene)
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specificly towards this goal.28 The distinction was used to argue that to make re-
gional policy in the narrow sense efficient, an explicit assessment and regulation
of the broad regional policy was necessary. This led to reorganisations within
the relevant ministry, with the responsibility for the assessment of broad regio-
nal policies being institutionalised within the ministry. The point to note here
is that this involved a supervisory role from the perspective of regional innova-
tion policies towards the regional implications of innovation policies as formu-
lated in other ministries.
In the latter half of the 1990s the importance of financial strength of large
companies once more became a political matter. Globalisation – and in particu-
lar the increased importance of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the glo-
bal economy – raised the question of how Norwegian companies could compete
with large global multinationals in increasingly more open international capital
and commodities markets. The sale of the most successful Norwegian company
of the early 1990s, Nycomed, and the national symbol company Freia (chocola-
tes) to foreign competitors, as well as Kværner’s decision to move its headquar-
ter to London, triggered a discussion on how to keep national control of the im-
portant companies as well as being an attractive economy for MNCs. The argu-
ment for national control was the need for keeping knowledge production and
R&D in the country.
One of the political problems on the agenda in the middle of the 1990s was
therefore to develop financially strong national companies and ownership. The
State had become a major owner in Norwegian industry, controlling both big
manufacturing industry, the bank sector and high tech institutions. State
ownership could be used to make sure that important industrial companies re-
mained Norwegian. In addition the government returned to the old policy of se-
lecting some «national champions» which could be a collaborator in developing
strong national ownership.
The 1990s was the decade during which globalisation became more intesified
as a context for innovation policy. At the same time Norway had to resolve her
problematic relationship to the European Union. After Norway voted negative-
ly on the membership question in 1994, an European Economic Area Greement
was put in place, consisting of Norway and the remaining EFTA countries ex-
cept Switzerland, and EU. A major component in this collaborative collaborati-
ve agreement was membership in the European R&D policy, or the Framework
28 White Paper No 33 (1992-1993), City and countryside side by side. On regional development (By og land
hand i hand. Om regional utvikling); White Paper No 31 (1996-97), On district and regional policies (Om
distrikts- og regionalpolitikken)
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Programme. The participation in this European system of knowledge creation
and diffusion has since been well received and accepted as an integrated part of
Norway’s innovation or R&D policy.
2.5 Recent developments: Break through for a 
broad innovation policy?
Towards the end of the 1990s, the political interest in innovation and R&D pol-
icies increased. While innovation and systems theory had been highlighted in
the aforementioned 1993 White Paper, there had been no immediate breakt-
hrough for this line of thinking, nor a substantial increase in national R&D fun-
ding. From the late 90s however, Norwegian policy makers have increasingly di-
rected their attention towards matters such as increasing national investments
in R&D; increasing commercialization of research results; improving the qual-
ity of research and higher education; and stimulating network interactions. The
recent years have also seen a strong emphasis upon regional innovation policies,
and substantial changes in both the organization and contents of innovation
policies in general.
A White Paper on research policy published in 1999 was completely structu-
red around innovation theory.29 The Research Council became the institutional
stronghold for the theory and was supported by the Research Department at the
Ministry of Science and Education and partly by the Research Department of
the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In addition there were individuals in mini-
stries and in other agencies working on industrial policy for developing a new
strategy based on innovation theory. I 1999 the Research Council succeeded in
creating an alliance with the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development
Fund (SND) and the Norwegian Export Council (Eksportrådet) to promote the
idea that Norway needed a new industrial strategy and that this strategy should
be based on innovation theory.30
Increasing national investments in R&D was a central theme in the 1999
White Paper on research policy. It was recommended that R&D funding should
reach the OECD average, measured as a proportion of GDP (GERD), by 2005.
This has become a standing political goal. One of the measures that have been
introduced to obtain this goal is the Fund for Research and Innovation which
29 White Paper No 39 (1998-1999), Research at the beginning of a new era (Forskning ved et tidsskille)
30 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovati-
on, 2003
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was established in 1999. Another central measure is the FUNN tax break sche-
me which was introduced in 2001 on the basis of the report of the Hervik Com-
mission. The Commission was appointed in 2000 to consider policy measures
that could stimulate an increase in private investments in R&D. The Commis-
sion recommended that companies investing in certain types of R&D projects
should receive financial compensation from the State, but was split in the ques-
tion of whether the compensation should be given as a tax credit or as direct fi-
nancial support. The latter alternative won out in the FUNN scheme, which
gave public financial support to companies buying research and development
from universities, colleges and research institutes. In 2002, however, FUNN was
replaced by SkatteFUNN, which gives companies tax deductions for invest-
ments in R&D projects.31
The past few years have also seen increased focus on commercialization of
university and college research. The report of the Bernt Commission which was
appointed in 2000 to evaluate measures for increasing activities in this field,
stressed that universities and colleges should consider commercialization as
part of their activities.32 The argument of the Commission was followed up with
an amendment to the Act on Universities and Colleges, giving Norwegian uni-
versities and colleges an explicit responsibility for facilitating the exploitation of
research results to the common good.33 In the wake of this amendment, several
universities have established their own technology transfer offices, one example
being Birkeland Innovasjon at the University of Oslo. The goal of increasing
commercialization of university and college research has furthermore led to an
amendment to the Act on rights to inventions made by employees. The amend-
ment, which was passed in 2002, gave the research institutions the rights to ex-
ploit inventions made by their teachers and researcher. This right had formerly
belonged to the individual employee.34
Another central policy concern has been to improve the quality of Norwe-
gian research and higher education. In 2001, the Centres of Excellence scheme
was introduced for the establishment of temporary research centres characteri-
zed by concentrated, focused and long term research efforts on a high inter-
national level. Based on recommendations in the 2000 report of the Mjøs Com-
31 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovation,
2003
32 NOU 2001:11 From insight to industry (Fra innsikt til industri)
33 Ot.prp. nr. 40 (2001-1002) Om lov om endringer i lov 12. mai 1995 nr. 22 om universiteter og høgskoler og
lov 2. juli 1999 nr. 64 om helsepersonell
34 Ot.prp. nr. 67 (2001-2002) Om lov om endringer i lov av 17. april 1970 nr. 21 om retten til
oppfinnelser som er gjort av arbeidstakere
Rapport 6-2004m.fm  Page 29  Wednesday, November 10, 2004  9:29 AM
30    Rapport 6/2004
mission on Higher Education, the Minister of Education and Research carried
out a «quality reform» at Norwegian universities and colleges in 2003. The re-
form introduced a new grade system and degree structure, and made the studies
shorter than what they had formerly been. In connection with the quality re-
form, the Ministry of Education and Research established a new national orga-
nization for quality in education, called NOKUT. This organisation is now the
main authority as regards the accreditation and approval of institutions and
educations.35
Over the recent years, Norwegian policy documents have increasingly stres-
sed the central role network interaction plays in innovation. A 2001 White Pa-
per on the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund, SND, stated
that one of the main tasks of this organization should be to stimulate innovation
in industry through the development of networks between different actors.36
Several policy measures have been introduced to encourage networking, e.g.
MOBI which is to promote interaction between industry, research and educa-
tion environments and innovation policy institutions, and Value Creation 2010
which network based innovation at the regional level.
The regional innovation policies that we have seen emerged in the late 1980s,
have been carried on by recent governments. The Labour Government in office
from 2000 to 2001 published a White Paper on regional affairs that stressed the
need for innovative and competitive companies in the regions.37 The Ministry
of Local Government and Regional Development in the following Centre-Right
government has been very much involved in the development of policy instru-
ments targeting regional innovation. One new development under this Ministry
has been a delegation of responsibilities from central authorities to the county
administrators, who have been given more influence over the administration
and allocation of innovation policy measures and funds.38
The last few years have furthermore seen substantial changes in both the or-
ganization and contents of Norwegian innovation policies. A reorganization of
the Research Council of Norway was announced in 2002 and carried out in
2003. The reorganization implied that the former six divisions were replaced by
three. The background was an evaluation of the Council that in part was very
35 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovati-
on, 2003
36 White Paper No 36 (2000-2001), SND: New efforts, new growth, new industry (SND: Ny giv, ny vekst, nytt
næringsliv)
37 White Paper No 34 (2000-2001), On district and regional policies (Om distrikts- og regionalpolitikken)
38 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovati-
on, 2003
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critical towards the activities of the institution, arguing that it had not been able
to coordinate Norwegian research as originally planned in 1993, when the for-
mer research councils were united in this new institution.39
Based on an evaluation of the structure of business-oriented policy instru-
ments and institutions, a new state owned company – Innovation Norway – was
established on January 1st 2004. The new institution replaced the former Nor-
wegian Government Consultative Office for Inventors (SVO), the Norwegian
Trade Council, the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund
(SND) and the Norwegian Tourist Board. One of the main arguments for this
reorganization was that the business oriented policy instruments should be bet-
ter coordinated and directed to one common goal: to contribute to increased in-
novation nationwide.40
The evaluation of the policy instrument system and the establishment of In-
novation Norway are part of the ongoing process towards the introduction of a
holistic innovation policy. This cross-ministerial process was initiated by the
Minister of Education and Research, but has been placed under the leadership
of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The only political steering document for
this process so far is the plan From Idea to Value which was mentioned in the
introduction of this paper. According to this plan, the explicit responsibility for
developing a holistic policy – and coordinating this policy across different poli-
cy areas and ministries – will be placed under a separate Government Commit-
tee.41
2.6 Towards a 3rd generation innovation policy?
It is evident from the overview presented here, that the contents and organiza-
tion of Norwegian innovation policies have changed considerably over the past
fifty years. Today’s plan for a «holistic» innovation policy, with its emphasis
upon network interaction and policy integration, differs radically from the in-
novation policies of the first post war decades where innovation and industrial
development were seen as the direct results of scientific and technological re-
search. While the latter can be termed «first generation» innovation policies ba-
39 Koch, P., Country Report Norway: October 2002-September 2003, the European Trend Chart on Innovati-
on, 2003
40 St.prp. nr. 51 (2002-2003) Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv
41 From Idea to Value -  the Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy (Fra idé til verdi- Re-
gjeringens plan for en helhetlig innovasjonspolitikk), Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2003. See also chapter
6.
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sed on their underlying linear understanding of innovation, the new «holistic»
policy can – as has already been pointed out – be seen as an expression of «third
generation» policies.
Our historical overview nevertheless shows that it is impossible to identify
any clear cut transitions from a first via a second to a third generation innova-
tion policies. Developments have taken place in a very gradual manner. Where-
as policies in the period from 1946 to the late 1970s indeed were strongly colo-
red by «the linear model», we have seen that a report published by NTNF as ear-
ly as in 1964 expressed the view that innovation occurred on the basis of
interaction between several growth factors, and not as a result of research alone.
Furthermore, while the view that innovation results from interaction be-
tween several factors was explicitly upheld by the Thulin Commission in the
early 1980s, the linear model did in fact continue to influence actual policies.
That decade’s focus upon generic technologies as it was expressed in the «stra-
tegic technology areas» implied a dominant technology push approach to inno-
vation and industrial development. We have also seen that it was not until the
late 1990s that policies began to be structured around innovation and system
theory to a substantial degree, and we thus can speak of a breakthrough for «se-
cond generation» innovation policies.
It is worth drawing attention to another feature that our historical overview
makes apparent, namely that there is commonly a time lag from the point where
a new orientation in innovation policy is expressed at the «idea level» – that is
in policy documents such as white papers and government reports – until it is
reflected in actual policies. Against this background, it should be pointed out
that today’s «holistic» – or «third generation» – innovation policies are still in
the process of being formulated. When and to what extent such policies are ac-
tually implemented – and whether they will turn out to be successful – remains
to be seen.
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3 An overview of the current 
innovation system and the key 
actors42
3.1 Mapping the actors
The institutional structure of the Norwegian innovation policy system anno
2002 is depicted in fig. 1. The main change since then has been a merger of three
agencies related to industrial and innovation policy (see below). As such, this
merger illustrates a main theme in this paper; a concentration on the agency le-
vel in the Norwegian system to accommodate and solve perceived co-ordinati-
on needs. Below follows a brief description of the actors in the system.
In Parliament (Stortinget) the committees dealing most directly with innova-
tion policy issues, mainly through the yearly state budgets and white papers, are:
• The Standing Committee on Science and Education (Utdannings- og forsk-
ningskomiteen)
• The Standing Committee on Trade and Industry (Næringskomiteen)
• The Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment (Energi- og mil-
jøkomiteen)
There is no single parliamentary forum with an innovation policy responsibility
where these issues are focused upon and co-ordinated, although the Committee
on Education, Research and Church Affairs handles broad R&D policy matters.
Accordingly, the responsibility for innovation as well as R&D matters is di-
vided between several ministries. Most ministries allot funds to R&D (see hori-
zontal indicators in Remøe et al 2003), the major players being:
• The Ministry of Education and Research
• The Ministry of Trade and Industry
• The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs
• The Ministry of the Environment
• The Ministry of Defence
• The Ministry of Fisheries
• The Ministry of Agriculture
42 The chapter is based on section 0.1 in Koch, P., Country Report Norway, October 2002-September 2003,
the European Trend Chart on Innovation, 2003.
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Figure 1: Policy-centred organisational map of the Norwegian system of 
innovation
Source: STEP
Comment: RCN and NFR = The Research Council of Norway
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The Ministry for Education and Research, The Ministry of Trade and Industry
and the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development have the
main responsibility for the development of national innovation policies.
Norwegian R&D policy formulation is based on the so-called «sector princi-
ple», meaning that each ministry is responsible for promoting and funding re-
search activities within their own areas. The Ministry of Education and Re-
search is responsible for the overall R&D policies, for funding large parts of ba-
sic science in the universities and colleges, and for co-ordinating sectoral R&D
policies. At the governmental level there are two high level committees focusing
on science and technology policy related issues: The inter-ministerial Research
Forum for Government Officials (Departementenes forskningsutvalg – DFU)
and the Government’s Research Board (Regjeringens forskningsutvalg – RFU).
The Minister of Education and Research chairs RFU.
3.2 Three key agencies
The Research Council of Norway (Norges forskningsråd) was established in
1993, as a merger of the former five research councils. The institution bears
overall responsibility for national research strategy, and manages nearly one
third of public sector research funding.
One of the principal tasks of the Research Council is to promote co-oper-
ation and co-ordination among Norwegian research institutions. The Council
identifies important fields of research, allocates funds and evaluates R&D. It is
also called upon to offer strategic advice to the Government on science and
technology issues (see also chapter 6).
SND, the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (now In-
novation Norway) was, like the Research Council, established in 1993 as a reor-
ganisation and reorientation of several pre-existing institutions. It was until the
beginning of the year the central institution for public funding of industrial and
regional development in Norway. SND was then merged as mentioned above
with other agencies: Firstly, SVO, the Norwegian Government Consultative Of-
fice for Inventors (Statens veiledningskontor for oppfinnere) was a public body
that offers advice and scholarships to inventors. The office may support patent
applications and the building of prototypes. Secondly, The Norwegian Trade
Council (Norges Eksportråd) was a foundation aimed at strengthening Norwe-
gian exports. The Council assists companies and public institutions in the field
of international technology cooperation. The most important part of its activ-
ities takes place in its 39 foreign offices, situated in 32 countries. Thirdly, the
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Norwegian Tourist Board (Norges Turistråd) had the responsibility to further
tourism through industrial development and international marketing. The idea
behind the merger is to improve the co-ordination of international and regional
perspectives, and to create a larger, highly integrated agency for innovation and
industrial development, Innovation Norway.
SIVA, the Industrial Development Corporation of Norway (Selskapet for in-
dustrivekst) is a state owned enterprise with its head office in Trondheim, Nor-
way. SIVA is a public enterprise, established to further the creation of business
opportunities, and increased employment. Its goal is to develop strong local en-
vironments by providing investment capital, competence and networks for
small and medium-sized companies. It owns and operates 40 industrial parks
and is a co-owner in ten science and «knowledge» parks. SIVA is organised as a
«network» organisation, and operates within three areas: real estate, develop-
ment and investment/finance. These areas often overlap. The company is ow-
ned by the state, and controlled by the Minister of Local Government and Re-
gional Development.
3.3 Support institutions
TI, the National Institute of Technology (Teknologisk institutt) is a private
foundation with approximately 270 employees. TI receives public support in or-
der to be able to offer small and medium-sized enterprises relevant expertise to
improve company know-how, productivity and profitability. TI offers consult-
ancy and developmental services, training, expertise and technology transfer
programmes and laboratory test and certification services. TI works in areas like
manufacturing technology, environmental and safety technology, business de-
velopment and internationalisation.
VINN, the Advisory Institute in Northern Norway (Veiledningsinstituttet i
Nord-Norge) is a semi-private consulting and contract R&D institute, organis-
ed as a foundation, and receiving public support for parts of its activity. The
foundation offers services within several technical and economical/administra-
tive areas. The purpose is to improve the competitive strength of companies
through increased productivity, improved profitability, stronger market orien-
tation and profitable environmental and quality management measures. The
most important industries addressed by VINN are engineering and other in-
dustrial sectors, fishing and the building and construction industry. They serve
as advisors and offer elementary and post educational training, laboratory and
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testing services. The regional focus of VINN reflects the structural weakness of
this part of the country.
Argentum is a limited company owned by the state. It is to strengthen com-
petent leadership in industry. Argentum invests in companies and tries to influ-
ence the venture capital sector, helping them to gain access to international ca-
pital. One aim is to help more ideas and concepts lead to commercially viable
enterprises and to maximize the profit made from investments. Argentum will
normally own between 33 and 50 percent of the companies involved.
GIEK is a state institution for guarantees insurance of export credits. The
main objective is to promote export of Norwegian goods and services and Nor-
wegian investments abroad.
The Norwegian Design Council (Norsk Designråd) was established in 1963
by the Norwegian Trade Council and The Confederation of Norwegian Busi-
ness and Industry (NHO). It is now a foundation financed by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry and by commissions made through counselling and various
projects. The Council is to further the use of good design in market oriented
product development and marketing.
Some public financial institutions remain outside the SND structure. The
Norwegian local government-funding agency Kommunalbanken is a special
purpose agency established for the Norwegian public sector to secure competi-
tive financing to the Norwegian local governments. Loans are granted solely to
local government or against a guarantee. Although Kommunalbanken may be
seen as an element in the Norwegian system of innovation, the agency does not
appear to pursue systematic innovation policies as such.
Another major investor in Norwegian industry is the Norwegian Public Se-
curity Fund (Folketrygdfondet). The fund is operating as a large and significant
financial investor. The fund’s industrial investment activities are based on using
part of the future liabilities of the public security system for industrial invest-
ment with a strict financial objective.
There are other institutions that are not primarily taking initiatives to do
R&D nor financing the activities, but which still facilitate or in other ways mo-
dulate or give direction to research efforts and innovation processes. Among
these are public regulatory, standards setting or appropriability agencies, and
municipalities and county councils.
As a part of the general framework within which firms and innovators ope-
rate there exists a system of supervisory public agencies taking care of public in-
terest. Their main areas of work relate to problems of public health, working
conditions, consumer issues, and the environment. They establish a system of
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minimum standards for products and processes and by doing so influence the
use of technology in the business sector. Such agencies include the Norwegian
Pollution Control Authority (Statens forurensingstilsyn); the National Office of
Building Technology and Administration (Statens bygningstekniske etat); the
Drug Administration (Statens legemiddelkontroll); and the Norwegian Metro-
logy and Accreditation Service (Justervesenet)
Related to processes of deregulation of key infrastructure related sectors,
such as telecom, energy production and utilities and rail transport, the need of
establishing new systems of regulation to accommodated the effects of deregu-
lation have been met by the establishment of new and reorganised regulating
agencies. Standards are taken care of and co-ordinated by the Norwegian Stan-
dards Association (Norsk standardiseringsforbund), which also represents
Norway in international standardisation work. It operates on the basis of advice
from five independent technical standardisation organisations, for general stan-
dards, construction, electrotechnics, technology and post and telecommunica-
tions respectively.
The Norwegian Patent Office (Styret for det industrielle rettsvern/Patentsty-
ret) offers protection for inventions, trademarks and designs and gives informa-
tion, guidance and training in the area of intellectual and industrial property
rights. Norway has so far not become a member of the European Patent Orga-
nisation (EPO).
Municipalities and county councils have traditionally played an important
role in business development by way of infrastructure building and mainten-
ance, and by providing public services in general. Over the last years, counties
and some municipalities have taken up the challenge to stimulate business de-
velopment and innovation within their geographical area. The counties will
now be given a much larger role in the design and implementation of innova-
tion policies.
Information is a crucial ingredient in innovation and R&D, and libraries play
an important role in making information available. The National Office for Re-
search Documentation, Academic and Special Libraries (Riksbibiliotekstjen-
sten), the National Library (Nasjonalbiblioteket) and the library services at the
universities are independently founded.
Science parks also constitute an element in the Norwegian innovation sy-
stem. The term «Science Park» is used to describe a property-based initiative
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• which has operational links with universities, research centres and/or other
institutions of higher education,
• which is designed to encourage the formation and growth of knowledge-
based industries and other organisations, normally resident on site,
• which has a management team actively engaged in fostering the transfer of
technology and business skills to tenant organisations.
Among the Norwegian Science Parks are:
• Tromsø Science Park Ltd., Tromsø
• Trondheim Innovation Centre Ltd., Trondheim
• Leiv Eriksson Innovation Ltd., Trondheim
• Bergen High-Technology Center Ltd., Bergen
• Rogaland Science Park Ltd., Stavanger
• Campus Kjeller Ltd., near Oslo
• Oslo Research Park Ltd., Oslo
• Ås Science Park Ltd, Ås
The traditional role of the science parks has been to be service organisations and
real estate managers. Now, however, the role as incubators and assistants for in-
novation is becoming increasingly important. Many parks have their own com-
mercialisation units or companies, and they are often local representatives for
the FORNY-programme.
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4 Perceived policy challenges 
and policy mix
In this section, we map the central challenges in Norwegian innovation policies
as they are perceived by actors in the policy system, as well as the current policy
mix – that is the set of established priority areas and actual policy efforts within
the field of innovation policies. The mapping is done against the background of
an actor oriented picture of the national innovation system (NIS), as shown in
figure 2.
By comparing the information of central challenges and current policy mix,
we assess the degree of correlation between perceived problems and actual ef-
forts in today’s Norwegian innovation policies. Although one may expect a con-
siderable degree of overlap between the pictures, this is not necessarily the case.
It is expected that factors such as lack of attention, lack of capabilities for expe-
rimentation, and inertia leading to politically untouchable areas are typically
part of the policy system and should hence lead to significant gaps.
4.1 Performance of the STI system
We start, however, with an assessment of the existing priorities and biases in the
Norwegian STI system. This assessment is based on joint MONIT work to as-
semble information on performance indicators that reveal in this case Norway’s
performance in contrast with other countries. This is not done as benchmarking
individual indicators which is a common technique. Rather, we highlight how
the bias for the given country is on the context of an average picture of other
MONIT countries, with a view to inducing questions about how this bias can be
justified and explained, and we aim at stimulating a critical focus on the priori-
tization capability of the system
A necessary set of information has been reliable, comparable information on
how each country performs on a set of science, technology and innovation in-
dicators. To avoid unacceptable workloads, a dataset was chosen that included
most countries as well as the main indicators relevant for the study. Hence, a re-
cent EU study was chosen, and expanded with data on non-EU countries that
were willing to provide information on those same indicators43. The statistical
43 “Benchmarking national research policies: The impact of RTD on competitiveness and employment
(IRCE)”, EU Commission, STRATA-ETAN Expert Group, 2002.
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work has been done by the Dutch team for all involved countries. To better pre-
sent how each country scores relative to the others, without creating nation-spe-
cific patterns that were not comparable due to the scales, all data were normali-
sed, and the performance for each country is illustrated on the backdrop of the
«average others». Hence, the scales have no meaning in absolute terms.
The result for Norway is shown in figure 2 below. The (red) circle depicts the
average of all countries involved, while the black, broken line illustrates how
Norway scores relative to this average.
The picture reveals an interesting, albeit somewhat contradictory message.
Norway score relative high on labour productivity, although this must be seen
in relation to the large GDP, a fact that also leads to lower GERD (Gross ex-
penditures on R&D) than what would have been the case without the oil rent.
More illuminating is the combined effect of high scores on tertiary education
(without which knowledge investments (D3) would have been lower) and num-
ber of Ph.D.s. It illustrates well that Norway is an education society, with a great
number of Ph.D.s in the overall economy. On the other hand, the production of
graduates in science and engineering is very low, a recurrent theme in Norwe-
gian debates. Taken together with the fact that BERD (Business expenditures on
R&D) is low, it seems reasonable to argue that the significant knowledge invest-
ments in Norway create a well educated work force, but one which is not enga-
ged significantly in business R&D.
Looking more closely at the innovation-related indicators (A1–7), paten-
ting, employment in medium and high tech manufacturing, inward foreign di-
rect investments and BERD are all low. On the other hand, the share of SMEs in
R&D is high, as is employment in high tech services as well as direct govern-
ment funding of business R&D. This would tell us that employment in high tech
services are well developed, and telecom probably influences this. The other
side of this coin is the relatively low share of innovative firms in services in gen-
eral (F1s). The combination of low, innovation expenditures, low patenting, low
FDI and low BERD is particularly worrisome, as it conveys a message about a
low overall innovation activity and vitality in the Norwegian economy.
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The combination of relatively acceptable scores on C2 and C3 should be seen
together with A7 to confirm a picture consistent with Norwegian R&D policy to
have been greatly focused on direct support in a way that includes incentives for
collaboration with research institutes and universities. This is also linked to low
levels of basic research, leading to a conclusion that public investments in
knowledge are skewed towards higher education and applied, business oriented
support, while basic research and graduations in science and engineering suffer.
It should be noted that these data are from 2000, before the introduction of
tax incentives for R&D in 2002–2003 (see separate section). Still, the picture be-
ing presented in this graph should lead Norwegian policy makers to re-examine
some of the emerging biases. While government activity is acceptable on several
areas, areas to be rectified are in particular those that seem to be linked to low
levels of capability and attractiveness of Norwegian firms, most notably em-
ployment and activity in business with higher levels of R&D (medium and high
tech), production of science and engineering graduates, foreign direct invest-
ment, and innovation and R&D activity in the economy in general.
Figure 2:  STI performance for Norway
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4.2 Perceived policy challenges
4.2.1 A methodological note
Our mapping of perceived challenges in Norwegian innovation policies is based
on two data sources: 1) a survey carried out among actors in the policy system,
as well as 2) an analysis of relevant policy documents. Although not providing
a complete picture, the mapping exercise gives an overview of what is perceived
to be the central challenges by both individuals and organizations across a wide
spectrum of the innovation policy system.
Survey
In November 2003, a questionnaire was distributed to a total of 90 persons who
work in organizations44 that are involved in the development and implementa-
tion of innovation policies in Norway.
Policy document analysis
In addition to the survey, we have chosen to build our analysis on primary ma-
terial which is eminently suited to our purpose. A significant collection of do-
cuments has been available to us in which key actors in the innovation policy
system detail what they see as key challenges in the innovation policy system,
what role their own institutions plays, and should play, and how specific issues
concerning their own operations ought to be addressed. The documents are a
response to the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s call for contributions to and
opinions on an overall revamping of the innovation policy system in Norway.45
The following analysis is primarily based on a content analysis of this collection
of documents.
44 Covering the Ministries of Trade and Industry; Education and Research; Local Government and Region-
al Development; Finance; Labour and Government Administration; Fisheries; Agriculture; the Research
Council of Norway (NFR), the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Developments fund (SND), the In-
dustrial Development Corporation of Norway (SIVA), and the Norwegian Trade Council. It should be
noted that the SND and the Trade Council on 1.1.2004 merged with the Norwegian Tourism Council and
the Norwegian Government Consultative Office for Inventors. See also appendix for the questionnaire
(in Norwegian).
45 The documents are referenced at the end of this document. At the time of writing, the documents are
available at the internet address http://www.odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/p30000694/p30003208/024091-
990021/index-dok000-b-f-a.html. 
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4.2.2 Challenges
The various statements submitted to the Ministry of Trade and Industry are very
different in both scope, length, as well as in the generality of the perspectives.
Small institutions with particular missions address narrow issues, while the lar-
ger organisations such as the Norwegian Research Council (NRC) and State’s In-
dustry and Development Fund (SND) chose to submit voluminous reports add-
ressing the broad issues concerning not only their own activities, but the overall
structure and function of the Norwegian system of research and innovation.
Here, we relate the central challenges that are highlighted in these statements to
our map of the innovation system presented above, and we discuss these in the
subsequent sections under the headings:
• General challenges
• Performance of the governance system
• Performance of the R&D and education system
• Performance of the company system
• Non-governmental organizations
• Citizens
Figure 3: An actor oriented picture of the national innovation system (NIS)
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We are not able to pay attention to specific issues concerning actors and opini-
ons, to what extent opinions are shared or contested, what actors hold what po-
sitions, etc. In general, we portray the key issues that seem generally to be
focussed in the debate, and that are generally considered relevant and import-
ant.
General challenges
The shark’s jaw
The overriding concern among policy makers is what has been termed the
shark’s jaw. During the recent decades the Norwegian economy has been heav-
ily influenced by the probably most successful innovation policy strategy in the
post war era: The build-up of the petroleum sector. From the 1970s onwards
this sector represented a change in the development path for the Norwegian
economy, both in terms of the knowledge, technology and innovation genera-
ted and used in that sector (or cluster) as well as in its financial and fiscal merits.
Measured in GDP, the trade balance, state revenues or public saving, this sector
has been extremely important for the revitalisation and upgrading of the econ-
omy, but has also represented a potential threat, often referred to as the danger
of becoming a «Kuwait» economy with heavy dependence on this one sector
and a lack of economic diversification.
In short, the perceived challenge consists of uncertainty of future revenues
for the state as well as a fading away of highly knowledge-based economic activ-
ities in time when public welfare expenditures, notably «pay-as-you-go» based
pensions will soar. This is a long term structural challenge, and there is wide-
spread political consensus that this challenge has to be met. It has recently
prompted the Government to initiate a comprehensive policy or plan for inno-
vation policy (see chapter 5).
Framework conditions and infrastructure
Judging from the documents reviewed, there is a rather broad agreement that
the general conditions for pursuing innovative business ventures are relatively
poor in Norway. Macro-economic policy is one concern. There is a need for re-
stricting the use of oil revenues in order to curb inflation and in order to keep
interest rates low. Contrasting the need for fiscal restraint, there is a broad con-
cern about tax policies. Seen in isolation, tax levels are too high, and this, many
believe, creates competitive disadvantages for Norwegian firms and hinders in-
novation and industrial growth.
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Liberalization of trade and globalisation trends represents formidable chal-
lenges for many firms and industries in Norway. The challenge concerns new
competitive pressures at home, but obviously also the successful migration of
business activities to foreign markets.
Are the policy institutions, the R&D and education system, and the company
system, able to cope? What should be done to strengthen actors in these systems
so that they may prevail in the times ahead? Such questions are asked by many
in the innovation policy system, and proposals are made for changes that will
affect most of the subsystems and the interfaces in the innovation system. Col-
laboration, alliances, legal and institutional reform are among the issues most
frequently mentioned.
The need for strengthening infrastructure for transport of people, goods and
information is pointed out, and is seen as intimately related to the above issues.
In a similar vein, the need for strengthening infrastructure for regional develop-
ment is also emphasised. In order to create opportunities for innovation, busi-
ness development and industrial growth around the country, there is a need to
improve transport infrastructure, and to gear investments to the needs of inno-
vation systems, rather than to focus on equal access to infrastructure of compa-
rable quality in peripheral areas.
Broadband development and telecommunications infrastructure seems not
to be of very great concern today. The privatisation of the public telecommuni-
cations systems is a thing of the past. Today, only one significant issue seems to
be on the agenda: What should be the role of government with respect to pro-
moting the development of broadband «information highways»? Should this be
a sole concern of the private telecommunication companies, or ought the state
play a leading role?
The results from the survey on the issue of framework conditions reveal a
more simplified picture. The issues are all of importance, but the one that seem
to stand out are in particular EEA regulations, IPR regulations, diffusion of ICT,
taxation policy and administrative simplification. There is a notable difference
between the two data sources on the importance of ICT, implying that this a
contested area in the innovation policy.
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An insufficient level of spending on R&D and innovation
The concern with R&D and innovation spending is a continuing theme in the
innovation policy debate, from top to bottom in the innovation policy system.
Nearly everyone seems to be in agreement that the low level of investment is a
bad thing, and there is considerable debate concerning what ought to be done
about this.
An ideological and professional dividing line demarcates two approaches to
the issue. The dominating paradigm for dealing with the issue is economic, and
addresses the problem with an economic vocabulary where terms such as mar-
ket imperfections and additionality are key concepts. A core issue for propo-
nents of this line of thinking is what is called «crowding out». The question is:
Do public activities, in spite of all good intentions, in effect replace private ac-
tivities which would have been able to emerge if it weren’t for the public activ-
ities going on already? Is there a crowding out of what could be normal econo-
mic activities, when government establishes itself in functions and roles that co-
uld just as well be filled by private firms?
On the other hand, there is a line of more systems oriented thinking which
focus on systems failures (or bottlenecks) and which has a more pragmatic and
evolutionary approach to innovation policy issues.
Figure 4: Perceived challenges on framework conditions
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The two strands of thinking do not only lead to conflicting policy implica-
tions. All agree that there is a need to create incentives that help fostering re-
search in industry, and more collaboration between researchers and people in
industry. However, there is disagreement on the need for and the usefulness of
direct measures targeting specific industries, technologies or firms. It appears
that the systems perspective today increasingly is entering the scene in the poli-
cy system as a theoretically well grounded alternative to neo-classical economic
arguments.
Systemic flaws
To what extent concrete systems mappings and bottleneck analysis can deliver
what policy makers need, cannot yet be fully established. The fact remains,
however, that the systems perspective has entered decisively into the Norwegian
innovation policy debate. There is broad concern with the structure and functi-
on of the innovation system. In particular, there is focus on the key interfaces,
and on the volume and quality of links between agents within and across sub-
systems. Issues that are raised in the debate concern, for example, the ability and
willingness of people in business and academia to establish collaboration and al-
liances. Also, there is a concern with the ability of government institutions to
collaborate strategically with actors in the company system. Further, there is
concern with how much and how well different institutions in government are
able to collaborate. Beyond this, there is, as mentioned earlier, very much con-
cern with the ability of Norwegian firms and institutions to enter into collabor-
ations and alliances internationally.
Performance of the governance system
The disagreements referred to above influence the policy debate to a great ex-
tent. Some feel a great need for bridging the gap, or at least for establishing a the-
oretical framework that could make it possible to establish a more solid scient-
ific rationale for more direct and hands on policy action. In this perspective, and
in line with the dictum that nothing is as practical as a good theory, some of the
participants in the innovation policy debate are convinced that the performance
of the policy system could be greatly improved, if only a better and more cohe-
rent theoretical rationale for policy action could be established. In reality, the
large scale and ambitious reorganisation of the RCN as well as the SND (now
part of Innovation Norway), build on opinions about what is necessary and im-
portant, for example with respect to needs for basic and applied research, that
are not at all well grounded in theory and knowledge.
Rapport 6-2004m.fm  Page 48  Wednesday, November 10, 2004  9:29 AM
4 Perceived policy challenges and policy mix    49
The systems oriented and the neo-classical economics oriented approaches
do not always contradict each other, but they seem to lay the ground for distinct
initiatives with respect to policy action. In general, economists play a very im-
portant role when analyses are concluded. There is, thus, a very strong tendency
to see the introduction of market based and for-profit interactions (privatisati-
on) as a necessary means to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency in most
areas of activity. In part, institutions are transformed by changing the fram-
ework conditions within which they operate. Not seldomly, this transformation
amounts to moving an agency from the Government sphere into the Company
system. Less drastically, the activities of centrally placed bureaucratic structures
are transformed by dividing them into smaller units, placing each unit in differ-
ent regions, in effect, it is claimed, «moving the agencies closer to their custo-
mers».
Finally, there is a current concern today with the overall structure of the go-
vernment system, the coherence of decisions and actions, as well as the timeli-
ness and rationality of decision processes. This concern is voiced by key players,
not least in the ministries and at the level of Government Ministers. (The finan-
cing of MONIT project activities in Norway is a result of such concerns.)
There are clear indications of shortcomings in the policy or governance sy-
stem, a fact that we will assess more broadly later in the document. Fig. 5 illus-
trates some of these issues. Both co-ordination between units in the same orga-
nisation and learning in policy institutions are seen as more important then the
other two, although all four stand out as important. Still, we assess this indica-
tion that the Norwegian system may be better equipped with evaluation and
benchmarking activities and a knowledge base than the capability to exploit
them.
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Performance of the R&D and education system
In the innovation policy debate, there is a concern with both the quality and vo-
lume of research being undertaken, as well as a concern with the way the invest-
ments actually being done in these areas pay off with respect to commercially
successful innovation. Results depend on the performance of the company sy-
stem, a fact we will return to in the next section.
The quality of disciplinary research has been a concern for a long time. Nor-
wegian researchers do not publish sufficiently in academic journals, and many
are preoccupied with why this is so, and what can be done about it. As will be
pointed out later, the current government has embarked on a program of con-
crete policy action to promote higher quality in university level research. The
task is ideologically problematic, as the principles of academic autonomy and
individual freedom for academics are potent rhetorical weapons against con-
ventional approaches to management reform and organisational streamlining.
Another issue which is considered very important is the issue of size and
structure of the public and semi-public research institute sector. Over the years,
the institutes have increasingly been moved away from the system of govern-
ment and public services towards the company system. Institutes have gradually
had to deal with economic competition, in addition to the academic competiti-
on faced by institute researchers aiming at scientific publication. The institute
sector is still large, public financing of the sector significant, and it is a key issue
to decide on the future development path of this sector.
Figure 5: Important issues in the policy system
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It appears unavoidable that further debate on this raises fundamental ques-
tions about roles, relationships and missions of the research institutes seen as
elements in the larger innovation system. So far, little has been said about this.
The relationship between business and academia is a key concern, and many
are critical to the ability of academic researchers and research institutions to re-
late meaningfully to firms, business activities and real life innovation processes.
Academics are seen as being located too far away from milieus where commer-
cial applications are being developed. This is not least seen as a cultural issue,
but also as a clear result of institutional and individual incentive structures.
The broad picture above is supported by the results from the questionnaire.
Fig. 6 shows that commercialization of R&D and educational attainment or im-
provements in the education system We assess the latter to be linked to the gen-
eral discussion in Norway on the shortcomings of the educational system to
provide quality education in natural sciences and engineering throughout the
educational chain.
Performance of the company system
The debate may be critical to the actual contribution of academic researchers to
innovation processes, but it is no less preoccupied with the ability and willing-
ness for firms to connect to advanced research in order to exploit the fruits of
this effort. The industrial structure of Norway is considered to be a problem, in
Figure 6: Challenges for the R&D and education system
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two ways: There are too many small firms in which the absorptive capacity with
respect to science and research results tends to be very low. At the same time,
the industrial structure of Norway has a bias in the direction of process oriented
activities around exploiting raw materials and cheap energy. Not enough busi-
ness activities are knowledge based, and more should be done, it is claimed, in
order to develop such knowledge based industry in Norway.
The debate on performance of the company system does not seem at present
to pay much attention to corporate governance. This relates to the fact that the-
re is broad political agreement (in the policy system) to reduce the role of state
ownership in commercial activities. This is a general view relating to the overall
layout of the Norwegian innovation system, but it is also an issue which is seen
as touching upon the company system in particular.
In general, framework conditions are considered essential. The push for pri-
vatisation in the sense of reducing state ownership, and in the sense of moving
public agencies and services towards the Company system (corresponding to
new approaches to public management), is very important today, at least in the
political rhetoric.
Some steps are taken to improve innovation effectiveness for private firms,
as well as the competitive environment. The debate on the need for a tax incen-
tive scheme for allocation of resources to R&D, a scheme which has recently
been implemented, is a sign of this. Taxation overhaul which would improve
profitability of firms is argued to be another effective means for promoting the
establishment of new firms and to promote a entrepreneurial spirit among citi-
zens in Norway.
But several of the ideas and opinions on why the Norwegian company system
is underperforming with respect to research and innovation run counter to this.
Some of the themes brought up are the following: What can be done to counter
the almost total lack of private venture capital which new firms experience to-
day? What can be done to stimulate collaboration and networking between fir-
ms, and between firms and other institutions, inside Norway as well as interna-
tionally?
These are supported by the results form the questionnaire in fig. 7: Both the
R&D performance and seed or venture capital stand out as severe challenges for
the renewal of the private sector or the company system in Norway.
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An important component of the company system is its capability to engage in
co-operation and collaboration with other firms or knowledge sources. This in-
cludes the capability for policy makers and public institutions to engage in net-
working to ensure their own learning. In short, networking is key to an innova-
tion driven economy in times when the firm’s knowledge base is more widely
distributed among private and public actors and sectors, and when the policy
environment is getting more complex with important ramifications for policy
institutions. Policy makers’ assessment of these challenges is presented in fig. 8,
illustrating several dimensions of networking. What is here termed triple helix
networks, i.e. between firms, R&D institutions and the public sector, are seen as
extremely important and a challenge for the Norwegian system. Policy makers’
need to engage in learning across countries is also seen as an area to be invested
in.
Figure 7: Challenges for the company system
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Non-governmental organisations
NGO’s are critical elements in the innovation system, as they gather and focus
popular demand for renewal both in commercial and non-commercial oper-
ations. It is an interesting fact that NGO’s are not mentioned in the innovation
policy debate that we have analysed.
Citizens
Citizens are focused on in two ways in the debate. First, by pointing out that a
culture for entrepreneurship must take root in the population as a whole. Inte-
rest for and commitment to industrial renewal may well be seen as a cultural
trait, and the role of the education system and other opinion formers in promot-
ing such a culture is called for.
Secondly, citizens are seen as the most basic and essential of resources for in-
novation efforts, and the need to recruit and motivate the young to embark on
studies and careers that are key to technological and other innovation efforts are
emphasised.
Figure 8: Challenges for networking
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The overall picture
A graphical representation of what we have found is presented below. In sum,
the perceived challenges include some of the usual suspects, like low R&D fun-
ding, an industry structure not conducive to future needs of the economy, lack
of venture capital and lack of entrepreneurship (start up of new firms with
growth potential). However, beyond these there are several interesting issues
coming up. In particular, we would like to highlight the focus on a lack of cohe-
rent policy rationale and the overall governance of the innovation policy area.
This also leads to an awareness of the problems linked to the macro-economic
policy, and implicitly the dominance it takes in the Norwegian policy environ-
ment. Notable are also transport and infrastructure as well as issues linked to
globalisation and international competitiveness. Lastly, we note a clear aware-
ness of weaknesses in the core education and research system, including basic
research and the role of the research institutes in the innovation system. A gen-
eral, long term threat providing a context to these perceptions is the future re-
duction of state revenues as discussed under the heading of the «shark’s jaw».
4.3 Policy mix
By policy mix, we understand the set of established priority areas and actual po-
licy efforts within the field of innovation policies. First, current priority areas
are identified on the basis of the latest Trend Chart reports for Norway46 as well
as recent policy documents such as white papers, government reports, action
plans, law amendments, etc. Secondly, we provide a picture of the scale and di-
rection of actual policy efforts by mapping the largest innovation policy meas-
ures by annual budget.
In conclusion, we provide a summary of the recent government proposition
Instruments for an innovative and creative industry. The proposition is part of
the Government’s plan to develop a new «holistic» innovation policy. Thus, the
proposition – and the reactions to it in Parliament – gives us an indication as to
how the Norwegian policy mix will develop in the future.
46 The reports contain a section on innovation policy developments, which accounts for the areas in which
the focus and drive in innovation policies are concentrated.
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4.3.1 Current priority areas
Figure 10. provides an overview of central themes in current Norwegian inno-
vation policies.
Against this background, it is possible to identify seven overriding areas in
which the present interest and drive in Norwegian innovation policies is con-
centrated: the actual contents and organization of innovation policies; the gen-
eral framework conditions for Norwegian industry; the scale and quality of na-
tional research and development; the quality of higher education; the commer-
cialization of research results; the level of interaction between industry and
institutions for education and research; and the scale of company start ups.
4.3.2 Contents and organization of Norwegian innovation 
policies
The development of a new holistic innovation policy (HIP) was initiated by the
Minister of Education of Research in 2002 (see separate assessment). The new
policy is to be characterized by a coherent understanding of traditionally sepa-
rate policy areas in order to ensure an effective use of existing resources and to
avoid that different policy measures are in conflict with each other or in other
ways hinder innovation. The process has been placed under the leadership of
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, but – as the main objective is to establish a
horizontal, intersectoral policy – it involves other Ministries as well as actors
outside the Government.47
The process has hitherto resulted in an «innovation plan» entitled «Fra idé til
verdi», which was published on October 23rd 2003.48 As part of the HIP pro-
cess, the Government has also proposed a comprehensive reorganization of the
business oriented policy instrument system.49 The proposition is presented in
more detail below.
Another recent effort concerning the organization of the Norwegian innova-
tion policy system is the reorganization of the Norwegian Research Council
(NFR) which came into effect in September 2003. The decision was made by the
Government in 2002, and was for a large part based on an evaluation of NFR
which pointed to weaknesses in the coordination of Norwegian research. The
previous six «theme- based» divisions have been replaced by three «function-
based» divisions:
47 Koch, Per M., TREND CHART Country Report: Norway, September 1 2003
48 http://www.odin.dep.no/archive/nhdvedlegg/01/09/fraid001.pdf
49 St.prp. nr. 51 (2002-2003) Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv
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• a division for disciplinary development
• a division for innovation and user-initiated R&D
• a division for strategic efforts
The new organization is to ensure that Norwegian research actively contributes
to innovation and industrial development by facilitating interaction between on
the one hand industry and the institute sector, and on the other hand basic and
applied research.50
The delegation of responsibilities from central to local authorities is yet
another current focus area touching upon the organization of the Norwegian
innovation policy system. The Government is in favour of giving the counties
more responsibility for resource allocation and development in the regions.
Thus, the administration and allocation of innovation policy measures and
funds are to be increasingly the responsibilities of regional rather than central
authorities. This trend is discernable in the 2003 state budget where parts of the
regional funding have been decentralized to the counties, who are free to use
parts of this funding to finance innovation policy measures.51
4.3.3 Framework conditions
The appointment by the Government in 2000 of a Commission for Benchmar-
king (Referansetestingsutvalget) reflected an interest in improving the fram-
ework conditions for industrial activities in Norway on the basis of comparisons
with framework conditions in other countries. The commission was to evaluate
the use of benchmarking as a method and develop a system for the evaluation
of the framework conditions for industrial wealth creation. In its report, the
commission recommends that the Ministry of Industry and Trade – possibly in
cooperation with other ministries – is made responsible for industrial fram-
ework condition benchmarking; that there should be established a reference
group with the responsibility for updating and development; and – with refe-
rence to the EU Lisbon-strategy – that benchmarking exercises should be held
every second year.52
50 http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/aktuelt/pressem/045071-070067/index-dok000-b-f-a.html; 
http://www.tu.no/arbeidsliv/article.jhtml?articleID=21680; Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and dis-
seminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the Member States – The TREND
CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September 2002 
51 White Paper No 31 (2002-2003), White Paper on Big Cities (St.meld. nr. 31 (2002-2003), Storbymeldin-
gen); Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technolo-
gy diffusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-
September 2002 
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In order to increase productivity and efficiency in industry, it is a political
goal to reduce firms’ administrative burden. As part of a broader programme
for the modernization of the public sector, the Government has introduced the
action plan «Simplifying Norway». The plan is to provide Norwegian industry
with a sound regulatory framework and user-friendly public services. Emphasis
is placed upon:
• making the regulatory framework easily accessible
• improving regulations in targeted areas
• strengthening the knowledge base for decisions on new regulations and
other government reforms
• reducing firms’ reporting obligations
• making the public sector aware of the needs of industry
It is the Government’s ambition that the quality of Norwegian public services is
to give firms an international competitive advantage. An advisory forum with
participation from the business organizations has been set up in order to secure
a balance between the needs of industry on the one hand and society at large on
the other hand. The Government is to present a revised and updated plan in the
autumn of 2003.53
Traditionally, competition policies have not been an integral part of Norwe-
gian innovation policies. However, stimulating the development of an innovative
industry is presented as one of the motives for the action plan for competition pol-
icies which has been initiated by the Government. The action plan is part of the
programme for modernizing the public sector, and the main focus is upon
• strengthening the position of the Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsy-
net)
• assessing laws and regulations in order to remove arrangements that may
impede competition
• developing a public purchasing policy that promotes competition.54
52 http://odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/publ/utredninger/NOU/024001-020006/index-ved001-b-n-a.html; 
http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/dep/nhd/2000/pressem/024041-070003/index-dok000-b-n-a.html;
Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology dif-
fusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September
2002 
53 From words to action – modernization, efficiency improvement and simplification in the public sector
(Fra ord til handling – modernisering, effektivisering og forenkling I offentlig sector), report to Parlia-
ment from the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration, 24.01.02 (electronic version at http:/
/www.dep.no/archive/aadvedlegg/01/02/85128065.pdf); Presentation of the action plan Simplifying
Norway on the Government’s web-pages (in English), http://odin.dep.no/nhd/engelsk/publ/handling-
splaner/024081-220006/index-dok000-b-n-a.html
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Improving the conditions for value creation by reducing industrial taxes is a
core issue for the present Government and a central priority in the 2003 state
budget. 2002 saw the removal of the investment tax and an increase in depreci-
ation rates. One central initiative in 2003 is the extension of the tax incentive sc-
heme SkatteFUNN. Whereas the scheme, which gives tax reductions for
industrial R&D investments, originally was targeted towards small and medium
sized enterprises, it now applies to all firms – irrespective of size.55
eNorge 2005 is the Government’s plan for IT policies for the period 2002–
2005. The overriding goal of these policies is to exploit the possibilities offered
by information technologies, the use of which is seen as an important impetus
for societal change and improvement. eNorge has three focus areas:
• Value creation in industry: A strengthening of the development and use of
information technology in industry is believed to contribute to value cre-
ation in industry by increasing innovation and competitiveness.
• Efficiency and quality in the public sector: The use of IT is to improve the
quality and efficiency of public services.
• Participation and identity: The possibilities offered by IT are to be open to
all citizens, and to be exploited in the conservation and development of
Norway’s cultural heritage, identity and languages.56
4.3.4 Research and development
Increasing R&D investments as a proportion of GDP is a central political objec-
tive. In 1999 investments amounted to 1,70 % of GDP, which is below the
OECD average and the lowest share among the Nordic countries. The Govern-
ment’s goal is that Norwegian investments by 2005 as a minimum should have
reached the OECD average. The State is to play a significant role in achieving
this goal, i.a. by increasing the capital of the public Fund for Research and In-
novation. However, the Government maintains that industry is to be responsi-
ble for 60 % of the increase. The tax deduction scheme SkatteFUNN has been
introduced as an instrument for increasing industrial spending on R&D.57
54 From words to action – modernization, efficiency improvement and simplification in the public sector
(Fra ord til handling – modernisering, effektivisering og forenkling i offentlig sektor), report to Parlia-
ment from the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration, 24.01.02 (electronic version at http:/
/www.dep.no/archive/aadvedlegg/01/02/85128065.pdf)
55 Government proposition  No 1 (2002-2003) The state budget including the Social Insurance Scheme
[folketrygden] 
56  http://odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/enorge/p10001876/024101-990129/index-dok000-b-n-a.html
57 Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology dif-
fusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September
2002; http://www.skattefunn.no
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It is also the ambition of the Government to strengthen Norwegian research
in qualitative terms. Several evaluations have indicated that the quality of the re-
search being conducted is low, at least in some disciplines. One subsequent go-
vernment initiative is the establishment of «centres of excellence» – research
groups united under a common leadership which are given long-term financing
based on a research plan. In addition, the Government wishes to increase the
number of researcher recruits and to strengthen the funding of scientific equip-
ment.58
4.3.5 Quality in higher education
The Norwegian system of higher education is presently undergoing major
changes referred to as «the quality reform». Among the changes are
• the introduction of a new degree structure consisting of three levels: Bachelor
(three years), master (two years) and Ph.D. (three years)
• the introduction of a new grades system
• the establishment of a new national organization for quality in education,
NOKUT, whose main task is to evaluate the mechanisms for quality assu-
rance in both public and private universities and colleges
The quality reform was initiated by the previous Labour Government in 2001,
and has been followed up by the present Conservative-Centre Government.59
4.3.6 Commercialization of research results
It is a political goal that inventions based on publicly funded research should be
commercialized, and hence exploited to the benefit of society at large. Univer-
sities and colleges have been given a legally based responsibility for promoting
the practical use of scientific research results. In 2002, a government appointed
committee presented its report on commercialization of results from university
and college research. Based on this work, there has been a political process lead-
ing up to a recent amendment of the law on rights to inventions by employees.
Unlike other employees, teachers and researchers at universities and colleges
have hitherto had the primary right to patent or commercialize their own re-
58 Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology dif-
fusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September
2002; http://www.skattefunn.no
59 http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/aktuelt/pressem/045071-070077/index-dok000-b-f-a.html Koch, Per M.,
Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology diffusion in the
Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September 2002 
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search results. The law amendment implies that this right is transferred to the
institution. This is believed to result in the establishment of institutional struc-
tures which will ensure that research results are patented and made available for
industrial use.
The political interest in stimulating the commercialization of research results
is also reflected in several policy instruments. The FORNY programme aims at
promoting commercialization of research based business concepts or ideas con-
ceived at universities and colleges as well as research institutes. Also, the science
parks actively help university and college researchers patenting, developing and
marketing their inventions vis-à-vis industry.60
4.3.7 Interaction between industry and education/research 
institutions
Interaction between education/research institutions and industry is a central
theme in Norwegian innovation policies. In the so-called «Government-plat-
form» – a document which outlines the main ambitions of the present Govern-
ment – it is emphasized that the knowledge transfer between universities/colle-
ges and industry is to be strengthened.
A number of policy measures aim at increasing the links between research
institutions and industry, e.g.:
• the user driven programmes, the objective of which is to actively involve fir-
ms in publicly funded R&D programmes
• the NT programme, which gives support to innovation in Northern Norway
by i.a. developing networks of companies and knowledge institutions
• the MOBI programme, which aims at promoting innovation in firms i.a.
through establishing links to research environments
• Value creation 2010, which is to promote innovation at the regional level
through strong interaction between industry and reseach
• Science parks, which are property-based initiatives with operational links to
education/research institutions designed to encourage the formation and
growth of knowledge-based industries61
60 Innst.O.nr.6 (2002-2003) (electric version at http://www.stortinget.no/inno/200203-006-001.html;
Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology dif-
fusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September
2002; http://program.forskningsradet.no/forny/om/
61 Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology dif-
fusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September
2002 
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4.3.8 Company start-ups
Facilitating company start-ups is an expressed political goal and a central moti-
ve behind the current restructuring of business oriented policy instruments and
institutions. Today, there are several policy instruments oriented towards start-
ups. Science parks play an important role in encouraging the establishment of
new technology-based companies, as do the programme for incubator activities
(in which science parks may participate) which stimulates the establishment of
«incubators» – environments for the development of firms in the start-up pha-
se. A related measure is the incubator grant scheme which provides financial
support to entrepreneurs located in an incubator.62
4.4 A summary of innovation policy measures
This overview, illustrated in fig.11 below, confirms that the Norwegian policy
mix has taken up the innovation systems perspective to a great extent, but, rela-
tive to the challenges perceived by many, fails to address some deeper concerns
like industrial structure and globalisation. Still, some of the challenges are being
met, at least in terms of political ambitions, like improved coherence and ratio-
nale in policy. The overall assessment is that the Norwegian system is capable to
address proper challenges on the fringes, but fails to integrate and renew the
foundations for industrial policy using perspectives from the innovation policy
tool box and thinking. A number a areas are still challenges, as they have been
over many years, like the institute sector and funding of R&D, without being
addressed properly in the wider policy system.
4.5 Looking ahead: the 2003 Government 
proposition on instruments for an innovative 
and creative industry
On March 28th 2003, the Ministry of Trade and Industry presented to Parlia-
ment a proposition entitled Instruments for an innovative and creative in-
dustry. In this document, the Government proposes a comprehensive reorgani-
zation of the business oriented policy instrument system, with the aim of ma-
62 Koch, Per M., Monitoring, updating and disseminating developments in innovation and technology dif-
fusion in the Member States – The TREND CHART: Norway, Covering period: October 2001-September
2002
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king the system more efficient and better suited to facilitate value creation in
Norwegian industry. The proposition is based on a review of the existing inno-
vation policy instruments (Virkemiddelgjennomgangen), and is part of the Go-
vernment’s initiative to introduce a new «holistic» innovation policy.
According to the document, the policy instruments should increasingly be tar-
geted towards the same goal, which should be to promote innovation nationwide.
To achieve this, the instruments are mainly to focus upon the following three areas:
• research and competence development
• the idea, development and commercialization phases
• internationalization,
and to target the following five main groups:
• entrepreneurs
• young companies
• the innovation system
• small and medium sized enterprises with ambition and potential for growth
• researchers and R&D environments in industry and the research and educa-
tion sector.
On a more specific level, the proposed reorganization of the policy instrument or
delivery system would lead to the establishment of a new organization for innova-
tion and internationalization by January 1st 2004. It is proposed that the new orga-
nization is to be represented abroad as well as domestically, and that it is given the
responsibility for the measures presently administered by the Norwegian Industrial
and Regional Development Fund (Statens Nærings- og Distriktsutviklingsfond,
SND), the Norwegian Government Consultative Office for Inventors (Statens Vei-
ledningskontor for Oppfinnere, SVO) and the Norwegian Trade Council (Norges
Eksportråd), as well as some of the innovation oriented policy measures adminis-
tered by the Research Council of Norway (Norges Forskningsråd, NFR). The new
institution was to be called Innovation Norway.
The suggested organizational form of the new unit is a «Special law company»
(Særlovselskap). The company is to own and administer a network of offices all
around the country, which is to provide a single «point of entrance» to the policy
instruments and thus making them more easily available to their users. The main
reason for organizing the unit as a «Special law company» is that such an arrange-
ment allows for the necessary balance between the Government’s need for control
on an aggregated level on the one hand, and the unit’s need for independence and
freedom to make decisions on a day-to-day basis on the other hand.
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Figure 11: The 20 largest policy instruments
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Other proposals forwarded in the document, include an increase in the budget
for regional funds from NOK 500 mill (€ 60,7 mill) to NOK 1 billion (€ 121,4
mill) and that the Norwegian Space Agency (Norsk Romsenter) is to become a
more independent state institution (forvaltningsorgan med særskilte fullmak-
ter).
The government proposition was discussed in Parliament on June 18th 2003,
and was in general positively received. There was broad agreement on the need
for increased co-ordination of the policy instruments, and that innovation
should be a central goal.
Parliament was also in favour of the establishment of a unit for innovation
and internationalization. It was however decided that the unit should include
the Norwegian Tourist Board (Norges Turistråd, NTR) in addition to the insti-
tutions suggested in the proposition. Also, the possibility for including other in-
stitutions or instruments at a later point is to be held open.
While Parliament’s reactions to the proposition all in all were positive, a few
critical comments were made. For one thing, some Members of Parliament ex-
pressed «a slight surprise» with the fact that decisions regarding policy instru-
ments have been made before the actual content of the new «holistic» innova-
tion policy has been established, pointing out that it would have been more ra-
tional to deal with the two matters in reverse order. Also, several of the parties
in opposition argued that more attention should be paid to regional develop-
ment, and that the objective of the policy instrument system should be to pro-
mote regional industrial activities in general, and not only activities that are re-
lated to innovation.
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5 Agenda setting, prioritisation, 
and stakeholder involvement
Innovation governance includes the capabilities to identify challenges ahead for
the respective national economy, formulate strategic visions for future develop-
ment, and prioritize resources accordingly. Agenda setting and prioritization
are therefore key elements in the process of creating dynamism and inducing
structural changes if that is perceived as necessary. However, these processes do
not take place in a vacuum. They are influenced by earlier agendas and prioriti-
es, inertia in building knowledge and preferences, stakeholders often represen-
ting existing priorities, and political and economic belief systems prevailing in
the policy making system. The institutionalist approach taken in this analysis,
as presented briefly in the introduction, assumes that agendas and priorities are
not the result of rational, explicit choices, but depend on a numbers of formal,
informal, structural and cultural factors. The analysis in this chapter aims at
creating an understanding of how these influence the outcomes in the innova-
tion governance system in Norway
5.1 A corporatist system in a macro-economic 
environment
Norway’s governance system has generally been based on a tri-partite relation-
ship between the parties in the labor market and the state. For a brief assessment
in the context of innovation policy, it is fair to say that the corporatist system
has been strong, but limited. Nordby (1994) states that the corporatist gover-
nance system in Norway rests on three pillars:
a) The tri-partite incomes policy, that is a division of labor with employers,
trade unions and the state to ensure the competitiveness of Norwegian industry
through moderate income settlements. This pillar also underlines the very way
competitiveness has been conceptualized in Norway: low unit costs relative to
competing countries. This was a high level relationship, but was indeed limited
to a very narrow segment of the overall economic policy.
b) The second is referred to as corporatism under public management, a key
mechanism for agenda setting and stakeholder involvement. It refers to the sy-
stem in which organisations and individual persons are invited to take part in
commissions, committees, advisory boards etc. These entities typically deliver
their assessments and conclusions on specific issues within the framework of
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«public studies» (Norges offentlige utredninger», see also section on policy
learning). An important aspect of this form of corporatism is that the «owner
ministry» giving the mandate for the commissioned work represent a deeply in-
grained tradition in Norwegian public administration, the sector principle,
implying that each ministry has all relevant responsibilities for policy actions
within their respective domain. As such the link between sectoral ministries and
this corporatist system reinforces divisions between policy domains and hence
may lead to lack of policy co-ordination. It should be noted that a great many
reforms and major policy decisions in the innovation policy field, like the recent
tax refund system for R&D expenditures, the merger of five research councils
into one in 1993, and benchmarking of Norwegian industry’s competitiveness
in 2002 have been initiated through such corporatist solutions.
c) The final version is often referred to as inner corporatism, which is linked
to profession based trade unions and their influence in public management (see
Moen 2001).
This brief description deserves expansion on some key points. First, the com-
mittees and commissions referred to do not exercise any power in terms of de-
cision making. Government, or the respective ministry, are totally free to ac-
cept, reject or change the implications as white papers and other documents are
prepared for wider policy debate. This was e.g. the case during the reform of the
research council system. Hence, these structures should be seen essentially as
stakeholder mechanisms.
Second, the sectoral principle has led to processes within what has been coi-
ned the «segmented state» (Egeberg, Olsen and Sætren 1978) and «the negotia-
ted economy» (Hernes 1978), implying a strong tendency to un-co-ordinated,
but selective action vis a vis industries and interest groups. It is for example re-
flected in an old fashioned organisation of industrial policy whereby primary
industries (fisheries and agriculture) still have their own ministries. This system
prevails and is recognised in an extremely skewed distribution of government
support to industrial activity: Of the total amount of support in 1998 of 18.5 bill.
NOK, 12.4 bill. NOK were directed to agriculture, 4.8 bill. NOK to secondary
and tertiary industries, and 0.7 bill NOK to industrially oriented R&D (NOU
2000: 21; Moen 2002). More recently, an increasing tendency to implement re-
forms according to principles of new public management (NPM) has led to
what is termed a «fragmented state» (see Tranøy and Østerud 2001). Reforms
and governance lead to a swelling of agencies and other institutions mandated
with implementation of policy, leaving the overall institutional design to frag-
mentation and co-ordination failures. A general assessment is that while the
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prime minister level has little power, the individual ministries much more so,
the agency level has increased in authority and power due to the position in the
policy cycle. An additional conclusion from the recent power study was that
even the recent reform processes of state institutions itself have been sectoral
and un-co-ordinated (NOU 2003: 19).
The key point in this analysis is that the Norwegian policy making system
lacks a co-ordinating body or mechanism ensuring broad and strategic decision
making across the domains of individual ministries. It is mirrored by a policy
making platform that may be termed the «macro-economic rationality» (Koch
2003). Compared to other countries, this macro-economic rationality has been
particularly strong, based on the «iron triangle» of the economist institutions of
the Central Bank, Department of economics at the University of Oslo and the
Ministry of Finance. Starting out as a strong element in labour party govern-
mental planning, it has only increased its role in policy making with the stron-
ger tendency to rely on market solutions and economic liberalism in recent ye-
ars. Industrial policy as such has been more or less removed from the agenda to
the benefit of a market failure approach to especially capital markets. Industri-
ally oriented policy is best left to the Ministry of Finance (Moen 2002). On top
of that, the role of the state is now characterised as state capitalism without stra-
tegy, except selling state shares in major corporations (NOU 2003: 19).
5.2 The politics of agenda setting
Agenda setting basically takes place at the political level. In this section we ex-
plore briefly some key aspects of this. Although the term political level usually
refers to politicians and political parties, patterns of tension and conflict typi-
cally cut through many layers and institutions.
5.2.1 Multi-dimensional tensions
Relative to the emergence of comprehensive innovation policy, several di-
mensions of partly deeply ingrained tensions influence the Norwegian system.
A point of departure is the notion of the dominant «macro-economic rationali-
ty» alluded to above. Although this dominant feature of Norwegian policy ma-
king has existed during most of the post-war era, in particular in the 1960s and
1970s with Keynesian economic policy, it has become even more dominant over
the past 20 years due to two factors: First, the petroleum sector has generated
not so much energy for the Norwegian economy as financial assets. From early
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on a perceived challenge has been to avoid the dangers of a Kuwait economy
identified as one being deeply dependent on oil and gas based revenues and ac-
tivities. The financial assets were therefore defined as oil and gas reserves trans-
formed, and put aside as savings. The strong capabilities of the economists com-
munity in Norway has been a stronghold and a competence asset in the man-
agement of these resources. Second, a cross-political preference for new public
management (NPM) became pervasive over the past 10–15 years, including a
market oriented focus in economic policy, privatisation of suitable public ser-
vices and a stringent, even ideologised, view on the interface between the state
and the market.
As new perspectives on innovation policy emerge, several lines of tensions
become visible in the political and policy making system:
a) The conservative party, Høyre, currently leading the government coalition,
is split between a traditional or neo-classical economist view and a more
pragmatic stance. Still, innovation policy is a difficult issue in Høyre, as it
challenges the role of the state in economics and politics.
b) The Labour Party has tensions along the same lines, but less severe. The
party is also more pragmatic than Høyre on the role of the state in the econ-
omy, in particular state ownership. The party is also strongly linked to the
trade union movement.
These tensions provide a vital background for the fact that a modernised versi-
on of industrial and innovation policy is very difficult to achieve. Further, these
tensions are reinforced by similar rifts in the civil service:
c) There are deep tensions within the Ministry of Trade and Industry, basically
between the division for economic policy well founded on the neo-classical
approach to economic policy, and the division for R&D and innovation that
has assumed a perspective more in line with the innovation systems ap-
proach and evolutionary economics.
d) There are tensions between the Ministry of Trade and Industry and
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, in particular on
the question of state vrs regional perspectives.
e) The Ministry of Science and Education takes up an ownership role for R&D
policy and remains resistant to being (too much) co-ordinated. It led, as will
be shown for the new Government Committee for Innovation Policy RIU
(see chapter 6) to a lack of integration between R&D policy and innovation
policy.
Rapport 6-2004m.fm  Page 71  Wednesday, November 10, 2004  9:29 AM
72    Rapport 6/2004
Hence, there are two dimensions of conflicts related to economic and innova-
tion policy, on the one hand an academic-economic dimension, and on the
other a political-economic dimension, both reinforcing each other and making
a well-informed modernisation and renewal of the interface between economic
and innovation policy very difficult.
5.2.2 Processes in Parliament
As mentioned above, the Parliament is the high level policy formulation body
and has therefore an overall policy function. We cannot include all kinds of pro-
ceedings taking place in the Parliament in this paper, but some key mechanisms
and process are important to be able to understand the system as such.
First of all, the Parliament divides itself into 12 standing committees as de-
scribed above. The Presidency decides on how this is done, but the rule is that
the committees should have a reasonable workload, a rule that necessarily leads
to trade-offs concerning which get what for political treatment. For example the
Standing Committee on Science and Education (SCSE) has responsibility for
the R&D budget. The Standing Committee on Trade and Industry (SCTI) has
responsibility for three ministries (all industrial), and will according to the pro-
cedural system leave major R&D affairs to the former. These trade-offs are well
illustrated by the way the yearly state budgets are treated. The state budget, with
its resource allocation and prioritization, is the key vehicle for policy formulati-
on. However, due to the division of labor between the committees, they may not
have the whole budget for a sector for treatment. For example, the Standing
Committee of Trade and Industry will not treat the chapters of the budget for
the Ministry of Trade and Industry that deals with R&D allocated for use outsi-
de that ministry (for RCN). Those chapters will be dealt with in the Standing
Committee for Science and Education. This seems at face value to represent a
co-ordination failure, since an important instrument in industrial and econo-
mic policy is R&D. This seems even more to the point in so far as the SCTI does
not formally attach comments for priority for the subsequent treatment in SC-
SE. But the SCSE is then responsible to prepare the discussion in parliament.
This cross-functional system could not operate without the co-ordinating
role of party groups. Before preparing the final proposals for discussion in Par-
liament, the issues at stake are discussed broadly in the respective parties, allo-
wing them to instruct or inform the committee delegates to vote or push for spe-
cific positions and priorities. Hence, the party groups operate as cross-referen-
ces in the system. In other words, the organisation of parliament as such does
not necessarily indicate how positions are being formulated. It is the party mac-
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hinery that has opinions through the committees, while these are not decision
making bodies in their own right. For example, as is the case in Norway, the
treatment of industrial R&D budgets for RCN in the SCSE and not in SCTI of-
ten leads to competition between basic, university research and more applied
industrially oriented research. Seen through the budgets for industrial R&D
over the 1990s, there has been a clear trend that industrial R&D lost out (RCN
yearly report 2002). The typical sectoral principle of responsibility is broken
leading to a weak link between industry and R&D. In addition, there is an im-
plicit abdication of political responsibility vis a vis RCN, the receiver of these
funds. Not without some truth, many people refer to this situation as having the
kinder garden teachers in SCSE deal with important policy issues for industrial
development.
Contrary to some countries, these committees do not have joint meetings to
better co-ordinate policy. On the other hand, some important cases may be tre-
ated in more than one committee, a matter that is decided by the presidency.
Still, the committee system is vulnerable to the competence of party delegates
and the level of information and knowledge among these. In addition, delegates,
or members of Parliament, may also operate individually as allowed by the par-
ties, or individually according to specific procedures in the parliamentary agen-
da.
The latter is best illustrated with the proposal to establish a new regional loan
facility for industrial development for the year 2003. One MP, Inge Ryan from
the socialists, forwarded an individual proposal for the facility, after which the
Parliament entered into a compromise with the government resulting in total
financial limit of 1 billion NOK. The regulations for the new facility, or fund,
were established by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in consultation with
other ministries. No clients and relevant agencies were consulted. During the
process, Mr Ryan was asked to reduce the overall limit of the fund and instead
achieve a higher loss threshold. This was not done, and the Ministry of Finance,
concerned about the balance of the budget, cut the loss threshold to 15 % from
25 %, thereby deciding through a zero-sum game to implement a fund for which
no client has any use. The 2003 limit of 500 mill NOK was exploited only with
146 mill NOK (Mühlbradt 2003).
A co-ordination challenge also arises from the type of instruments in various
ministries’ portfolios. For example, the Standing Committee of Finance Policy
(SCFP) will discuss policies that are of key importance for the SCTI, but since
the former, through the contents of finance policy, handles all financial instru-
ments, like tax policy, a coherent treatment vis a vis industry and innovation is
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extremely difficult. This case also illustrates that the division of labour in Parli-
ament has a multi-dimensional co-ordination problem: Firstly through various
policy fields being distributed across the committees according to the «fair bur-
den» principle, and secondly through the fact that various instruments are dis-
tributed across committees.
For a coherent and horizontal innovation policy this situation becomes ex-
tremely difficult, and a rational process is hence dependent on insightful pro-
cesses in and among political parties and their delegates. The organisation of
parliament is ill suited to broader, strategic approaches in areas like innovation
policy. In fact, if the government is to have success in establishing a comprehen-
sive innovation policy, it needs to be extremely sensitive to important positions
taken by the opposition in parliament to able to achieve negotiated outcomes.
5.3 Prioritization in R&D: The role of ministries 
and RCN
Prioritization takes place through state budgets which we technically discuss in
the next chapter as a co-ordination mechanism. Here we focus on the more po-
licy relevant decision making system.
As alluded to earlier, the ministries have great autonomy in the context of a
weak prime minister level.63 They operate according to the principle of sector
responsibility, which says that each ministry shall be responsible for their own
R&D strategy according to their own knowledge needs. Typically, the ministe-
rial strategy shall include a definition of the boundaries of responsibilities and
strategies for exploitation.
The key ministry is the Ministry for Science and Education (see also chapter
on co-ordination). But prioritization takes place within each ministry. This pro-
cess is linked tightly with implementation as each ministry delegates the imple-
mentation of the priorities to the key agency, the Research Council of Norway,
the dominant and almost omnipotent agency in the STI domain. Hence, the pri-
oritization takes place within the «contract» between the ministries and the
RCN on a yearly basis (see section on state budgets). The process is a combined
top-down and bottom up, in which priorities stemming from strategic proces-
63 It is said that a main reason for this stems from the period under Danish rule, where the Danish king was
afraid of possible opposition from a strong prime minister and government, and hence ensured to weak-
en the office of the prime minister and made the ministers autonomous and divided (a version of the well
known split and rule doctrine). 
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ses with RCN are interfaced with ministerial priorities. This is depicted in fig 12
which gives an overview.
The main points to be made here is that the prioritization processes take pla-
ce without formal exercises like foresight etc. The main priorities from govern-
ment are typically laid down in white papers, which in the Norwegian system
substitutes other strategic intelligence functions. But these are loose visions and
objectives with no binding impact on yearly allocations. Hence the prioritizati-
on process is very much linked to the yearly budget.
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However, the main feature in the system is the principle of earmarking, as mi-
nistries in their prioritized allocations to RCN in a very detailed manner in-
struct the use of the funds. Six ministries provide the general funding base for
RCN, which together with financial means from the new Fund for R&D and In-
novation, makes up 75 % of RCNs financial base. The rest is provided by dedi-
cated funds from 14 ministries, in many cases with very small allotments (down
Figure 12: RCN Budget Process Overview
Source: Research and Innovation Governance: A study of eight countries. Technopolis 2003.
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to less than 1 mill euro). The RCN is therefore very much reduced to an imple-
menting institution rather than the strategic institution it was meant to be. A re-
cent study of this earmarking system highlights the fact that while the Norwe-
gian governance system in general rests very much on new public management
principles, the earmarking system is a very evident contradiction (Technopolis
2003). The overview over the styles of various ministries (see table 1) is summed
up as follows:
Smaller spenders tend to discuss their funding of individual programmes.
Rather than supporting various categories of activity, they treat RCN much
more like a supermarket, buying a packet of this here, a slice of that there –
essentially for their own consumption. They are also much more likely to
earmark within individual programmes, and these earmarks can relate on
occasions to quite small amounts. From the allocation letters, it is clear that
these earmarks represent a mixture of politically imposed requirements and
ministries’ needs for very specific pieces of research. In isolated cases, it seems
that the level of control desired by the ministries is extreme.
• The agriculture (LD) and fisheries (FiD) ministries have a behaviour of
their own. As former owners of research councils, they have a more develo-
ped set of internal definitions of needs than most ministries, and these are
articulated in strategies. Their allocation letters refer to these strategies in
a general way, but the effect is to make the instructions to RCN highly spe-
cific. It is as if their management style has not adjusted to the new situ-
ation, so that the real management of RCN’s BF division is contested. The
detail and complexity of the agriculture ministry’s micro-management in
the past is illustrated by a letter from the general audit office to RCN, which
proposed an 80-point agenda for a meeting intended to review whether
RCN had complies with all the instructions contained in the agriculture
ministry’s 1999 allocation letter to the council. The environment ministry
is in a somewhat similar position. While it never formally owned a research
council, the Norwegian National Committee for Environmental Research
had, in practice, worked as the environment ministry’s research council for
a period before the RCN merger. The environment ministry therefore acts
in a similar way to the ministries of fisheries and agriculture, with a high
degree of formalisation of its needs and with very specific earmarking of
funds.64
64 Riksrevisjonen letter from Per Scott and Maggi Vineshaugen Rødvik to RCN, dated 3 March 2000, refer-
ence S.2 2000/627 MVR/WSC
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Note: Allocation basis: P = programme; V = type of funding (virkemiddel). ns = not specified. Ministries providing general funds are indicated in italics
Source: Technopolis 2003, based on Tildelingsbrev 2000, except FiD, 1999 and FIN, 2001. KUF earmarks relate only to special funds
 Table 1: Ministries’ Earmarking Styles
Spend with 
RCN
Allocation 
basis
No of 
categories
Biggest 
category 
(MNOK)
Smallest 
category 
(MNOK)
MNOK/
category
No of 
earmarks
Smallest 
money 
earmark 
(MNOK)
Categories 
+ earmarks
Degree of 
Ear-mar-
king
KRD 101 P 12 45.2 1.5 8.4 10 0.45 22 H
OED 249 V 4 70.0 34.0 62.1 14 ns 18 L
SHD 99 P 20 21.8 0.3 4.9 4 2.00 24 H
LD 251 Strategy/P 20 31.8 0.1 12.5 32 1.50 52 H
NHD 848 V/theme 17 165.0 2.9 49.9 17 2.00 34 L
KUF 765 V/theme 8 208.0 43.0 95.6 20 0.85 28 L
FiD 180 strategy 47 24.2 0.1 3.8 12 ns 59 H
FIN 8 P 10 3.3 0.1 0.8 1 0.05 11 L
UD 39 P 12 11.7 0.2 3.2 0 0.20 12 H
SD 53 P 4 11.0 0.3 13.2 3 1.50 7 H
MD 194 V 5 102.0 27.0 38.7 37 1.00 42 H
Total/Avge. 2785.1 159 208.0 0.1 17.5 120 0.05 279
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Several analytical points may also be made in the degree of variation in behavi-
our (ibid):
• The purpose of the funding – whether it is fundamentally paying for re-
search to be done or whether it is paying for answers to the ministries’ qu-
estions – or, in other words, whether the funding provides patronage or
custom. Often, the two are not clearly distinguished
• The scale of the funding. Small funders trust RCN less and earmark more
• The history of the ministry. Those who have owned sectoral research
councils in the past still deal with RCN at a level of great detail
• Intensity of political demands of the sector. Some (such as regional deve-
lopment) are simply more prone to lobbying and political interference
than others
• Variations in the degree of personal interest and competence, especially
at the level of the responsible officers in the ministries
Hence the sector based governance system is deeply ingrained in the way prio-
rities are made, and undermines a broader strategic agenda setting for R&D and
innovation policy. The control exercised may more readily be termed negative
than positive, it implies a significant weakening of RCN strategic elbow room
and potential to broader and long term policy deployment.
As mentioned, the Ministry for Science and Education is a major player in
general R&D policy as well as education policy. It funds some 25 % of RCNs ye-
arly budget (in 2003). But given the fact that R&D and education are both core
areas in innovation policy, one may also expect that these two areas in the mi-
nistry are highly co-ordinated to represent a coherent policy.
This is not the case. It may be illustrated by the discussion of the research in-
stitute sector in Norway. Currently, Norway, after the privatization of major
parts of the institute sector, has some 200 small and large research institutes,
mostly organised as private foundations. These are linked to the public R&D
policy through a system of basic and strategic funding. The point here is that the
recent and current debate point to the possibility of this sector being to big.65
The R&D department of this ministry has typically held that position. However,
by recent policy developments, universities and colleges have been met with in-
creasing demands for more external funding aside the funding received from
the ministry. This has led the institutions in many cases to establish their own
applied R&D institutions generally in competition with the research institute
65 This debate tends to overlook the fact that many countries have a similar size, but organised as units of
public institutions and therefore more invisible in the institutional landscape. 
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sector. The development has been encouraged by the other main department in
the ministry, the department for universities and colleges. Hence, it is fair to say
that the left hand does not know what the right hand does.
The story behind this seemingly lack of co-ordination is in simple terms as
follows: Through the late 1990’s the political pressure for increased external
funding for universities and colleges increased, partly to enhance their econo-
mic vitality and reduce the dependence on public funding through the state
budget. The department for R&D affairs observed that this would lead to con-
tradictions in the institutional as described above, but chose to downplay the
possible internal conflict in the ministry. This was done to better engage in the
struggle with the Ministry of Finance as this was seen as more important for
overall R&D policies. Further, there is an important difference between the two
sister departments, as the R&D department has its roots and rationale in de-
veloping R&D policy, but had no administrative responsibility for external in-
stitutions. The department for universities and colleges, on the other hand, was
established with the explicit rationale to ensure the administration of the exter-
nal institutions. It was preoccupied with the task of managing the resources for
these institutions, and hence took on the role of being the protector of them.
Currently, the division between the two has been reduced, but the example abo-
ut the consequences of external funding illustrates very well how policies inter-
act, and how easily they may be left un-coordinated.
5.4 Innovating a new policy: The case of the tax 
credit scheme
The dynamics of policy making often take place within the context of tensions
between policy agendas or orientations. This was certainly the case in the deve-
lopment of the SkatteFUNN or the tax credit scheme (see Kaloudis 2004 for a
complete analysis). The market model of conservatives or liberals has typically
been opposed by the welfare model of the left. The tensions that often arise con-
cerns whether to choose market models in promoting R&D investments, i.e.
using tax breaks, or relying on direct measures through R&D support pro-
grammes. In addition this, there is often a tension concerning the use of the tax
system for various purposes in general, often not following strict part lines.
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Chronologically, the history of introduction and implementation of Skatte-
FUNN in Norway may be divided in three periods:
1. The first period started officially with the nomination of an expert commis-
sion (Hervik-commission), 23rd of March 1999, with a mandate from the
Ministry of Trade and Industry (NHD), in collaboration with the Ministry of
Finance (FIN) and the Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs
(KUF) to assess measures to enhance R&D-activities in Norway. This period
ends on 8th of March 2000, when the committee’s final report was formally
delivered to the minister of NHD.
2. The period after the 8th of March lasts until the implementation of the mea-
sure in October 2002. This period is characterized by intense policy maneu-
vers about how the suggestions from Hervik-commission may be
implemented. Initially, under the period of the Labor party minority
government (government Stoltenberg), a measure for subsidizing firms’
purchase of R&D services from R&D institutions with a predefined budge-
tary limit (FUNN) was introduced in 2001. During the period 2001–2002
competing agendas of political parties and a shift of government in October
2001 (Bondevik II) resulted in the phasing out of FUNN and in the intro-
duction of SkatteFUNN. Inputs and initiatives from the responsible mini-
stries, in particular FIN, KUF and NHD played also an important role in
shaping the FUNN and SkatteFUNN.
3. The period after the implementation of the SkatteFUNN is characterized by
a period of adjustment. As predicted by the Ministry of Finance, businesses
immediately embraced the SkatteFUNN measure. R&D tax credit claims in
2002 surpassed 700 million NOK. In comparison, the entire budget of the
Research Council of Norway for stimulating R&D and innovation in 2002
was about 600 million NOK. On the other hand, because of the popularity
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of SkatteFUNN, the tax revenue loss for the Norwegian state has been
understood as considerable. This triggered the need to limit funding to
direct measures for enhancing R&D and innovation to balance the budget.
The main recommendations of Hervik-commission were:
- The introduction of a new tax-credit measure enabling small and medium si-
zed firms to claim a deduction of 25 per cent of maximum 4 million NOK
R&D expenditures from their tax bills. This upper limit can increase to 8 mil-
lion NOK if the R&D-project involves collaboration with an R&D institu-
tion. In case of negative balance sheets, companies receive an allowance
equal to the tax credit. The Research Council of Norway (RCN) has to appro-
ve that the project falls within the definitions of an R&D activity before the
firm has the right to a tax credit. There was a disagreement in the commis-
sion about whether the new measure should be practiced as tax credits or as
R&D subsidies. The majority of the Commission voted for the tax credit so-
lution. The chairman of the Commission, prof. Arild Hervik, together with
two other members of the Commission voted for the subsidy solution.
- In addition to the introduction of this new measure, the Commission recom-
mended a 500 million NOK increase in funding of strategic and marked ori-
ented R&D programs administrated by RCN. However, the Commission
proclaimed that the content of these programs should be adjusted in order to
achieve good synergies with the new measure.
- The funding of risk-taking loans as well as seed-money to start ups, adminis-
tered by The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND),
should be increased.
However, a shift in government soon after to a Labor party government led to the
rejection of using the tax system and to an introduction of a subsidy scheme. Soon
after the current government took over, representing a political philosophy more in
line with the market model, and introduced a tax base scheme, but even more com-
prehensive than what the Hervik commission had proposed, embracing all firms.
The interesting issue is how the introduction of ths innovation policy instru-
ment contrasts with some key arguments on the tax system. Formally, the argu-
ments against a tax credit scheme was that the new measure represents a real ex-
pense for the State and , therefore, that it should be treated as an expense in bud-
getary terms. This argument refers to a subsidy measure administrated
exclusively by RCN and not to a tax credit measure.
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Furthermore, a subsidy measure could be administered by RCN without the
unnecessary and inefficient involvement of tax authorities. Furthermore, it was
argued that businesses would appreciate a swift subsidy payment through RCN
compared to a tax credit realized after a considerable time interval. Finally, in
principle, it is not recommended to impose such tax credits on the tax system
because this leads to a non-neutral tax system. A non-neutral tax system, accor-
ding to economic theory, distorts optimal investment decision making in priva-
te sector (see Skatteutvalget 2003: 61).
There are reasons to believe that the real worry of the Ministry of Finance
was that firms’ statutory right to tax credits may result in a substantial (and in
worst case uncontrollable) loss of tax revenues. A subsidy measure, administe-
red by RCN, could, if necessary, be framed inn by defining some maximum up-
per budgetary limits to SkatteFUNN in the annual State budget. In other words,
a tax credit scheme would escape the control of the Ministry of Finance. A sub-
sidy scheme was easier to manage and to bring it under the Ministry’s budgetary
control if necessary.
On the other hand, the SkatteFUNN was seen as the main instrument to
achieve the overall goal of reaching a level of R&D investment, measured as sha-
re of national GDP, equal to that of OECD average within a five year period.
This goal, which had the support of the government parties as well as most par-
ties in parliament, necessitated a rapid and substantial increase of R&D invest-
ments especially in the private sector. A tax credit scheme is less likely to be fra-
med in budgetary terms compared to a subsidy scheme. And the unrestrained
use of SkatteFUNN by the private sector was considered as a precondition for
reaching the OECD average R&D level of investments.
The real shaping of SkatteFUNN took not place in the parties, but in the civil
service, especially in negotiations between the relevant ministries. During the
second half of the 1990’s the Ministry of Education, Research and Church Af-
fairs was struggling hard to get increases in public investments in R&D and in
national R&D investments in general. So did the Ministry of Industry and Tra-
de, although they focused exclusively on R&D of relevance to the business sec-
tor.
They did not succeed. The Ministry of Finance proposed substantial cuts in
the public R&D investments, and the two pro-R&D ministries had to struggle
to keep the funding lines they already had allowable. The Ministry of Finance
did not accept the arguments presented by the policy advisers in the Ministry of
Education and Research, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and other mini-
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stries with substantial R&D portfolios seeing R&D and innovation as the driv-
ing force of economic growth.
The Ministry of Education and Research proposed the establishment of a
special fund for long term research and innovation, the proceeds of which could
not be touched by the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Trade and Industry
was given the task of working for a genuine tax incentive, which – of course –
would also be outside the control of the Ministry of Finance. By combining the-
se two measures, the proponents of R&D could hope to gain more funding for
public R&D (through the fund) and private R&D investments (through the tax
incentive scheme).
It could perfectly well be that the policy advisers and civil servants in the
«pro-R&D» ministries originally preferred other solutions, seeing the weaknes-
ses of both approaches. However, given their negative experiences in the annual
budget negotiations with the Ministry of Finance, a tax credit scheme would
seem to be an alternative strategy to bypass the objections of the Ministry of Fi-
nance.
5.5 The need for long term perspectives: The 
case of the fund for research and innovation
As will also be discussed further below in the context of the state budgets and
the ministry of finance in the co-ordination process, there has in recent years
been an ever increasing tendency to more «short-termism» in Norwegian policy
making. Further, the sector principle was in the late 1990’s seen as a potential
source of government failure for policy areas that requited a more long term
perspective. As the government in the 1999 white paper on research made a
commitment to increase the R&D expenditures by 5 % yearly, it ensured this by
installing a funding mechanism that literally cheated the short term prioritisa-
tion logic of state budgets. The solution was the fund for research and innova-
tion, or generally the Research Fund which was set up with a capital base of 3
BNOK, whose earnings should be used to fund research. The capital base has
been increased in subsequent budget years. The fund came also to replace a less
stable funding for research through a specific public lottery scheme. It is notable
that Research Fund was initiated by what many observers held as the first re-
search minister in decades (Mr Lilletun) who saw the need for long term invest-
ment, implying that ministers of science and education have been mostly occu-
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pied with educational matters. Hence, the case underlines the importance of
personal characteristics and ambitions of ministers in question.
The fund is currently (for the year 2003) earning 793 mill NOK from a capital
base of 15.8 BNOK. 1/3 of that is devoted to universities and colleges, while the
RCN retains the rest (see also below). Although the priorities change according
to strategic decisions in RCN, the research part of the fund is crudely allocated
to the following priority areas (2002 numbers):
• Quality enhancing initiatives (including Centres of Excellence) with some
175 MNOK;
• Large, long term initiatives or programmes (270 MNOK, like functional
genome research, cross sectoral competence areas, long term programmes
like petroleum research, material research, biospecter research linguistics
and technology, polar climate research, modernisation of the public sector,
and basic deceases;
• Thematic priorities in the white paper of 1999 (58 MNOK).
However, there are some dilemmas concerning this new mechanism for in-
creased long term priority of research. Firstly, the prioritization of the fund was
meant to channel funding to research, mainly basic research that was seen as ha-
ving been under-prioritized. Instead, the fund was increasingly used to finance
another reform, the one called the quality reform in universities and colleges.
Secondly, and this is not so much a problem as an illustration of the fund being
a solution to later defined problems, the fund became the available source of
funding for the new Centres of Excellence, as scheme that was initiated in 2002
to enhance scientific quality in selected areas. Thirdly, and this is possibly the
most interesting feature, the fund is managed by RCN, and hence reinforcing
what some observers call a monolithic structure of research funding in Norway.
In other words, as the fund was established, there was no policy in place to en-
sure a funding diversity in the system, and the fund is generally subsumed under
the RCN’s priorities. Fourthly, as the earnings from the fund is defined as part
of the state budget and thus in the realms of the ministry of Finance, there are
some uncertainties as to whether the fund represents a source of fresh money
(see Sejerstad 2001).
As a concluding remark, the fund is an interesting illustration of a well meant
mechanism for additional or supplementing research funds, but is institutiona-
lised under the umbrella of RCN and thus subsumed under the «monolithic»
umbrella of this single research council. Still, the fund helped significantly to
improve the long term allocation and prioritization of research funding.
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5.6 Innovation in fish farming: Different agendas 
from different ministries
Firms and industries may typically be seen as a nexus of influences from various
governmental policies. These may or may not be well co-ordinated. However, it
is not necessarily the case that these policies represent instrumental, easy-to-co-
ordinate priorities. Rather, they may reflect deeper concerns and traditions in
various ministries that lead to a policy environment for a given industry that is
both complex and inconsistent.
This is well illustrated in one of the studies in MONIT on how innovation in
fish farming is influenced by a set of partly inconsistent and conflicting cultural
preferences, priorities and mentalities in policy. Fig 13 shows the interaction on
the industry level of four participating ministries in the development of the fish
farming sector in Norway (Ørstavik 2004).
This diverse focus is supported by a sector-specific knowledge base typically
organised in research institutes and agencies that are linked to the agendas of
their principals (ibid). Hence, the conflicting agendas are not only a ministerial
challenge of integration, but a structural challenge of providing coherence in
the knowledge base used for developing policy for such a sector.
Lastly, the results from this study visualize the difficulties in creating a cross-
ministerial strategy for innovation policy, and the problems inherent in percei-
ving co-ordination as a technical activity when agendas differ the way they do
in this case.
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5.7 Setting a new agenda? The Government’s 
plan for a coherent innovation policy66
5.7.1 Introduction
Responding to various pressures, the Government set out in 2002 to develop an
action plan for innovation policy. This initiative was in particular motivated by
two drivers: First the Government had been criticised for a lack of industrial po-
licy and relying only on what many critics termed «old-fashioned», hands-off
market-failure policy with no long term perspective in meeting the structural
challenges facing the Norwegian economy in a post-petroleum era. Second, a
key political challenge, often referred to as the «shark’s jaws», was the future
discrepancy between the flattening out and even reduction of state revenues
Figure 13: Conflicting agendas for an emerging industry
66 This section is based partly on Mariussen, Å. and Fraas. M.: Development of the entire country: Regional
and innovation policy co-ordination in Norway. Report on the MONIT regional study, draft, STEP-Cen-
tre of Innovation Research, Oslo, 2004.
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from the petroleum activity and the increasing welfare expenditures to be met
by the state. This section explores the emergence of this new agenda and to what
extent it is linked to subsequent stages of the policy cycle.
5.7.2 Which agenda?
How was a «holistic» innovation policy to be understood? The SEM declaration
of the Government of 2001 explicitly referred to the OECD indicators of na-
tional expenditures on R&D. GERD is a measure of public and private invest-
ments in research and technological development, as a share of gross national
product. Throughout the 1990s, GERD had an important role in countries with
an offensive R&D policy, like Sweden, Finland, and Korea. In these countries,
both public and private spending on R&D is high. High public R&D spending is
supporting knowledge development in new industries, where private actors are
following research oriented competitive strategies – and accordingly are inves-
ting heavily in R&D. The combination of these factors results in a high over-all
level of R&D spending. Throughout the 1990s, it also resulted in the develop-
ment of regional clusters in university and industrial cities, where public spen-
ding on universities and basic research was successfully combined with private
investments in industrial R&D, exploiting regional labour markets with highly
educated young people. This public – private dynamic was often supported by
local and regional planning, known as regional cluster policies. It led to growth
in capital and medium sized university cities, as well as high GERD levels. In
Norway, this industrial dynamic was not initiated. This was the problem refer-
red to by the SEM declaration.
However, a high GERD level is an outcome of a specific form of interaction
between public and private partners. The absence of this dynamic in the case of
Norway clearly had to do not just with lack of public investments in research,
but also in the structure – and strategic orientation – of Norwegian private in-
dustries. Most private Norwegian firms – and in particular large firms in the
core national clusters, petroleum, maritime and marine industries – are not
competing to create new science driven products and industries. Instead, inno-
vation strategies are often focussing on a higher level of efficiency in processes
based on natural resources. Norway has developed sophisticated supplier in-
dustries, for example in machine and engineering industry, as well as highly
sophisticated bio-technologies, serving the users in the petroleum industry,
shipping, marine aquaculture, and fishing. These industries provide advanced
technological products to the receiving industries. An important source of fun-
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ding is public investments in industry-oriented R&D, through the Research
Council of Norway.
The specialization of the Norwegian marine – maritime – petroleum clusters
in the direction of process efficiency did not motivate these big private actors in
the Norwegian industries to invest as heavily and directly in R&D as their co-
unterparts in for example Swedish and Finnish ICT industries did. During the
1990s, this disjunction in the Norwegian innovation system efficiently aborted
the initiation of the public – private synergy in promoting R&D investments
which characterized the leading OECD countries. Instead of a positive spiral of
public and private investments, leading to the development of new high tech in-
dustries, the Norwegian innovation system is locked into a negative spiral, whe-
re lack of private R&D investments is used as an argument to avoid public in-
vestments.67
One may have thought that the structurally determined lack of firms with en-
trepreneurial or research driven strategies of competition could be seen as a
problem. On the contrary, this somewhat reluctant attitude among the big in-
dustrial actors soon became an argument against the public sector in going in
an OECD direction. If private actors are not investing in R&D, why should the
public sector do it?
When the problem emerged on the agenda through the SEM declaration, it
is not surprising that the initiative to move further was made by the Minister of
Research and Education, and the Government’s Research Committee. The Mi-
nister, Kristin Clemet (Conservative), was a former deputy director of the Con-
federation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO). As the leader of the Re-
search Committee she initiated a cross-ministerial process that continued with
the process of a new «holistic» Norwegian innovation policy led by the Ministry
of Trade and Industry.
Given the fact that the initiative came from the science and research sector,
one may have expected an understanding of innovation inspired from the
OECD emphasis on new high technologies, such as ICT, biotechnology, nano-
technology, etc – and a corresponding thrust in the direction of regional clusters
in university cities, copying the «OECD success story».
On the contrary, in the debate which followed, it soon became clear that the
dominating perception of innovation in the core group of people working on
coordination was more in the direction of innovation policy interpreted as a
67 We are not suggesting that copying the Swedish or Finnish pattern would have been wise. For example,
the enormous concentration of R&D in a few firms in Sweden is both unfeasible and irrelevant in the
Norwegian system, and possibly even ineffective in the Swedish.
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new form of cross-sector industrial development policy. It was new job creation,
rather than new path creation – i.e. creation of new science based growth indus-
tries – which was the focus.
As it were, the expansion of the scope of innovation policy, which was im-
plied in the reference to «holistic» policies, tended to reduce the significance of
R&D policy. Not surprisingly, then, the responsibility for the development of a
new «holistic» innovation policy was transferred to the Ministry of Trade and
Industry in the summer of 2002. This move tended to draw attention in the di-
rection of existing industries which are the major clients for industrial policy
operators. A key focus became the commercialization phase of the knowledge
conversion process, rather than on science based knowledge creation, and new
path creation.
This focus tended to give the work on innovation policy a somewhat in-
cremental point of departure. A Swedish consulting company was asked to
make an analysis of the Norwegian innovation system. This analysis did result
is some specific recommendations, which were referred to in the plan. However,
the over-all point of departure for innovation policy development was not ana-
lytic, but administrative. Horizontal innovation policy was interpreted as an up-
graded industrial policy – on a cross sector basis. Needless to say, because this
placed the administrators in the leading role, the policy making approach taken
tended to be incremental.
The minister – level coordinating group had an administrative cross sector
secretariat, a HIP committee, the objective of which was to develop an action
plan. It was supplemented with thematic groups.
Most of the ministries were involved in this work. The objective was to de-
velop a policy that encompasses more than the «traditional» innovation mini-
stries of Trade and Industry, Education and Research and the Ministry for Local
Government and Regional Development. The development of the plan was cha-
racterized by horizontal dialogues and hearings between sector ministries, whe-
re the development of the understanding and definition of the new policy was
debated. Not surprisingly, this approach stirred up several conflicts of under-
standing and definition within and between the sectors.
The interaction undertaken in this process was time-consuming, and some-
times frustrating, as there was resistance against the new policy initiative from
several partners in the sectors. Sector ministries mobilised arguments against
the new policy approach – to defend their objectives and modes of operation.
There was also a keen interest in the process from the level of the ministers, who
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were personally engaged. Accordingly, the process did not produce the needed
consensus in terms of developing an analytical basis of the new policy.
These debates led to a document which was published in 2003, titled «From
idea to value» (Fra ide til verdi). Failing to achieve a consensus-based, imple-
mentable action plan, it was emphasized that the document was a start of a lon-
ger process.
5.7.3 Loosing coherence: Towards prioritization and 
implementation
The document specified that it was an initiation of a process which would con-
tinue. The next step came shortly after the publication, and it gave the develop-
ment a more operational – and somewhat different direction. This was the Go-
vernment Conference of February 10. Here, the innovation policy of the go-
vernment was presented. This policy was a step further – to some extent in a
new direction, as compared to the previous plan.
The 10 February conference took as a point of departure three major chal-
lenges
• Increased international competition, globalization, and technological deve-
lopment
• Reduced production in the core Norwegian industry, petroleum and natural
gas,
• Increased costs in maintaining the national welfare and pension system (the
shark’s jaw).
The emphasis was a bottom up mobilization:
The government recognizes clearly that innovation policy must be bottom-up.
Innovation takes place in firms and markets, where people meet. Innovation
may also take place in cooperation with other firms and with actors within
research and education. But also local authorities are important to enable
innovation. Much may be achieved through a right attitude in a municipa-
lity. (…) we also have given the county council (fylkeskommune) a new re-
sponsibility to enable industrial development. (Prime Minister Bondevik,
10 February 2004)
In this way the government strategy was more oriented towards regional policy
than the plan presented from the administration. The over all approach was fol-
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lowed up by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Ansgar Gabrielsen, who stated
that
To ensure our value creation, we must mobilize a common effort in the entire
country
The Ministry of Trade and Industry launched 8 projects (later to be extended by 2):
• The petroleum and maritime cluster. This project is targeting the core na-
tional cluster
• Commercialization of research, with a focus on a leading regional cluster in
the «technology capital» of Trondheim
• Northern-Norway – which is a territorially oriented project targeting job
creation in peripheral areas
• The industrial cluster Kongsberg-Grenland-Vestfold (a regional cluster)
• The Interior, a territorially oriented project to develop specific industries in
agriculture and forestry
• The capital city and regional centers, a project for city and regional develop-
ment
• Entrepreneurship
• Innovation in services
However, these projects were not based on key priorities in the earlier plan, nor
were they a result of a strategic process of prioritization. They were selected
through an informal process in which the minister basically made a choice.
Hence, there is a weak link between the agenda setting as laid down in the earlier
problem identification and plan, and the priorities that came of the process.
This spilled over into the implementation phase: First, the Government cho-
se its own ministries to manage the implementation, giving a marginal role to
the implementation agencies like RCN and Innovation Norway. This represents
a solution contrary to earlier practice in which ministries do not have any expli-
cit competence in project management. In fact, it runs contrary to the Govern-
ment’s own principle of public management as one of contracting out tasks that
were not seen as key to the Government’s role.
Second, the as key civil servants were not part of the prioritization process,
and disagreed with many of the outcomes, they tended to resist the implemen-
tation even to the point of communicating negatively about the likely realisation
and funding of these projects, to the detriment of both internal confidence in
the ministries, as well as external confidence among the business community. It
should be noted that the key ministry responsible for the innovation policy, the
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Ministry of Trade and Industry, is dominated by a strong market failure/market
efficiency focus in its traditional economic policy.
Third, the loss of confidence was reinforced as one the implementing agen-
cies, Innovation Norway, received dramatic cuts in its budget in the process of
the half-yearly state budget revision in June 2004. The proposal for a cut (later
«saved» by the opposition in Parliament), severely undermined the over all con-
fidence in the new innovation policy vision of the Government. This problem
came on top of a message of uncertainty in the conference of February 10: The
minister of trade and industry communicated that the most important role of
the Government in this innovation policy was «to get out of the way» of private
industry, hence substantiating a hands-off position vis-à-vis the market.
5.7.4 Inherent contradictions in the policy cycle: A summary 
analysis
How can the initiation and early implementation of the Government’s plan for
a comprehensive innovation policy be assessed? What may explain the apparent
problems that this otherwise timely and important initiative met? We try in this
concluding section to bring together some dimensions that, linked to material
elsewhere in this report, may put the plan in perspective. It should be added that
a specific outcome of this process, the Government’s Committee for Innovation
Policy (RIU) will be assessed in chapter 6 as a co-ordination structure.
The external threat: Raising the right agenda?
The perception of the external challenge to Norwegian economy as outlined in
the document is mostly long term and related to the widening divide between a
long-term decline of petroleum revenues and increased welfare expenditure.
The challenge is structural, and the implication would have been to identify a
structural solution, like science-based creation of new industries or long term
structural change. This is not the case, rather, a shorter term approach of indus-
trial policy and new job-creation became the main focus.
Innovation policy v. s. economic policy
Whereas economic policy in Norway has a focus on general framework condi-
tions promoting entrepreneurship and industrial development, some protago-
nists of innovation policy argued for the need to make an emphasis on specific,
selected industries, like the existing strong clusters – or, alternatively, new high
technologies.
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This stirred up a debate on «industry neutrality» as a guiding principle in
economy policy. The solution to this conflict is balanced in the stated «vision of
the government» in the introduction to the document:
Norway should be one of the most creative countries in the world, where fir-
ms and people with courage and creativity have good opportunities to de-
velop profitable activities. In important areas, Norway will be leading
internationally when it comes to knowledge, technology, and value creation.
The orientation towards general or «neutral» industrial policies to promote in-
dustrial development and entrepreneurship and job creation across all industri-
al sectors is obvious through the first sentence. The second sentence balances
this approach in the direction of national specialization, without specifying
what this specialization is.
Innovation policy v. s. R&D policy
To those who may have expected this document to be in line with the OECD ap-
proach of the SEM declaration, it came as a surprise. The document did include
an argument for innovation policy, as well as a summary of the debates between
and within sectors as to how innovation policy was to be understood and defi-
ned. However, to the extent that the document refers to networks of innovative
firms, the text is going to great lengths is rejecting the significance of R&D pol-
icies.
Innovative firms are learning firms. It is firms who develop or access the new
competence necessary for renewal, either from customers or suppliers, vari-
ous public or private knowledge institutions, private consultancies, or from
public industrial policy agencies. (Fra Ide til Verdi, page 9)
This statement is a factual description of typical incremental innovation proces-
ses in core Norwegian industries, in line with findings from innovation research
in Norway. Importantly, the document does not make a problem out of this state
of affairs. This is surprising in the context of the discussion on what innovation
is:
Innovation builds on new knowledge and new combinations of existing
knowledge. New knowledge may be generated from practical experiences or
through systematic research and development. (Fra Ide til Verdi, page 9)
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When it comes to measures, four priorities are mentioned:
• Educational institutions which produce and disseminate relevant knowledge
on an high international level
• Better competence in natural sciences and mathematics
• Strengthen life-long learning and the capacity of firms to apply knowledge
in practice
• Increase knowledge flows between industry and milieus of knowledge and
competence, regionally, nationally and internationally
The section on «research, development, and commercialization» includes refe-
rences to
• Work to get Norway to the OECD average in GERD within 2005
• Increased quality and internationalization in Norwegian research
• Stimulate increased research in private industries (through a tax deduction
scheme)
• Stimulate commercialization of results of research
• Stimulate better interaction between knowledge institutions and private
industrial actors
In sum, the emphasis on knowledge diffusion and application vrs knowledge
creation is well balanced:
An increased emphasis on R&D to promote innovation must be accompa-
nied with increased emphasis on commercialization of research results. (Fra
Ide til Verdi, page 27)
The analysis presented on why Norway has such an over-all low level of R&D
does emphasize the industrial structure. The answer to this problem is,
however, incremental. There is no focus on the need to create new R&D-inten-
sive industries. On the contrary, most of the core measures, such as a tax de-
duction system for private investments in R&D, and programmes to promote
public R&D – private industry networking, are incremental.
Regional policy
The plan document does not have any specific section on regional policy. In-
stead, regional policy considerations are referred to throughout the entire do-
cument. In the introduction, the potential problematic link between a science
driven innovation policy and regional policy is presented:
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There are significant regional differences when it comes to the industrial ef-
forts towards development, growth, and innovation. Differences in industri-
al structure, differences in distances to important markets and knowledge
milieus may also generate different preconditions for innovation. An in-
creased transformation from capital- and labour intensive industries to-
wards knowledge intensive industries may also lead to a lower level of
activity in the periphery.
This obviously is at odds with the over all objective of the government regional
policy, which is
to secure population, value creation and sustainable local communities all
over the country (The SEM declaration, page 37)
Hence, throughout «Fra Ide til Verdi», several references are made to various
aspects of regional policy, such as:
• The new objective of the Norwegian Research Council, to support R&D all
over the country, through regional offices
• The regional development role of educational institutions and regional uni-
versities
Competing paradigms
The general emphasis of «Fra Ide til Verdi» is a long-term understanding of the
global threat to Norwegian economy. Even though more short-term challenges
are mentioned, often referred to in terms which are quite similar to general in-
dustrial development policies, it is the long term structural challenge that is
identified.
• No analysis of the national innovation system. Even though several references
are made throughout the document of properties of the Norwegian industry
and innovation system, no comprehensive theoretically informed analysis of
the National system of innovation is presented. Instead, references are ad hoc
– and related to specific problems, such as lacking private investments in
R&D, explained through loose references to industrial structure. This in-
cremental approach may be expected, given the theoretical dispute over the
field. The field of innovation policy was, and still is, characterized by a con-
flict between on one hand innovation theorists, on the other hand neo-clas-
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sical economy theorists. Given this theoretical conflict, assuming an analyti-
cal point of departure for policy development was a lost option.
• An eclectic operational approach. The other option – which was chosen, was
an administrative, eclectic approach. The horizontal or holistic notions of
innovation policy are feeding into a general discussion of the framework
conditions for Norwegian industry. On this basis, long lists of measures are
presented. Several of these measures are quite similar to industrial policy
discussions in general.
• The definition of innovation policy is a contested area. In the analysis of the
document, outcomes of conflicts with other sectors are referred to several
times, as compromises of conflicting interests between innovation policy
and other policy fields. These outcomes contribute to limiting the scope of
innovation policy. They include
 R&D policy, where the importance of basic research and knowledge dis-
semination through education and the labour market is emphasized.
 Regional policy, where the potential conflict between a research driven
innovation policy approach – and regional policy spatial redistribution,
was emphasized
 Economic policy, as the document did not contribute to solving the inhe-
rent conflict within Norwegian economic policy, between on one hand
improving general framework conditions for industry through reducing
public spending, on the other hand public investments to break the spiral
reducing R&D investments in Norway, preventing new path creation.
• The new innovation policy represents an inherent challenge to the existing
policy making paradigm in economic and innovation policy. The general
arguments for R&D are well founded, but weakly linked to long term struc-
tural choices. To some extent we see two paradigms competing: First, the
traditional, strong and well-founded paradigm of market efficiency and
market failure, implying a focus on framework conditions and an ideologi-
cally based, clear interface between the state and the market. This implies
also a state that «gets out of the way» and interferes in markets only if these
are distorted. Second, a more dynamic, long term paradigm based on the
presumed need to make choices concerning structural development, a flexi-
ble and pragmatic understanding of the interface between the state and the
market, and integration between policy areas.
Rapport 6-2004m.fm  Page 97  Wednesday, November 10, 2004  9:29 AM
98    Rapport 6/2004
6 Co-ordination of policy 
formulation and 
implementation
6.1 Indicators of horizontalization
Measuring horizontalisation in national STI policies is a challenging task. So far
there is no established set of indicators for this. The challenge in this part of
MONIT is to grasp qualitative aspects of policy in a meaningful system of me-
trics. There is a growing number of studies on qualitative indicators for policy
action. This body of knowledge can be helpful for MONIT. However, one
should be aware of the obvious limitations of such indicators.
The Norwegian organization of STI policies is in this respect an interesting
case study for several reasons. Firstly, there is a strong and long tradition of a
sector-oriented R&D and innovation funding policy, meaning that each ministry
has a particular responsibility to fund research relevant to ministries’ objectives.
This decentralized pattern of public R&D funding has recently been viewed as
a major hindrance for an overall harmonisation of the Norwegian innovation
policy efforts (Arnold, 2001).
Secondly, the Research Council of Norway was established in 1993, by mer-
ging Norway’s existing 5 research councils. The main coordination responsibil-
ity of national STI-policies is hence delegated to the Research Council of Nor-
way, despite the principle of sector-oriented R&D and innovation funding po-
licy. A distribution of responsibilities on the policy level is attempted re-
integrated on the implementation level.
Therefore, there is a tension between ministries’ sector-oriented R&D fun-
ding policies and a centralized Research Council of Norway which complicates
the horizontalisation efforts of national STI- policies in Norway. In the follow-
ing we shall briefly present some basic indicators and facts about STI-funding
policies in Norway.
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6.1.1 STI funding in Norway
Figure 14 displays shares of R&D funding in the Norwegian innovation system
the last 20 years. In 1990’s there is a marginal change towards more private R&D
funding relative to public sector. Figure 16 below displays the flows of public
R&D funds in 2001.
Figure 15 illustrates some of the dilemmas in coordinating ST-policies in
Norway. Research Council of Norway (RCN) share of the total public R&D fun-
ding was 26 per cent in 2001. R&D direct subsidies to the private sector (as per-
forming sector) are mainly channeled through other sources than RCN, mainly
through The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND).
Collaboration between SND and RCN has been quite successful the last years
and there are several concrete examples showing an increasing degree of inten-
ded complementarity between these two key institutions for innovation policy
in Norway.
Figure 14: R&D expenditure in Norway by source of funding. Shares of total 
R&D-funding (20,3 billion NOK in 2001). 
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Ministries funding of R&D performing institutions takes place either directly
with funding allowances or through RCN/SND. Figure 17 shows the break-
down of public R&D funding by ministries.
Figure 16 illustrates the sector-oriented character of public R&D funding in
Norway. Of course the most important ministries for ST-policies in Norway are
the Ministry of Education and Research and the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
However, other ministries, such as, The Ministry of Health, Ministry of Fishe-
ries, etc. are important funding actors of R&D performed by research institutes
and the private sector. Several studies of the Norwegian innovation system con-
clude that a better coordination between Ministry of Education and Research
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry could be achieved.
Figure 15: Public funding to performing sectors. 2001 (2003 data constructed 
later in 2004). 
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For a better understanding of the potential for an horizontal and coordinated
ST-policy in Norway is important to know not only who are the main funding
agencies, but also what kind of funds are channeled through the state budget.
Table 2 below shows some of the main types of R&D funding in Norway in ad-
dition to ordinary R&D transfers via the state budget.
Norwegian participation in EU’s Framework programmes is seen as the main in-
strument for a more international oriented R&D activities in Norway and have
had a remarkable direct and indirect effects on how modern innovation policy
Figure 16: Norwegian public R&D-funding by ministries. 2003. Project 
assignements excluded. Million NOK.
Table 2: Types of public funding of innovation in Norway 
Ministries' funding of R&D and innovation
Funding of the Norwegian participation in international R&D organizations and in EU's re-
search
Research Fund (Forskningsfondet)
Tax deductions of R&D costs (SkatteFUNN)
Public procurement of technological products and services
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is performed in Norway. Not only R&D performers have been more exposed to
international R&D collaboration, but also ministries and RCN has been expos-
ed to international policy processes. From this point of view the Norwegian par-
ticipation to EU’s research at a policy level have had a catalytic effect on the ad-
vancement of a more coordinated Norwegian ST-policies.
Apart from the ordinary governmental R&D funding there is another im-
portant ST funding source in the Norwegian policy system. That is the Norwe-
gian Research Fund of about 350 million NOK in 2002. This type of funding is
mostly earmarked for high-quality basic research, but it also provides funding
to alleviate various ‘bottlenecks’ in the Norwegian innovation system (see
Forskningsrådet 2003). This type of funding is of great interest in the future sin-
ce it could be used as an instrument to achieve a better coordination within and
between national ST-policies. Yet, it is too early to assess the long-run effects of
the Norwegian Research Fund on the Norwegian innovation performance.
Tax deductions for R&D expenditures is also a new policy measure in Norway,
launched in October 2002, and has been welcomed by many firms, most of them
having a low R&D performance. A high-profile evaluation of the effects of this
new policy measure is already under planning. A particular important issue in
this evaluation is the direct and indirect effects of tax R&D deductions on the
overall coordination of ST-policies.
Last but not least is the question of how public procurement policies are ma-
naged and coordinated in Norway. To our knowledge there is a poor if any kind
of coordination between state agencies and ministries with respect to procure-
ments of high importance for the Norwegian innovation system. This is a key
question, since the value public procurement in Norway amounts to 200 billion
NOK per year. Although this figure includes all types of public procurements,
it is almost certain that the value of procurements of innovation intensive pro-
ducts and services is much larger than the value of the total R&D public fun-
ding.
6.1.2 Measuring coordination in innovation policy agendas
Some few qualitative indicators may be introduced in order to address this qu-
estion. These are:
- Importance and frequency of innovation white papers: There is no regular pro-
duction of an innovation white paper, although innovation policy issues are
included in white papers on R&D, industrial policy etc. The Norwegian whi-
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te paper on R&D policy is signed by the minister of education and research
and is published every 4–6 years. The last white paper has been published in
1998 (Stortingsmeld. Nr. 39, 1998–99).
- A mechanism for regularly producing a government innovation policy agenda
or innovation strategy. The Ministry of Education and Research is responsible
for the overall R&D policies, for funding large parts of basic science in the
universities and colleges, and for coordinating sectoral R&D policies. In this
respect and at the governmental level there are two high level committees
both chaired by the Ministry of Education and Research focusing on science
and technology policy related issues: the inter-ministerial Research Forum
for Government Officials (departementenes forskningsutvalg – DFU) and
the Government’s Research Board (Regjeringens forskningsutvalg – RFU).
DFU consists of high level civil servants in ministries with a substantial
R&D-budget and its main responsibility is to discuss issues of organization
of research and innovation policies, including R&D-budget. RFU consist of
ministers in ministries with a substantial R&D-budget and its main respon-
sibility is to prepare policy proposals for the cabinet.
- The number of ministries mentioning innovation in their mission statement: In
Norway only the Ministry of Trade and Industry explicitly mentions innova-
tion as its major objective. However, and as mentioned earlier, almost all mi-
nistries have and take seriously their responsibility for funding research (and
innovation) falling within their domain. From this point of view one may say
that in the Norwegian governmental system there is relative high awareness
of but, perhaps, little focus on ST policies.
- Number of STI-programmes are governed by more than one ministry? RCN
identifies and implement a large number of multidisciplinary R&D-pro-
grammes. All these programmes are almost invariably discussed, negotiated,
approved and funded by one or more ministries. Therefore, in important in-
novation areas, such as, biotechnology, ICT, nanotechnology, etc. there are
many R&D-programmes funded jointly by many ministries. This again un-
derlines the importance of a RCN as a coordinating actor of STI-policies in
Norway, but highlights also the high degree of coordination costs for funding
type of innovation not clearly defined within ministries jurisdiction.
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6.1.3 Co-ordination practices
Before discussing the practical arrangements in place in the Norwegian system,
some indications on the practices and behaviour of the governance system will
be illustrated. From the questionnaire we are able to tap into participants’ ex-
periences and assessments, and the results are given in fig. 17.
A striking feature is that while the majority of the respondents were involved in
the development of the Government’s plan for a comprehensive innovation po-
licy (HIP), only some 35 % assess that the HIP work led to improved collabor-
ation with other departments or ministries. The existence of informal networks
both within own organisation and beyond pervasive, but participation in syste-
mic co-ordination processes within own organisation or across ministerial bo-
undaries is quite mixed.
6.2 Two levels of R&D policy co-ordination: 
The role of RFU and GFU
R&D policy constitutes a core element in innovation policy. It is essentially
cross-ministerial and is long term, and therefore subject to specific governance
or co-ordination needs. In this context, two arrangements stand out as key to
the co-ordination process. They are the Government’ research committee
(RFU) and the ministries’ research committee (DFU), and should be seen as a
response to co-ordination needs arising from the following tasks:
Figure 17: Co-ordination practices in innovation policy
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a) White papers on research policy. Research policy is cross-ministerial, as il-
lustrated earlier in the way each ministry, according the principle of sector
responsibility, has the responsibility for research policy for its own sector,
presuming that they know better than anyone else about long term know-
ledge needs in the sector. The white papers on research are typically produ-
ced every four years (the current situation is 5), and includes the need to
exchange information, conduct discussions and dialogue, organising view
points from people and organisations inside and outside government and the
like. The work on white papers in the Norwegian system is relatively open,
typically with inputs from stakeholders and experts, and could be seen as a
functional alternative to research foresight processes which has not been
conducted in Norway to any great extent for policy formulation purposes.
b) Yearly state budgets (see further discussion below): This work contains co-
ordination activities especially in case of growing budgets, as the additional
budget from one year to the next needs to be prioritized and distributed
across ministries. In this case the Ministry of Science and Education has a
role in proposing to the Ministry of Finance how a possible distribution
should look like. In the case of no-growth or reduction, the co-ordination is
essentially done by the Ministry of Finance in their budget balance activity,
and the Ministry of Science and Education is not able or competent or inter-
vene in other ministries budgets.
c) The relationship to the RCN: As RCN is funded by a whole range of mini-
stries, and the interaction between the council and the ministries needs to
be co-ordinated.
6.2.1 RFU (the Government’s research committee)
This committee is at the outset key to an over all political co-ordination of re-
search policy. However, and this is a contradiction between objective needs and
political priorities, it is not institutionalised as such. Every government makes
its own decision about the RFU, and one government (the Jagland government
in the mid-1990s) even chose to close it down, having other solutions in mind
that did not materialize). Hence, the mandate is general, and reinvented for eve-
ry government. It contains the general task of preparing research policy issues
for discussion in Government. The composition varies, relative to the import-
ance given to R&D by each government, to personal interests of ministers etc.
But the key ministries are always member of the committee. An interesting
point is the current coalition government’s decision to only allow less than 50 %
of the ministries participate, to avoid a (party-based) decision making process
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ahead of the formal process in government as a collegium. The meetings are
held according to need, typically 3–7 meetings a year. The Ministry of Science
and Education is the secretariat and co-ordinates and prepares the agenda etc.
It also co-ordinates inputs from other ministries.
It is also variable to what extent civil servants take part in these discussions.
From a «back up» point of view, one should expect that this was a regular rou-
tine. However, for policy co-ordination to take place without representatives
from the individual ministries performing a strict sector based view, the minis-
ters often take part alone. It should be noted that this political, or supra-minis-
terial, function is similar to the way the committees of deputy ministers perform
(see below). The RFU processes and performance vary, mostly with the degree
of importance attached to the policy issues at hand.
6.2.2 DFU (the ministries’ research committee)
The DFU covers all ministries. It is no decision making body, and it is being led
from the Ministry of Science and Education. In earlier times, under a different
state budget regime, there was close contact between the two levels of co-ordi-
nation. However, with the current framework budgeting (see below), these two
have been mostly decoupled.
DFU meets 4–6 times a year, participants in are typically middle manage-
ment, often 1–2 from each ministry, and DFU is used as a reference group dur-
ing the work on white papers on research. DFU is an important body for the Mi-
nistry of Science and Education as it helps fulfil the co-ordination function as-
signed to the ministry. In the structural context of the Norwegian public
administration, DFU co-ordinates through exchange of information between
ministries, henche facilitating dialogue between them.
In the context of DFU, there is an additional structure of ministries, in par-
ticular the two camps of «industrial ministries» like trade and industry, agricul-
ture and fisheries, and «welfare ministries» like social affairs and health. These
two camps resembles quite different outlook on R&D policy, they have very dif-
ferent traditions and cultures, making positions in the DFU quire different. The
Ministry of Science and Education has a better contact with the industry mini-
stries, as the latter seem to have a more profound R&D policy as a means to
achieve political goals. There is no policy integration at hand between the two
camps, e.g. to let industrial R&D be better integrated in areas of health to enhan-
ce health technology and the relevant industrial development. Rather, such
group structures to some extent compete to have their priorities and line of
thinking embedded in the white papers. For example, the recent white paper on
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research had a tilt towards industrial issues while welfare issues were to a lesser
extent on the agenda. Additionally, bilateral processes between ministries take
place, as e.g. is currently the case between the ministries of Agriculture and of
Fishery in their attempt to align their research policies.
An additional feature of the work of DFU is its working group. To allow for
better continuity and to be better able to deal with key policy matters, DFU has
also constituted a smaller working group of some eight ministries. They meet
more frequently than DFU itself, and focuses especially on policy issues arising
from the interaction with RCN, e.g. priorities like large programmes.
6.3 Committees of (deputy) ministers
On major cross-sectoral policy issues, the government organise politically to le-
verage the co-ordination of the issues at stake. One response may be to organise
the work within specific committees of ministries, like spontaneous RFU’s. This
became the response to the deep co-ordination needs arising from the attempts
to formulate a horizontal or coherent innovation policy in 2003 (HIP). As will
be discussed elsewhere, this policy came out rather empty-handed and consti-
tuted a will to act rather than substantive policy. Committees of ministers are
generally difficult to assess, as they are dependent on ambitions, dedication, fre-
quency of meetings and the nature of policy issues. Such committees are backed
up by deputy ministries as a working group. For example, the HIP initiative was
a new area in which the ministers participating had little experience, and it re-
presented policy initiatives in which some major ministries felt uncomfortable,
e.g. ministry of trade and industry. On well known policy issues, such commit-
tees may prove more fruitful.
The more relevant co-ordination mechanism that is often put in place, are
committees of deputy ministers (CDM). The Norwegian system of government
is based on one minister for each ministry (which is frequently changing in
numbers and structure due to reshuffling, with the inherent result of fragmen-
tation), and 2–3 deputy ministers, each responsible for dedicated policy areas.
The CDM is typically initiated on the basis of a governmental decision which
formalises the selection of ministries to participate, and the mandate and
leadership. CDM has a key ministry as the «owner» and which also serves as the
secretariat. The CDM meets frequently, often once a week, implying a tight
working schedule. Based on lessons learned, the following seem to constitute a
reasonable assessment of conditions for a positive impact if CDMs:
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• In case of difficult political questions (in particular in the context of a coali-
tion government), there is a need to clarify these in government itself, and lay
these clarifications down in the mandate, with the result that deputy minis-
ters may more easily arrive at consensus.
• A dedicated leader with legitimacy vis a vis the others in the group.
• Ministerial ownership in the sense that ministries internalise the policy area
as one of their own.
• The deputy ministries need to behave as politicians and not as representati-
ves or defenders of sectoral interests of their own ministry. This means also
that civil servants participating in the process need to be held in check.
• Active participation is needed, and participation based on duty rather than
ambition is detriment to the outcome.
• Well known policy areas are better suited to this co-ordination mechanism,
while new ones, like the HIP, needs more time for maturation and more
substantial inputs to have an impact, as they may to a greater extent chal-
lenge the traditional policy priorities and values of the ministries in ques-
tion.
6.4 State budgets and the role of the Ministry of 
Finance
The budgeting process and the Finance Ministry has been alluded to above, but
are important components in innovation policy co-ordination and deserve a
more extensive treatment. This is even more so the case as the budgeting pro-
cedures changed recently and contrary to expectations gave more elbowroom to
the Ministry of Finance and less to sectoral ministries.
Given the lack of long term budgeting, the yearly process for the state budget
becomes a key ingredient in the innovation policy co-ordination. The process
itself is best depicted by the R&D budgets, and according to the so-called secto-
ral principle in Norwegian governance, each ministry is responsible for the
R&D for its own domain. The process itself overseen, if not steered, by the Mi-
nistry of Finance, which takes the role of keeping the budget balance decided by
government.
The co-ordination of R&D and innovation allocations were more easy in the
former system than the current. Formerly, the process started with the develop-
ment of an adjusted budget based on last year’s allocation adjusted by additional
calculations. In addition, the various ministries presented new proposals, and
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the budgets were discussed in detail also in government. Although this was a
rather messy process, this was not the case for the R&D budgets (Olsen 1997):
• Typically, an R&D pool emerged, that is a total allotment for R&D
• The proposals from the ministries were then assessed against the pool
• The Ministry of Science and Education proposed a solution for distribution
across ministries, thereby taking on a role as a mini-Ministry of Finance.
This was then discussed and decided in co-ordinating bodies like DFU and
RFU (see below).
Hence, there was a system in place that ensured a reasonably coherent treat-
ment of R&D budgets. This was helped by a decision in 1989 of 5 % growth in
R&D as well as a certain profile on these investments. R&D was given priority,
contrary to what has been the case in subsequent years.
More recently, a new system emerged, still in place, called framework budge-
ting. This system is organised through three governmental budget conferences:
The first (called Halvorsbøle conference and takes place in March) includes the
main priorities for next years budget based on proposals from ministries. As a
preparation for this conference, the Ministry of Finance issues so-called R-pa-
pers, basically a list of budget cuts to retain a given budget balance. The inte-
resting feature here is that contrary to what one may expect, the Ministry of Fi-
nance does not cut on the overall sum (in a framework mode) but directly on
detailed posts in sectoral ministries’ budgets. Hence, the Ministry of Finance is
deeply involved in substantial policy. The key player in this conference is there-
fore the Ministry of Finance. The outcome of the conference is a set of prelim-
inary budgets and some proposals that are held against a «profile pool» of new
initiatives.
Then there is the adjustment conference in May/June. The ministries have by
then allocated the budget posts and often also proposed new ones. The Ministry
of Finance is also here the key player. Cuts are suggested often with reference to
the budget balance. The third conference is set in August, where the profile pool
is distributed.
For our purpose the main conclusion from this process is that ministries re-
sponsible for R&D and innovation policy areas have their influence reduced to
the benefit of the Ministry of Finance. As R&D lost on the priority lists during
the 1990s, R&D is now one of many areas each minister has to defend, com-
pared to earlier where the overall pool received more strategic attention, includ-
ing recommendations from RFU.
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An interesting feature of the recent developments in the budgeting process,
is the erosion of long term perspectives, most notably the disappearance of the
tradition long term programme issued by the ministry. For decades there was a
system in place with the function to ensure long term planning in state budge-
ting. The ministry had at times even its own secretariat to perform this function.
However, the viability of this system, or rather the steady tendency of having a
marginal impact of the long term planning, led to the abandonment of the four
year planning schedule. It is evident that this development also leads to greater
degrees of freedom for the Ministry of Finance, as it assumes the strategic role
for each yearly budget.68 It is also notable that the government as a collegium is
weak vis a vis the Ministry of Finance. The government may at points in time
communicate visions and strategies, e.g. on targets for R&D investments like
reaching the OECD average. But the Ministry of Finance has a very high barrier
in the way room is made available for such change in priorities. A new target by
the government is not sufficient, and is even not seen as binding, if it is not bac-
ked by a formal government decision that explicitly implies that there will be
sacrifices in other areas. This was in fact the case in the white paper on research
from 1999 (no 39) in which the investment target was extensively discussed.
Rather than choosing the fluctuating target of a share of GDP on the level of
OECD average, which had been a loose target for a while, the government for-
mulated a binding decision to raise the R&D expenditures by 5 % every year
over the period covered by the white paper (4 years). This was largely followed
up, and the logic of this is that the more expenditures are committed in this way,
the less elbow room there is for the ministry of finance in the processes for the
yearly state budget.
6.5 Building agencies: 
Processes and outcomes in the case of the 
Research Council of Norway
6.5.1 Introduction
The Norwegian state is fragmented, contains more than a fair share of contra-
dictions, and a part of this picture is the «agencification» of the governance sy-
68 An interesting inconsistency in this case is that the ministry demands from the municipalities a four-year
budget plan, and while the revenues of these to a great extent come from the government, the latter’s
budget are decided on a one year basis, albeit long term allocations typically in the welfare sector. 
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stem. The case of the Research Council of Norway (RCN) illustrates very well
the complex political processes behind such a reform in the innovation policy
governance domain, and is therefore discussed here.69
The phenomenon of research councils; separating funding from research,
first came into being immediately after the Second World War. The Norwegian
Research Council for Scientific and Industrial research (NTNF), under the Mi-
nistry of Trade and Industry (NHD), and the Norwegian Research Council for
Agriculture (NLVF), under the Ministry of Agriculture (LD) was established in
1946. In 1949 a council for basic research was set up: the Norwegian Research
Council for Science and the Humanities (NAVF). NAVF was organized in four
sub-councils: medical, natural science, social science and humanities.
The council system was lively debated in the post-war period; the tasks and
roles of the existing institutions, proposals to create new research councils and
the co-ordination and co-operation between the different councils. New sub-
councils were established and reorganized. The universities were not content
with their position under NAVF; they wanted to become more active in deter-
mining their own research policy. And, a series of committees on governmental
level were put in place to advice on research policy.
In 1970 a proposal was put forward to establish a single research council, but
was turned down due to its «centralist» character. However, a need for a reform
in the research council structure was repeated several times during the 1980s.
The need for ‘strategic agencies’ was emphasized, including a capacity of medi-
ating between the political and the institutional level. The relationship was
handled through the ‘Langslet doctrine’ in the early 1980s, bringing in the prin-
ciple of distance between ministries and research. The ministries roles were to
define research budgets and not buy research needed to support policy develop-
ment directly.
In 1990 the Grøholt committee was set up to examine the research council
structure. They reported in 1991 that there should be a single research council,
organised in three strategic disciplinary councils; for life sciences, physical sci-
ences and technology and culture and social science. The members of these Dis-
ciplinary Boards and the Executive Board should be appointed by the govern-
ment, and the Ministry of education were to take over responsibility for the core
funding from the other ministries. The sector principle would in that way be
modified, and make room for a national research strategy. There should be a
69 See also Remøe, S. and Røste, R. Agency level governance – the case of the Research Council of Norway.
Report to the MONIT project, Oslo, STEP 2004, and reports from the evaluation of RCN by Technopolis
(www.technopolis.com). 
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better integration of basic and applied research and a professionalized research
management. Research councils should be central, neutral managers of inte-
rests, and research policy advice and implementation should be more clearly se-
parated in a re-establishment of the research policy council (Forskningspolitisk
råd).
There was agreement on the general lines of the Grøholt report, but conflict
on the divisional organisation. In February 1992 the major research ministries
had reached a compromise upon the new research council; constituting in the
six sub divisions (områdestyrer) that became the 1993-organisational model:
• The Bio-production and Processing Division (BF)
• The Culture and Society Division (KS)
• The Environment and Development Division (MU)
• The Industry and Energy Division (IE)
• The Medicine and Health Division (MH)
• The Science and Technology Division (NT)
The government had some other proposals than the Grøholt committee regar-
ding the institutional model. A white paper in June 1992 said that the Govern-
ment should appoint the Executive Board, but that the Executive Board it self
should appoint divisional boards. The Government was also of the opinion that
the research policy council was not necessary, this should be a part of the tasks
of the new research council. The White Paper emphasised in particular the uni-
fied nature of the council with the unified organisation of the council’s adminis-
tration. RCN was formally established on the 1st of January 1993.
6.5.2 RCN comes into being
To understand the reasons and dynamics of RCN and its birth, there is a need
to go back to the formative year of 1988. At that time there was general agre-
ement that the system of 5 research councils and additional policy bodies like
the National Committee for Environmental research, the Committee for Deve-
lopment Research and eight steering committees for priority areas, was in great
need of a major overhaul. The system was plagued by many overlaps, rivalries
and unclear division of labour (Olsen 2000).
Further, the political climate was ready for change. There was a readiness in
the system to generate better conditions for innovation, and it was seen as «…
important to make borders between sectors and subjects permeable for know-
ledge and experiences in other sectors and fields. A more integrated research
council system was therefore more than wanted (ibid).
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The white paper addressing these issues ended up with a proposal to let an
independent commission dig deeper. However, there was no easily traceable
link between the proposal by the committee and what came out of the process
as the end result. In fact, it is unclear what the committee actually proposed.
This is evident from the following statement from one of the committee mem-
bers:
The basic idea in the proposal by the committee was that there should be
three research councils. To be better able to distribute resources between the
three councils, based on a certain degree of scientific competence, and to en-
sure awareness of areas falling between them, there was at the last moment
proposed an umbrella organisation. The result, however, was one council, far
more integrated than what the Grøholt committee had proposed. Whether
this was caused by misreading of the committee proposal or simply that the
political bodies had a very different view than the committee, I do not
know.70
More insight into this process is gained from the text in box 2, which links the
proposal and the government decision with the Standing committee in Parlia-
ment. This committee felt uncertainty as to the proper policy to be chosen, and
as a result became victim to this uncertainty, partly due to its own traditional
lack of insight in research policy matters.
70 Interview with prof. Francis Sejersted, member of the Grøholt committee, Forskningspolitikk 2/2001,
Forskningsfondet: Nytenkning må til.
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Box 2: RCN in the political process1
A White Paper was submitted to Parliament in May 1992. Initially, the Stan-
ding Committee on Education, Research and Church Affairs in Parliament
did not see the Government proposal as an obvious road to follow. It was hesi-
tant about discussing the White Paper at the end of a hectic spring term im-
mediately prior to the summer recess. Actually, the Government had pre-
sented the White Paper after the normal deadline for such matters in the
spring session and postponing it was not far-fetched.
The Standing Committee made a preliminary decision to postpone the
matter to the autumn term. They also had in mind to study the R&D organi-
sation in the other Nordic countries before reaching a decision. The possibi-
lity of delay led to great disappointment as much activity among the suppor-
ters of the reform inside and outside of government. They argued that the re-
search councils should not be in limbo much longer. More importantly, they
feared that the opposition to the merger might gain momentum. However,
some key actors outside the Parliament managed to make the Chairman chan-
ge his mind on the timing.
Most of the Committee members soon came to the conclusion that for
them it was a matter of «taking or leaving» the entire reorganisation package.
It was so much of a fragile compromise that it could easily fall apart if even mi-
nor changes were introduced.
The result was that the bill passed the Standing Committee without any
major cleavages or changes; the entire Committee except its Progressive Party
members (right wing liberalists) supported the Government proposal.
However, the Committee stated that all resources to the new council should
be channelled through the Ministry of Education and Research. This was a
significant, but somewhat naïve point of view, given the existing financial
structure, practice and ministerial attachments to he existing funding and
existing research councils. For example, the Ministry of Industry channelled
the greater part of its funds for R&D through NTNF; Parliament’s view would
have revolutionised R&D funding in Norway. The Committee also stated that
all staff members in the former councils should be offered jobs in the new
council. Accordingly, the new organisation started off without much new
blood. 
1 From Hans Skoie: Diversity and Identity: The Merger of Five Research Councils in Norway. Science and
Public Policy Vol. 27, no. 2 pp 83-96, April 2000.
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Another point made by Skoie should be added. The White Paper was drafted ca-
refully, almost strategically, and gave room for different interpretations on im-
portant points. The text was vague, and critical considerations were left out. It
was basically a compromise paper representing a commonality of the positions
taken by the research councils and the relevant ministries and «attuned to par-
liamentary politics». Further, states Skoie, «… its supporters accepted the mer-
ger at a very abstract and general level; during the process many of the qualifi-
cations they set for accepting it de facto evaporated – they could not at all be
met.» (ibid).
A stunning fact is also that while such a reform needs «lubricants» to get off
to a good start, typically with sufficient funding, the availability of financial re-
sources declined severely over the next years, challenging both the outside legi-
timacy as well as the internal functioning of the council (see more below).
6.5.3 The policy function: Introducing a contradictory role?
The research council set up from 1993 had, as mentioned, several contradic-
tions that were mainly structural. A salient feature of RCN and the new all-en-
compassing model was a combination of a classic, albeit highly integrated, re-
search council, whose main function was to implement policy through funding
operations, with a policy function. In fact, the RCN was expected by the minis-
ter of Science and Education to perform a key science policy advisory role.
RCN never played the role foreseen. In addition to arguing for increased
budgets for R&D and providing strategic plans for its own mission (impossible),
activities that should be expected anyway (Skoie 2000), no major initiative for
long term policy development and prioritization was taken. Meetings were held
between the council and the Standing Committee of Science and education.
«However, these meetings do not seem to have been particularly successful, and
the number of attending ministries has varied considerably. It is noteworthy
that criticism of the lack of vigorous advice and engagement from the Council
has come from the Government itself» (ibid: 91).
A wider assessment of this seems needed. First, it seems natural that a new
council like RCN, meeting with demanding and multiple expectations from the
environment, puts the finger on the scar left over from the start up phase: A sig-
nificant reduction in funding that on the one hand led to infighting for re-
sources and on the other hand to recurrent demands vis a vis its owners for ap-
propriate funding. The lack of funding in the years after this reform is clearly a
policy or government failure leading to years of set-backs of the overall innova-
tion system. Second, the inability of the council in performing its policy advis-
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ory role may be linked to a vacuum of interest and capability in the political sy-
stem. The Standing Committee of Science and Education in the Parliament was
essentially an educational committee, and members had little if any competence
and interest in science or research policy. Still, they were the committee to deal
with the R&D budget, while R&D policy and budgets were not dealt with in the
committee that had the long term interest in the area from an innovation policy
point of view, namely the Standing Committee of Trade and Industry (follow-
ing an arrangement by the presidency of Parliament, see also ch. 5). It is there-
fore fair to conclude that the capability failure in the RCN to perform was and
is mirrored by the lack of capability, competence and interest in the political sy-
stem as well as a structural failure of attention in that system.
This criticism of the RCN may also seem unfair. After all, there was an inde-
pendent research policy advisory committee before 1993, but was abandoned
with the research council reform. The RCN was then expected to pick up that
function, and has held it until the new reorganisation valid from 2004. While
the research policy function may be criticized in general, it played a constructive
role in the inputs for policy processes related to white papers and decisions on
membership etc in the EU framework programme. Still, the RCN has now more
competition in policy advise, as the ministry of Science and Education currently
seeks advice and inputs from other institutions like the NHO (employers’ insti-
tution, NGO’s, universities etc).
6.5.4 Lock in and representation
RCN is a typical example of an ongoing trend in reforming governance in Nor-
way: the tendency to build monolithic structures71. Such structures may or may
not offer co-ordination effects. One point to highlight, however, is the lack of
diversity in the system, and the possibility that innovators become too depen-
dent on one source of funding. This is especially the case as Norway has a tradi-
tional corporatist structure with representation by interest groups on various le-
vels in committees and boards. As we have seen, the committee structure of
RCN invites representatives from user groups, usually established firms, to ser-
ve on these committees, and these in turn both formulate objectives and con-
tents of the R&D programmes and decide on distribution of support.
The political economy of this situation is evident, and is further supported
by a recent study by Narula (2002). While referring to the representative com-
71 A recent one is also the merger of three innovation related agencies: The Norwegian Trade Council, The
State’s Fund for Industrial and Regional Development (SND) and the Norwegian Council for Tourism
into one new “Innovation Norway”.
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mittee system already described, he illustrates that established firms (larger,
energy- and or capital intensive firms) are able to control the priorities of indus-
trial R&D in the RCN, thereby confirming the tendency to exclude smaller,
technology-intensive firms which then have to seek R&D funds and collabor-
ation abroad.
The governance problem of producing legitimate allocation decisions when
persons serving on the committees are themselves parties with interests in the
outcome of the decisions is evident. Hence, on a repeating basis, the problem of
independence is haunting the governance of RCN. While there is a need to crea-
te distance, legitimacy and independence, there is also a need to ensure suffici-
ent expertise in the areas in question. Further, the system of programme com-
mittees is well in line with the kind of corporatist traditions in Norway. While
there may be possible to initiate several changes of a detailed nature in the re-
cruitment and proceedings of the committees, the main challenge of such a sy-
stem in a small country is to operate with sufficient transparency and exploit the
potential for using expertise from abroad.
6.5.5 Mission impossible?
The framework conditions under which RCN has operated mean that many of
the more radical ambitions for the reform are simply «mission impossible»
(Arnold et. al. 2001: 118 and 39):
Given the birthday present of a large budget cut, followed by several years of
apparent government indifference, the organisations locked itself into in-
ternal battles and budget struggles.
RCN was set up in a period of very active educational reform. (…) In 1993,
with the students’ unions demanding better grants and the overall govern-
ment budget under pressure, the government reallocated money from re-
search to fund students grants, reducing the budget of the new council. (…)
the government therefore unknowingly created conditions which would
make it very difficult for the vision of an integrated research council to be re-
alised. This birthday present of a 10 % budget cut set divisions and ministries
against each other in a struggle for resources, reinforcing the very obstacles
to a more co-ordinated research policy that RCN had been created to over-
come.
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The public rhetoric was that of New Public Management, and that RCN had
enthusiastically embraced many of these ideas including the principle of man-
agement by objectives. However, at the same time, the Ministries’ interests in
research are strongly sectorized, and they have a tendency to defend their sec-
toral interests through very detailed micro-management of their research ex-
penditures. Neither the promised money nor the required autonomy was gran-
ted to RCN. The effectiveness of horizontal co-ordination advisory mechanisms
and the level of government interest in research and innovation policy have
been highly dependent upon personalities.
The relationship between RCN and Innovation Norway should enable
strong cooperation on closely selected topics and this will require a mutual
understanding of both the research and the innovation support traditions. With
two well-organized bodies this could be easier to achieve, the authors argue, as
with the current unified but fragmented RCN seems to be «governed by peace
treaties and not by a common strategy.».
The Ministry of Education and Research commissioned the evaluation and
was therefore responsible for following up this work. A Project Governing
Board (Styringsgruppe) was led by Christian Hambro. The Government an-
nounced on the 28th of May 2002 that the RCN would not be split into two or
more organisations.
In an article in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten72 the Minister of Edu-
cation and Research, Kristin Clemet, underlines the need for a close relation-
ship between basic and applied science, which is much easily achieved in one or-
ganisation. Moreover, she argues that in many areas the present organisation
functions well. There is for instance a better co-ordination of international re-
search co-operation, and a more coherent research institute policy. She men-
tions several issues that will have to be improved, however. Basic science will
have to be strengthened, the innovation policy functions are to be strengthened
and better co-ordinated, and internal governance and co-ordination must be
improved.73
On the 10th of September 2002 the Government announced that the RCN
would be reorganized. Six divisions were to be replaced by three:
72 Aftenposten, May 29 2002.
73 Norwegian press release at http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/aktuelt/pressem/045071-070045/index-dok000-
b-n-a.html
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• The Division of Science, which is to contribute to the development of basic
science within all disciplines as well as the development of interdisciplinary
research
• The Division for Innovation is to be a partner for the private and public sec-
tor in the field of research and innovation. The main focus is on innovation.
• The Division for Strategic Priorities is to identify and prepare research
needs of national importance and develop the knowledge base in priority
areas.
In the October 2002 National Budget, the Ministry of Education and Research
gave more detailed presentation of the plans for reorganisation.74 The Ministry
underlined that:
• The main board must be strengthened
• It may be possible for members of the divisional boards to be member of the
main board
• The main board will be given the responsibility of reorganizing the institu-
tion within the framework given by the Government
• The Research Council will remain an important policy adviser for the
Government. However, the Government will to a larger extent also ask
other parties for advice.
On September 1 2003 the Research Council switched to its new structure, in ac-
cordance with the reform implemented by the Government.75
6.5.6 The new model – end of governance failures?
A key issue emerging from the story of RCN is the fact that the process is one of
integration rather than co-ordination. In other words, merging several research
councils into one reflects institutional integration, but not necessarily policy-
co-ordination. A contrast with the EU framework programme may be helpful
in demonstrating this point. Over several programmes the framework system
has tried to integrate various activities into more wholistic approaches. For
example, the 3rd FP concentrated greatly on technology platforms, integration
basic and applied research in building knowledge bases for industrial develop-
ment. The 5th FP attempted another focus in using key actions in achieving a
74  St.prp. nr. 1 (2002-2003) Utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet, pp.19 http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/
publ/stprp/045001-030004/index-hov003-b-n-a.html
75  See St.prp.nr. 1 2003 and new governing regulations for the Research Council decided by the Cabinet on
December 20th 2002. 
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more coherent approach to R&D. The current 6th FP instigated Integrated Pro-
jects (IP) to essentially do the same as the technology platforms attempted in the
3rd. Hence, the framework system has been, albeit to variable degrees, an instru-
ment to co-ordinate activities through programme design. RCN on the contrary
has been an institutional solution of sectoral integration to what was at the out-
set labelled co-ordination problems. But RCN as an institution has not been
able to co-ordinate various R&D activities through e.g. organising basic and ap-
plied research in dedicated programme design.
Therefore, one may rightfully ask the question of how much institutional in-
tegration is warranted to ensure proper policy or activity co-ordination? There
is no straight forward answer to this, but what maximum integration leads to is
a lack of capacity in the system for self-organisation and adjustment, important
co-ordination mechanisms that play a role in more loosely coupled, flexible or
competitive systems. To high a degree of integration may therefore lead to loss
of co-ordination, but of course greater political control. There is therefore a ten-
tative contradiction in this material, as policy makers delegated policy making
functions to the research council while at the same time opting for an organisa-
tional solution that had greater control potential. In sum, we do not see signifi-
cant effects in policy co-ordination from these reforms. Some further conclusio-
ns may be noted:
First, the case of RCN illuminates a political failure in the sense that the po-
licy system is ill equipped, both in terms of attention and capabilities, to formu-
late and address long term R&D policy issues. The consequence thereof is two-
fold: The political system abdicates from key policy challenges while leaving to
the RCN to perform such a role. Next, RCN becomes the level of co-ordination,
as the political level is not able to do this. RCN as an example of the agency level
in the Norwegian governance system, is then overburdened with co-ordination
tasks for which it has few resources. The root of this problem, as we see it, may
even lie in the deeply set sectoral system in the Norwegian public administrati-
on, a point that is dealt with elsewhere in the MONIT project.
Second, of the two explanatory factors presented for the organisational and
co-ordination problems in the RCN, the structural and the cultural, we see the
structural as the main problem. The inbuilt tensions in the organisation, reflec-
ting a diverse set of expectations from a complex environment, stretched the
council in many directions, giving much leeway to the divisional level. Agency
level co-ordination in a world that is highly fragmented is indeed a mission im-
possible.
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Third, the linkage with the outside world, or rather the constituency,
through extensive user representation in boards and not least programme com-
mittees, may have a great number of advantages. But the history also illustrates
that it may extend the conflicting interface with the user community as well as
with the science community. This has in particular been the case in several con-
flicts relating to funding decisions, where people serving on programme com-
mittees are part of the decision making process concerning funding of projects
by their own competitors. These governance dilemmas have not yet found their
solution, but an independent study is being conducted with the aim to recom-
mend new procedures.
Fourth, the policy process leading to and beyond the reform to the current
reorganisation was based on assumptions of governance that were ill-concei-
ved. The idea of a monolithic structure being the answer to apparent co-ordina-
tion problems seems to be a political preference for control rather than diversi-
ty. Researchers and innovators in the Norwegian system may have got a one-
door system to forward their applications, but have lost a diversity in which dif-
ferent research and innovation policies may have enriched the funding system
and priority setting. We conclude at this point that the underlying logic of
achieving coherence is through bureaucratic, agency-level monoliths, rather
than flexible and diverse, even competing systems. An interesting implication
from this is that a monolithic structure may be by far sub-optimal in achieving
policy coherence and –co-ordination in an otherwise fragmented environment,
while agency level flexibility and adaptability may be better of, creating the ne-
cessary diversity for innovators and researchers to exploit a system in which
bounded rationalities are better distributed and represent lower risks.
Fifth, and this is a key issue, there is a need to distinguish between integration
and co-ordination. The story of RCN is not a story about co-ordination as such,
but rather sectoral integration on an institutional level. Such integration may or
may not have co-ordination effects. The process, as well as the outcome, was
evidently focussed more on developing a controllable institution than on achie-
ving dedicated co-ordination impacts.
In sum, the story of RCN is one with great and well-meant ambitions, but
with many weaknesses. It illustrates that the decision making process is weak,
in that far more resources are deployed for ex-post evaluation of the reform
than a thorough ex-ante assessment of the status quo as it was. Reforms with
vast implications are carried through without a sound policy assessment, and
represent often a trend in time and personal political ambitions of
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ministers and other key actors. We do not know how a revised, multiple sy-
stem of research councils would have looked like, but a system of more diversity
would not necessarily be worse off when it comes to co-ordination and buffe-
ring the complex system of interests in the environment.
6.6 The Government’s Committee for Innovation 
Policy: A necessary addendum?
One of the outcomes of the innovation plan issued by the Government in 2003
(according to some observers the major outcome) was the establishment of the
«Government’s Committee for Innovation Policy» (RUI). Given the perceived
need to co-ordinate policies across policy areas, RUI was given a key role, and
in the Norwegian system it assumes the strategic body for the Government’s
strategy in this area.
RUI is conceived basically according to the model of RFU, but as an extended
version. While RFU is made up of 5 ministers, RIU has 10 ministers, including
those for ministries like health, public administration, finance, and foreign af-
fairs. It is led by the minister for trade and industry. The most striking feature
of RIU is that it was organised as a separate institution and did not contain or
reorganise RFU. Hence, RIU is a governmental paradox: It has a broader re-
sponsibility than RFU, but has no responsibility for the R&D part of the inno-
vation policy. That is still contained in RFU.
As the RIU is just recently established and has no track record of perform-
ance, a reliable assessment is not warranted. However, some features of RIU
may be highlighted, as it seems to resemble some important characteristics of
the innovation plan itself.
• First, it will meet twice a month (only three meetings at the time of writing).
Hence, the intensity of RIU will be higher than RFU.
• Second, RIU has not yet established a strategic agenda, including a broader
assessment of the Norwegian innovation system, long term priorities for
industrial development or redefinition of the apparent contradictions in
Norwegian policy making related to a new innovation policy.
• Third, the key tasks so far has been the management of the 8 (now 10) pro-
jects launched spontaneously by the minister of trade and industry in
February. RIU itself is focussed on a division of responsibilities for these
projects and on avoiding overlaps and inefficiencies in the overall manage-
ment of them.
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• Fourth, as in the case of RFU, the Prime Minister has no function in RIU,
and there is therefore no «supra-ministerial» role that could provide per-
spectives beyond what each minister or ministry brings to the meetings.
• Fifth, to widen the basis for policy making, RIU is being extended with
external stakeholders from industry, labour, and science to make up an
extension termed FIP (Forum for Innovation Policy). This is an open forum
where also the Prime Minister may take part, and is further extended with
new participants on a flexible basis. It meets twice a year, and its main func-
tion is to ensure a dialogue to improve the contents and direction of the
innovation policy. However, FIP is only an advisory body, and there is no
obligation for the Government to follow up its advice and recommenda-
tions.
As a rather preliminary assessment, RIU is aimed at an incremental co-ordina-
tion of the roles of the various ministries taking part in the innovation plan, and
may thus serve important co-ordination functions. FIP is a useful extension to
provide a dialogue mechanism with stakeholders. However, while RIU includes
the ministry of science and education, it is still separated from the committee of
R&D policy, which is in our analysis a structural weakness and an unnecessary
complexity. Further, the agenda of RIU does not so far compensate for the lack
of structural focus in the innovation plan and the need to engage in broad and
long term prioritization for structural change.
6.7 A summary assessment
In this section we return to the questionnaire for an assessment by those who
participate in the system. Fig. 18 taps the respondents’ views on some key di-
mensions of the governance system for innovation policy.
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One immediate striking result is that the respondents have great difficulty in as-
sessing the role and impact of the mechanisms in place. For example, both RFU
and DFU are met with uncertainty or lack of knowledge, although RFU fares
better. An obvious preoccupation is the view that the distribution of responsi-
bilities in the area of innovation policy across several ministries leads to cum-
bersome c-ordination. On the other hand, there is not much confidence in a
specialised or separate ministry for innovation either. There is much hope con-
cerning the merger of agencies into Innovation Norway, but far less so in terms
of the co-ordination impact of the reorganisation of RCN.
Taking this into an overall summary, there is apparently too little knowledge
of how the key co-ordination mechanisms actually work, and how this leads to
policy outcomes. The strong sector principle in the Norwegian governance sy-
stem is viewed as a serious obstacle to a more coherent and co-ordinated policy
although close to 50 % assess the HIP process as a useful compensating factor in
this respect.
Figure 18: Assessment of the governance system for innovation policy
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7 Policy learning: 
The production and use of 
policy relevant knowledge
7.1 The policy cycle
Common to all participants in the MONIT project, there is a simple model of
the policy cycle. It consists briefly of the following steps:
a) Agenda setting
b) Prioritization
c) Policy implementation
d) Evaluation practices
While policy learning has often been associated with evaluation and monitoring
practices at the end of this cycle, and their feedback in the cycle for analysis and
prioritization, we take the view that policy learning includes the management of
learning processes throughout the cycle. Hence, while the cycle itself may be
seen as steps to be taken by governments in formulation and implementing po-
licy, policy learning may be seen as the particular ways and means that govern-
ments may use in the production, dissemination and use of policy relevant
knowledge.
In this chapter we will describe and assess the key policy learning mechan-
isms in place in the Norwegian system. This discussion will not strictly follow
the cycle presented above, but lead to a broader discussion in this context to-
wards the end.
7.2 Knowledge and learning the governance 
system
Before discussing and analyzing the policy learning practices, we present a cru-
de assessment of some policy learning dimensions by respondents of the ques-
tionnaire. The results are found in fig. 29.
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The message from this figure is that there is a great activity but little consensus,
There is a clear assessment that available competence among collegues in inno-
vation policy issues is quite high, and there is a notable participation in external
workshops, seminars etc. The use of evaluations and other assessments and stu-
dies is very extensive, as is the receptivity of inputs by external experts like re-
searchers. On the other hand, there is a significant lack of common understand-
ing and consensus between organizations like ministries on what innovation
policy is and should contain, a fact that necessarily leads to collaboration and
co-ordination problems
7.3 Strategic intelligence
The Norwegian system does not use technology foresight as a means for for-
ward looking, strategic intelligence. Even though some socio-political traits
seem very conducive to such foresight processes, notably an otherwise corpora-
tist basis for dialogue and partnership, the political system has not embraced the
foresight model as a broad, collective process for prioritization and learning.
This seems to be rooted in a lack of tradition in such a collective, expert-based
process with an imperative that outcomes and recommendations should be in-
cluded in the government’s policy making.
7.3.1 White papers
However, there are in place mechanisms that partly serve as functional alterna-
tives. Most notably this concerns the white papers and the way these are being
Figure 19: Knowledge and learning in the governance system
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produced and used. In short, white papers are broad communications from the
government to parliament on some key policy issue. As mentioned earlier, in-
novation related white papers are being produced regularly in the case of R&D,
and less regularly on related issues.
What makes the white paper interesting from a policy learning perspective,
is that the process is quite open and based on a number of inputs from a variety
of inside and outside sources. The full cycle of producing a white paper takes ty-
pically 1–2 years. They contain a factual description on areas under scrutiny,
and include broad assessments of developments, challenges and policy options.
The government will often use extensive outside expertise, e.g. the RCN, but in-
creasingly also other sources like stakeholders (e.g. the Norwegian Business
Association). Experts often participate, indirectly or directly, in providing up-
dates on specific issues, reflections on complex topics, and summaries of rele-
vant research.
The white paper is in the Norwegian system an important document, alt-
hough they vary in quality, comprehensiveness, and ambition. Hence, some
white papers, also in the R&D and innovation policy domain, have a standing
as reference documents even parts of the proposals therein may not be followed
up for political reasons.
7.3.2 Commissions and hearings
In line with the committee based corporatist model in place in Norway, the
work by commissions (a simple term for short term task forces or committees)
is important as well as abundant. On several complex policy issues, like the re-
form of RCN and the tax credit scheme for R&D, both of which discussed in this
report), such commissions are set up with a mandate given by government or a
minister, and a participation typically based on a mix of representing stakehol-
ders and independent expertise.
As with the white papers, the work of the commissions are open, only even
more so. Their work is typically published in the series of public documents cal-
led «Norwegian Public Studies» (NOU). This practice implies full transparency
of the process, such that the independent council represented by the commis-
sion is public in full.
There are two related policy learning processes attached to these commis-
sions. First, governments will not adopt their council as such, but will often la-
unch a white paper in which the governments own assessment is presented as
well as a proposal vis a vis parliament. Second, and before this takes place, the
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study is publicized to target audiences with invitations to respond with com-
ments and proposals.
It is important to state that the link between these commissions and subse-
quent white papers or even governmental decisions is rather weak. It means that
governments may or may not adopt the line of thinking used in the studies, and
may reject partly or fully the recommendations coming out of them. Still, they
are important institutions for policy learning, in particular since they are open
and inclusive.
7.4 Evaluation practices
If the strategic intelligence function of the system is limited to two, albeit rather
well-functioning institutions, the evaluation practice in Norway in the context
of innovation policy is very broad and comprehensive. Further, it is worth men-
tioning that the various evaluations undertaken are also linked to the existence
of a relatively large sector of social science research institutes and other research
based consultancies. These are indirectly an extremely valuable part of the poli-
cy learning system, and Norway’s policy learning rests on an active exploitation
of the research community, much unlike most other countries.
For practical purposes it seems fair to divide the evaluation practice in two;
institutional evaluation and programme evaluation76. These are discussed sepa-
rately below.
7.4.1 Institutional evaluation
There is a comprehensive evaluation practice with the aim to assess and develop
innovation related institutions. Crudely speaking, there are several variations
according to which institutions are being evaluated. We may divide this practice
as follows:
a) Agency evaluation: This takes place when a responsible ministry intends to
consider reform of their own agencies. The evaluation of RCN is a near
example, the evaluation of the State fund for regional and industrial develop-
ment (SND) another. In the first case the evaluation contract was given to fo-
reign expertise, with a Norwegian subcontractor for technical assistance and
data collection. Such agency evaluation will only be launched at times of spe-
76 In addition RCN performs discipline evaluation, like evalution of Norwegian research in engineering sci-
ence currently underway.
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cific change or controversy, and is thus not a regular evaluation practice.
b) Performer evaluation: The research institutes and other knowledge institu-
tions are regularly evaluated as part of the contractual relationship with the
RCN. RCN has within its mandate the responsibility to manage the sector
via a system of basic funding and strategic institutional programming, and
regular evaluation, typically every 5 years, by a broad, often international
panel is carried out. These evaluations are conducted in a learning rather
than a control mode, implying that the institute (or university etc) in ques-
tion is expected to enact on the recommendations set forth in the evalu-
ation, and hence comply with the expectations from RCN. As such,
evaluation is carried out within the framework of improvement as an impe-
rative in the contractual relationship between the institution and the RCN.
7.4.2 Programme evaluation
Programme evaluation represents the core business of Norwegian evaluation
practice. The centre of this activity is the RCN (and to a lesser extent other agen-
cies running programmes, like SND). This activity is very much an issue of ac-
countability, whereby the funder is expected to generate reliable knowledge
about the use of its public funds.
Programme evaluation is conducted on a regular basis, primarily as an ex-
post evaluation after a programme has ended. Programmes, be they research
programmes or innovation related programmes, typically last 5 years and are
managed by a programme committee made up of a mix of stakeholders and
professional expertise. This committee manage the programme according to a
mandate supplied by the administration of RCN. This mandate is then used as
a point of reference for the evaluation.
While the programme committee will not launch a programme evaluation,
but rather the administration of RCN itself, this is different with monitoring.
Monitoring on the programme level is usually to be decided by and carried out
by the programme committee as a means to ensure learning within their man-
agement task. Hence, monitoring is not a regular activity.
7.5 Evaluation in RCN
As the RCN was established in 1993, one of the 10 tasks assigned to it by the sta-
tutes laid down by Government was to «Implement and follow up evaluation of
research and research institutions». After the reorganization in 2004 this item
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still exists, albeit changed to the shorter «ensure evaluation of Norwegian Re-
search». An evaluation strategy was developed and endorsed by the main board
of RCN in 1995. This was ambitious, and stipulated that the resources devoted
to evaluation in RCN should be raised from 0.22 % (1994) to 1–2 % of the total
budget, in line with international practice.
The strategy was comprehensive, but not followed up. Currently, there is no
overall budget for evaluation in RCN, and over the years the responsibility for
conducting evaluation has been delegated to the divisions and their need for
evaluations of programmes and research institutions. This does not mean that
evaluation is neglected. On the contrary, it is pervasive, and as seen above, wi-
dely used. The apparent problem is that the strategy endorsed in 1995 was never
followed up as a RCN-wide mode for learning and development. In particular,
this concerns the need for a comprehensive, strategic evaluation of the overall
goal fulfillment of RCN and its role performance. This was among the issues sta-
ted in the strategy, but not implemented. Neither was there a follow up on the
strategic need to create a central R&D evaluation budget for evaluation across
divisions. Rather, the yearly evaluation plan resembles a bottom up assembly of
evaluation projects by the various divisions. In sum, and which was confirmed
by the RCN evaluation, the strategic approach to evaluation is missing, a point
that has weakened the strategic role RCN could have had, and which would
have helped RCN fulfill another statutory task: Giving advice to government on
R&D policy.
However, a number of activities and improvements have been initiated over
the years, some of which are briefly discussed below as examples of a practice
that seems to be the brand mark of RCN: Operative evaluation of programmes
and institutions:
• As RCN has the responsibility of governing the framework conditions for the
research institute sector through basic funding, it has developed a set of cri-
teria for performance of research institutions that are evaluated every 5–6
years. These institutional evaluations are basically development oriented
rather than towards control.
• A forum for evaluation of strategies and instruments for industrial develop-
ment (EVA forum) has been in place since 1994. This forum aims at contri-
buting to learning and improvement of the knowledge base for evaluations
and their practical use. Several ministries participate together with RCN, the
Norwegian Business Association (NHO), Innovation Norway etc. Recently
the ministry of research and education has cut their participation, as has the
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business association, seemingly an indicator of loss of relevance. However,
State Accountancy system has showed interest and participates.
• A modular system of data collection and analysis (ProVis) has been establis-
hed, improving the database for evaluation of results, effects and impacts in
and among firms participating in RCN’s programmes.
These examples illustrate that activities are there, but, as the evaluation of RCN
by Technopolis confirms, evaluation activities are extremely decentralized,
implying too little attention to this function as a strategic learning tool, and
evaluation results are hardly used for institution-wide learning and role deve-
lopment.
It should be noted that some notable changes may be under way. With the
recent reorganization of RCN, new initiatives have been made to re-establish
evaluation as a centralized, strategic tool to enhance knowledge production and
use for policy development. With the simpler organizational set-up of RCN,
such a strategic function should be within reach.
7.6 Two lessons from other policy areas
Wrapping this chapter up, we will draw attention to some results from studies
of two policy areas within the MONIT project. As mention in the outset of this
report, three policy areas outside the traditional realm of innovation policy have
been studied, with the aim to generate knowledge of governance in complex,
horizontal areas that may be of value in developing governance capabilities for
comprehensive, horizontal innovation policy.
First, the study of ICT policy in Norway, or the governance of national plans
for the information society, a particular mode of governance emerged that de-
viates from the traditional bureaucratic, hierarchical mode. Although a special
unit in the Ministry of Trade and Industry has the central responsibility for co-
ordination of the policies and initiatives in this area, the practice of governance
is far more decentralized and flexible (Pedersen 2004). Governance rests more
on distributed knowledge flows and self organization, leaving units in other mi-
nistries or agencies with great responsibility for priority setting and implemen-
tation. In line with Grande (2001), the mode of governance can be referred to as
emergent policy making, in contrast with deliberate policy making that is more
hierarchical and top-down. While the latter may have been useful for stable,
non-complex environments, the former seems functional for dynamic, complex
environments with a high degree of uncertainty and hence less potential for hi-
Rapport 6-2004m.fm  Page 131  Wednesday, November 10, 2004  9:29 AM
132    Rapport 6/2004
erachical control. On the one hand, this mode of policy making has inherent c-
ordination mechanisms built upon flexible adaptation and self organization.
On the other hand it has a need for a more decentralized build up of informa-
tion and learning systems.
Second, and this is in line with the first point, horizontal implementation of
a particular policy area may be well supported by dedicated monitoring and in-
formation systems that help integrate information on the effectiveness and pro-
gress of policy implementation. This was well illustrated in the study of envir-
onmental policy (see Ruud and Mosvold Larsen 2004). To follow of a national
action plan for environmental policy, a particular monitoring system has been
initiated that has the potential of being a powerful tool for broad based imple-
mentation and learning across ministerial sectors, as illustrated in fig. 20.
The system builds on an overall national strategy broken down in sectoral en-
vironmental plans. From these plans each ministry is required to provide re-
ports that are integrated in a result and documentation system (RDS), which to-
gether with cross sectoral analysis form the basis of bi-annual reports from the
Ministry of Environment. Although this system is not properly implemented, it
has potential for elevating environmental policy into a dynamic, horizontal
learning area. Innovation policy would be a relevant candidate for such a sy-
stem.
Figure 20: The National Environmental and Monitoring System
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8 Towards a comprehensive 
innovation policy?
8.1 Conclusion
The general conclusion arising out of this analysis is that the Norwegian gover-
nance system is rather ill fit for broad, strategic developments in innovation po-
licy. The many contradictions in the policy processes make it extremely difficult
to formulate strategic policies for innovation. However, significant changes
have been introduced in recent years that are likely to continue. We will high-
light the following important factors supporting this conclusion.
a) Innovation as a key ingredient to economic growth and industrial restructu-
ring has received great attention. Over the past years this area of policy has
been elevated to a central place on the political agenda. However, the winner
in real terms is R&D. R&D policy has received the significant increases in
funding, not least though new mechanisms like the Research Fund and the
tax break scheme SkatteFUNN. In the context of tight macro-economic and
fiscal management, the «science rationality» and the research community
has won back a role as a nexus for governmental efforts at a knowledge-based
renewal.
b) While the government’s plan for innovation policy has been framed in an
economic policy setting, it was initiated by the R&D sector. While R&D
policy avoids cuts in state budgets, industrially oriented innovation policy is
more easily a target for such cuts, illustrating on the one hand a tension
between direct measure handles by implementation agencies and indirect
measures (SkatteFUNN). As long term budgetary allocations will need a
binding governmental decision to guide the ministry finance, we conclude
that a broad, industrially oriented innovation policy has not yet received the
backing as a governmental strategy, although rethorically it has.
c) The past decades have reinforced a market oriented economic policy giving
a far less strategic role for the state than was the case in the decades after
1950. In the context of trends like new public management and economic or
market oriented liberalism as the general pillars of economic policy, mar-
kets are expected to solve long term allocation and strategic decisions. This
has served one important function in innovation policy, competition, and
competition policy has been revitalised. The state has become a passive
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capitalist with great ownership in Norwegian industry, but without strategic
visions. The role of the state is deemed ideologically to be passive and «not
get in the way» of private enterprise as was recently stated by the minister of
trade and industry. Projects as vehicles for long term development and
resource allocation has been abandoned compared to what was the case in
the decades after the war.
d) The general organisation of the state is now more fragmented than before,
with a greater role played by agencies and the implementation phase. The
prime minister level is weak, combined with strong and autonomous mini-
stries, making it difficult to transcend yearly combats for resources in the
budgeting process. Corporatist stakeholder involvement has been reduced
relative to the former model used by social democrats in the build up after
the war. The sector principle in R&D policy has a significant strength in that
it institutes a broad-based, but distributed responsibility for each ministry
to invest in R&D in their respective areas. However, it reinforces autonomy
and independence that are assessed as being obstacles for a government
wide linkage between innovation and economic policy.
e) The parliament is organised to balance the labour burden of MPs, and the
standing committees are the key units in which the parliament allocates
resources. However, the real co-ordinating and poly making process takes
place in the party groups, instructing the committee delegates in how to
vote and decide. Hence, one may conclude that the parliament abandons
the potentially professional decision making in the standing committees to
the benefit of general policy making in the party groups. As key parties are
divided on the economic vrs innovation policy discussion, a consensus
based redefinition of industrial policy has been difficult.
f) Without formal strategic decisions for long term resource allocation for
R&D and innovation, the short term logic of the state budget implies a
powerful role for the Ministry of Finance. The ministry is in a position to
ensure detailed intervention into sector ministries priorities during the bud-
getary process. This may be useful seen from the perspective of managing
the state budget from one year to the next, but in the case of policy areas
needing a long term perspective, it seems counter-productive.
g) The reform of the research council system into one singular council with a
strategic mandate has not reduced the detailed earmarking practice of mini-
stries funding the council. Hence, as mentioned above, the sector principle
prevails. But this effectively reduces the strategic role of the council which is
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then not able to counteract the lack of strategic decision making in govern-
ment. The result is that the system overall lack significant strategic capability.
The Norwegian system is relatively well equipped with governance capabilities
for static coherence. Extensive, short term co-ordination is being conducted,
operative, ex-ante evaluation practices are abundant, and prioritization of long-
term investments in the education system for human capital conducive to the
nation’s need for technology development and competence has been a decade
long challenge. Further, and in line with this, innovation policy has not yet been
sufficiently framed in a dynamic setting, where such a broadly based domain is
seen to play a major role for long term structural change to meet the challenges
from a reduction in oil and gas production.
A main problem in the Norwegian system is the ideologically based view on
a proper interface between the state and the market. This is also a mix of fiction
and reality, as e.g. the current policy principle of industrial neutrality (avoiding
selective preferential treatment for individual industries or firms) is both en-
hanced as the leading foundation of industrial policy, while at the same time is
hollowed out through special treatment of sectors with strong corporatist stake-
holder involvement like agriculture. Further, the process of globalisation has
lead to differential regimes for different industries, implying that governments
are pushed to consider competition based adaptation of support regimes, like
for ship-building.
8.2 Recommendations for Norwegian innovation 
governance
Some recommendations emerge from the material as the need to improve the
governance system and policy processes is evident.
First, a government level function that helps increase the strategic, long term
capability for resource allocation and change of development paths is needed.
Often governments look to Finland and her Science and Technology Policy
Council for a solution. This is not presenting itself as the proper solution in
Norway as it is likely that an extra-governmental body will not function with
sufficient legitimacy. Therefore, and given the unbalanced relationship between
the prime minister’s office and the ministries, it is recommended to strengthen
this office with both manpower and formal competence to instruct and request
sector ministries on issues of long term strategy development. In particular, the-
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re is a need to improve the cross-ministerial capability for horizontal action, and
the best placed body for that function will be the office of the prime minister.
Second, more weight should be given to ex-ante policy analysis and evalu-
ation for important policy developments like the comprehensive innovation
plan. This will help generating a common understanding of the challenges
ahead prompting new initiatives, improved and joint understanding of what in-
novation policy is, better bases for dialogue in working groups and task forces
crossing ministries and create a better link between the agenda being set, the
priorities selected, and the implementation of these priorities.
Third, the ministries’ governance of the RCN needs to be changed with less
earmarking and more build-up of the council’s strategic competence. Further,
the current mandate of RCN to perform a R&D advisory policy function vis a
vis the government should be reduced and/or replaced by a standing, indepen-
dent commission to give advise to government on long term R&D and innova-
tion policy issues. This is currently being implemented as an extension to the
Government’s Committee on Innovation Policy (RIU), but steps should be ta-
ken to ensure its legitimacy and that its recommendations are followed up. A
precondition for this is that government lends ear to recommendations coming
from this body, in particular in terms of redefining industrial policy and the
choice of larger, integrated projects used as vehicles for innovation and change.
Fourth, a renewal of the role of the state in policy is warranted. In particular,
there is a need to develop pragmatic models of how a «neo-corporatist» state
may operate in a globalized economy, without entering into the traps of select-
ive support of input factors like in the 60’s and 70’s. What is needed is a policy
that better exploits the state’s potential as an organising vehicle for long term in-
vestment, and stimulation of industrial development based on the assumption
that different industries generate different externalities and thus different
mechanisms for knowledge creation, flows and use.
Fifth, there is a need to develop what may be termed multi-objective policies
through both policy co-ordination as well as policy integration. While the for-
mer rests on various mechanisms through which alignments of policies may be
achieved, the latter implies greater efforts to building multiple goals into broa-
der, integrated policy domains, in particular domains with a great degree of ho-
rizontality.
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8.3 Generic capabilities for innovation 
governance
All countries have their own history, specialisation, culture and institutional
trajectory and set-up. Hence, lessons and recommendations from and for one
country are hardly transferable to others. But the following seems to be generic
lessons that may have wider relevance.
a) Governments should invest in ex ante policy analysis and evaluation provi-
ding a platform for dialogue, mutual understanding and strategy across mi-
nistries.
b) A strategic government function should be implemented that transcends
tendencies to short-term, distributive co-ordination and ensures a more
dynamic, long term resource allocation to areas that have an investment
nature.
c) Monitoring and learning mechanisms should be given attention to sustain
emergent, de-centralised and adaptive policy making.
d) Explicit identification and formulation of sector policies’ objectives and
instruments to help integrate policy across ministerial sector and reduce
overlap, inconsistencies and complexity.
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Marit Halleraker, secretary for the Standing Committee of Trade and Industrial
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Svein Erik Høst, Research Council of Norway
Carl Huitfeldt, Ministry of Trade and Industry
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Affairs
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Annex 3: Innovation policy measures 2002: 
Complete list
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
1 TaxFIND 2002-
indefinite
750 mill 91 mill SkatteFunn is a measure that gives SMEs tax allowances for invest-
ments in R&D. 18 % (or 20 % in the case of SMEs) of expenses for 
R&D projects may be deducted. The basis for deduction is R&D ex-
penses of up to NOK 4 mill (approximately € 530 000) for internal 
projects, and another NOK 4 mill for co-operative projects (or NOK 
8 mill for co-operative projects alone). The R&D projects should aim 
at generating new knowledge, information or experience which is of 
value to the development of new products, services or production 
processes.
Company system
2 The seed capi-
tal funds
1997-
indefinite
720 mill* 87 mill* Company system
3 User driven 
programmes
Start date 
varies – 
no definite 
ending
App. 
650 mill
App. 7
8,8 mill
The public ‘user driven’ R&D programmes are based on the premise 
that enterprises wishing to take part in publicly funded R&D pro-
grammes should have a decisive influence on the direction, control, 
management and implementation of the relevant programmes and 
projects.
Company system 
Education/research 
system
4 Centres 
of excellence
2001–2011 155 mill 18,8 mill The instrument Centres of Excellence is to stimulate Norwegian re-
search environments to establish centres dedicated to long-term, ba-
sic research at a high international level to raise the quality of 
Norwegian research.
Education/research 
system
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5 The IFU/OFU 
programme
1994-
indefinite
112 mill 13,6 mill The main objective of the IFU programme is to increase the co-oper-
ation between SMEs and larger firms. An IFU-contract is an agre-
ement between two companies, aimed at developing a product or a 
process needed by one of the companies (the customer). One of the 
two should be an SME. The State will support the endeavour financi-
ally. In the OFU-programme the customer is a public institution.
Company system
6 Programme for 
competence de-
velopment
2000–2003 
(may be con-
tinued)
100 mill 12,1 mill The Ministry of Education and Research has established a program-
me for competence development that is to contribute to innovation in 
the market for life long learning. Companies, municipalities, know-
ledge institutions, labour organisations and others may initiate pro-
jects under this programme.
Company system
Education/research 
system
7 Innovation sc-
heme
Includes se-
veral schemes 
with varying 
start dates – 
ending not 
decided
89 mill 10,8 mill Company system
8 The entrepre-
neurship grant/
the business es-
tablishment 
grant
1989-
indefinite
84,2 mill 10,2 mill The entrepreneurship grant is a scheme for business entrepreneurs in 
all parts of Norway, but with a particular emphasis on entrepreneurs 
in cantonal Norway. The main aim of the scheme is to stimulate to in-
creased business establishment, to create durable and profitable jobs 
for both women and men. 
Company system
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
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9 FORNY 1994–2010 59 mill 7,2 mill The FORNY programme is to support the process for wealth creation 
by improving the ability to commercialise research-based business 
concepts or ideas conceived at universities, colleges and research in-
stitutes, professionalize the process of commercialisation; turn the 
commercialisation of research-based business concepts into a stra-
tegic area of activity and set up a permanent service of commerciali-
sation of research-based business concepts through the establishment 
of a company that can deal with all aspects of the commercialisation 
process.
Company system
Education/research 
system
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
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10 MOBI
Consists of 
three sub-pro-
grammes:
TEFT
ARENA
nHS
2002–2009
TEFT: 
1994–2003
ARENA: 
2001–2005
nHS: 
2002–2004
52,1 mill
TEFT: 
20,8 mill
ARENA: 
2,3 mill
nHS: 
28,9 mill
6,3 mill
TEFT: 
2,5 mill
ARENA: 
0,3 mill
nHS: 
3,5 mill
MOBI (Mobilisation for R&D related innovation) is an ‘umbrella’ 
programme covering several smaller programmes. Its main goal is to 
promote learning, innovation and value creation in companies with 
little experience with R&D. In general this means SMEs. In many of 
these companies there are barriers to innovation, e.g. high risk asso-
ciated with innovation activities, lack of relevant expertise and of 
knowledge of how to acquire such expertise, and lack of capital. MO-
BI’s ambition is to reduce the number and impact of such barriers. 
The programme also aims at increasing the companies’ R&D based 
innovation efforts by stimulating long term co-operation with other 
companies, R&D environments and actors from innovation policy 
institutions, particularly on a regional basis.
MOBI is to continue and develop the activities of the BRO Program-
me, and covers the following four sub programmes:Industry oriented 
focus on colleges (nHS, Næringsrettet høgskolesatsing) – the objective 
of which is to establish competence increasing co-operation between 
companies and public university collegesSME Colleges – which aims 
at strengthening the position of university colleges in regional inno-
vationTEFT – which aims at promoting the transfer of technology 
from research institutes to SMEsARENA – Regional innovation pilots 
– the goal of which is to contribute to the development of regional in-
novation systems and industrial clusters
In addition to stimulating the innovation efforts of firms, MOBI’s 
ambition is to increase industry oriented research within R&D envi-
ronments and to improve the institutional framework for innovation. 
The programme will also function as a ‘laboratory’ for the develop-
ment of innovation policy measures, where existing measures are to 
be improved and new measures developed and tested. 
Company system
Education/research 
system
Political system
TEFT: 
Company system
Education/research 
system
ARENA: 
Company system
Education/research 
system
Political system 
HS: 
Company system
Education/research 
system
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
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11 FRAM 1992–2005 
(may be con-
tinued)
40 mill 4,9 mill FRAM supports basic learning within SMEs, particularly in the field 
of leadership and the building of company strategies, the goal being 
to make the companies more profitable.
Company system
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
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12 KUNI 2002–2007 35 mill 4,2 mill KUNI is a research programme which aims at strengthening the theoreti-
cal and empirical knowledge base for industrial innovation policies. The 
programme wishes to contribute to the development of a clearer appreci-
ation of the factors contributing to value creation ; a better decision basis 
for industrial policies at both national and regional level ; and prominent 
research environments that can contribute to the international knowledge 
development in the field.
KUNI focuses on two areas of research: (1) Innovation policy and value 
creation in an open economy; and (2) The role of knowledge development 
in innovation. Within the first area, there is need for more knowledge abo-
ut the factors influencing innovation ; the factors prompting commercial 
exploitation of innovations ; the areas in which returns on innovation dif-
fer significantly between industry and society at large ; the effect of innova-
tion on firm organization ; clusters and cluster formation ; the factors that 
promote and restrain innovation ; the relative importance of selective and 
general measures in innovation policy and regional policy ; the relative im-
portance of market power and competition in promoting innovation based 
industrial development ; and the relationships between ownership and in-
novation. Important issues within the second area of research are the value 
creation potential in new forms of knowledge and new combinations of 
knowledge; the facilitation of systematic knowledge development; and the 
exploitation of the possibilities offered by ICT.
The programme encourages research environments to develop projects 
within the two areas of research. The programme gives priority to a small 
number of large projects in order to secure quality through concentration 
and long term activity. Some small projects will be included, however, to 
ensure flexibility.
The results of the programme are to be communicated continuously 
through seminars, conferences, the internet, mass media and scientific 
journals.
Education/research 
system
Political system
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
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13 BIT 1989-
ending not 
decided
34,1 mill 4,1 mill The BIT Programme is to improve the profitability and competitive 
ability of firms by developing common ICT solutions adapted to spe-
cific sectors of industry.
Company system
14 Industrial 
gardens
1999-ending 
not decided
30,6 mill 3,7 mill The objective of the industrial garden programme is to stimulate va-
lue creation in the regions by creating regional clusters of SMEs 
which offer attractive work opportunities for highly educated per-
sons.
An industrial garden is a group of knowledge intensive firms gathered 
under one roof. The idea is, that by sharing premises the firms consti-
tute a professional and social environment which stimulates co-oper-
ation, exchange of knowledge, and mutual skills upgrading. The 
industrial garden environment is to stimulate the starting up of deve-
lopment activities – either within the single firm or in co-operation 
between the firms. In addition, the arrangement gives the participa-
ting firms the opportunity of establishing a cost saving common 
technical infrastructure.
Each industrial garden is connected to the other industrial gardens – 
i.a. through a common web-site and seminars – and should also be 
linked to wider industrial and competence networks.
As of today, there are 30 industrial gardens in Norway. Most of them 
are specialized within the fields of data processing, business services, 
trade and health and social services.
Company system
15 The NT 
programme
1987–2004 
(may be con-
tinued)
24 mill 2,9 mill The programme gives support to innovation in Northern Norway, by 
providing capital and advice and by developing networks of compa-
nies and knowledge institutions.
Company system 
Education/research 
system
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
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16 Value creation 
2010
2001–2010 21,3 mill 2,6 mill The main goal of the Value creation 2010 programme is to promote 
in-firm and network based innovation, particularly at the regional le-
vel. On the one hand the programme aims at stimulating broad em-
ployee participation and co-operation with researchers within single 
firms. On the other hand networks – or development coalitions – of 
firms, research institutions and actors from innovation policy institu-
tions are to be established. In addition the ambitions are to increase 
scientific knowledge about development and innovation processes 
and to improve the effects of innovation policy instruments.
Company system
Education/research 
system
Political system
17 Programme 
for incubator 
activities
2000–2007 20,5 mill 2,5 mill The objective of the programme for incubator activities is to stimulate 
the establishment of new firms with growth potential, and thereby to 
contribute to the development of strong regional and local environ-
ments for value creation.
An incubator is an environment for the development of firms in the 
start-up phase. The incubator is located in an established centre of 
competence, and offers the firms physical premises and a technical 
infrastructure, advice and guidance on all matters concerning the 
start-up, and links to wider networks of competence and services, 
such as research and financial institutions.
Any innovation oriented organizations, such as science parks, private 
firms, and knowledge intensive public enterprises (i.e. hospitals), can 
be hosts for an incubator.
The incubators are open to firms who have a considerable growth po-
tential, and who are in an early phase when support is crucial and the 
activity is connected with a high risk. The firms are to leave the incu-
bator as soon as they have become well established and economically 
viable.
Company system
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
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18 International 
technology co-
operation
1999-ending 
not decided
20 mill 2,4 mill The objective of this national scheme is to strengthen the inter-
national competitiveness of Norwegian firms, by stimulating technol-
ogy transfer from abroad; mapping the marketing possibilities for 
technology developed in Norway; and establishing networks and alli-
ances between Norwegian and foreign firms. The target groups are 
various public institutions, universities and other research institu-
tions, as well as firms.
Company system
Education/research 
system
19 Incubator grant 2001-ending 
not decided
19 mill 2,3 mill The aim of the incubator grant is to stimulate to increased establish-
ment of competitive, future-oriented and innovative businesses con-
tributing to innovation and business renewal in general. The 
incubator grant is a scheme for entrepreneurs located in an incubator. 
The grant is designated for start-ups with a high knowledge and tech-
nology level.
Company system
20 The entrepre-
neurship pro-
gramme
2002 – 
ending not 
decided
12 mill 1,5 mill The programme aims at helping knowledge intensive high tech SMEs 
commercialize their products and introduce them in international 
markets. The programme offers assistance in the fields of strategy, 
networking and marketing in the initial phase of commercialization 
and internationalization.
Company system
21 Women in 
focus
2000-
indefinite
12 mill 1,5 mill The goal of the measure is to increase the share of women in boards 
and in the management of SMEs, as well as to increase the share of 
women establishing their own businesses. The project will make use 
of women’s competences and experiences, especially in areas in need 
of change and innovation. 
Company system
Education/research 
system
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
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22 Programme for 
Entrepreneurs-
hip and Inno-
vation in 
Norway 
2001–2005 8 mill 1 mill Programme for Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Norway (Pro-
gram for entreprenørskap og nyskaping i Norge) was initiated by the 
organization Young Entrepreneurship. The programme is to develop 
methods, material and networks for the establishment of closer links 
between educational institutions and industry and the promotion of 
entrepreneurship in education on all levels. The programme will anc-
hor a nation wide permanent institution which is to develop and im-
plement models and methods for entrepreneurship in education and 
training in schools, colleges and universitites
Company system
23 Network 
credit/network 
bank
1992-
indefinite
7,3 mill 0,9 mill The goal of the measure is to stimulate increased entrepreneurship to 
create new and profitable workplaces for entrepreneurs with limited 
capital needs. The measure is in principle sex neutral, but has until 
now mostly been used by women.
The measure was first put into action by the women’s committee of 
the fishing industry in Norway inspired by network banks in Bangla-
desh.
Company system
24 The Norwegian 
school of entre-
preneurship
1999-ending 
not decided
5,8 mill 
(2003) **
0,7 mill 
(2003) **
The objective of the school is to increase value generation from re-
search based start-ups at institutions of higher learning. The school 
offers an entrepreneurship education programme aimed at creating a 
culture where entrepreneurship is applauded.
Company system
Education/research 
system
25 Venture cup 2000–2004 3 mill 0,4 mill Venture cup is a competition that rewards good business plans. Company system
Education/research 
system 
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
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* The number denotes the total available capital base
**Annual budget for 2002 is not available
***Annual budget for 2002 is not available
26 The icebrea-
king measure
1998-
not decided
1 mill 0,1 mill The goal of the measure is to contribute to increased use of design as 
a competitive force in Norwegian business life. The goal of the pro-
gramme is increased understanding of the significance of design, and 
coordinate initiatives to increase the use of design in Norwegian bu-
sinesses.
Company system
27 Dynamic local 
schools
750 000 92 500 The scheme is to stimulate entrepreneurship in order to establish new 
jobs. The programme0 is based on cooperation between schools, local 
authorities and local businesses and aims at teaching kids and young 
people industrial creativity and entrepreneurship.
Company system 
28 Start Norway 150 000 
(2003)***
18 
191(2003) 
***
The organisation gathers students for meetings where they can discuss 
entrepreneurship and get relevant information. The main aim of the or-
ganisation is to motivate students to innovation and renewal activities.
Company system
Title Period Annual 
budget 
2002 
(NOK)
Annual 
budget 
2002 (€)
Description MONIT 
classification
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